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I. INTRODUCTION
This article chronicles the negotiations among the states of the
Colorado River Basin ("Basin"), the federal government, and various
water agencies within Southern California concerning California's
overuse of water allocated to it by law from the Colorado River. The
negotiations began in 1991, at a time when California was dealing with
the effects of a multiple year drought, and sought the continued
availability of surplus Colorado River water. Many thought the
negotiations had culminated in 2001 when the Department of the
Interior ("DOI") adopted Interim Surplus Guidelines ("Guidelines").
The Guidelines established operating rules for Lower Colorado River
reservoirs for a fifteen-year period, and gave California some assurance
of continued surplus water, but only if it timely put into effect the
California Plan to reduce its dependence on surplus Colorado River
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water.' However, adoption of the Guidelines did not end the debate, it
only set the stage for California agencies and the DOI to attempt to
solve the tough environmental, socioeconomic, and political issues
inherent in implementing the California Plan.
Unfortunately, after more than ten years of negotiations, the
California agencies were unable to finalize the agreements necessary to
effectuate the California Plan. The negotiations continue, and their
success or failure will likely set the tone of the relationship of the
Basin's states and water agencies for years to come. Should the
California Plan fail, the relationship could be characterized by
adversarial politics and divisive litigation. Should the California Plan
succeed, the relationship of the federal government, the states and
water users in the Basin could be characterized, as has been the hope
of the Basin States, by good faith working relationships, innovation,
and problem solving in the best interests of the overall management of
the Colorado River. The importance of a productive working
relationship among the Basin States is critical, not just in resolving
California's water use problems. Such a relationship also is critical to
addressing the pressing issues on the Colorado River in the next
several decades, including Nevada's increasing need for water in
excess of its apportionment, and Mexico's demands for additional
water over and above its Treaty entitlement.
This article consists of two parts. Part I reviewed the development
of the Law of the Colorado River2 ("Law of the River") from an Upper
Basin perspective.
It focused on the motivations of the Upper
Division States, and Colorado in particular, in pressing for the
Colorado River Compact ("Compact") and later federal laws. These
motivations were premised on key themes or principles that remain
relevant today - and which have guided the positions of Colorado and
the other Upper Basin States in their negotiations with California.
Through those negotiations, the Upper Basin States have attempted to
maintain a foundation of security for their right to develop and use
water under the terms of the Compact as economic need dictates. As
its most important principle in protecting that right, the Upper Basin
has insisted that the California issue be resolved within the Lower
1. The California Plan, described in this article, refers to the complex series of
agreements and approvals necessary for California agencies to implement water
conservation measures and transfers from agricultural to municipal agencies so as to
reduce California's overall use of Colorado River water to its basic apportionment of
4.4 million acre-feet of water per year.
2. The "Law of the River" refers to a body of law affecting the interstate and
international use, management, and allocation of water in the Colorado River System,
including the 1922 Colorado River Compact, the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, several United States Supreme Court decisions
and the Decree in Arizona v. California,376 U.S. 340 (1964), and a host of federal laws
and administrative regulations.
3. See generallyJames S. Lochhead, An UpperBasin Perspective on California'sClaims to
Water From the ColoradoRiver- Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 290
(2001) [hereinafter Part1].
4. Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-61-101 to -104 (2002).
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Basin, in a manner consistent with the Law of the River.
An understanding of the historical development of the Law of the
River, as summarized in Part I of this article, is also important
background to the chronology of the California negotiations that have
occurred since 1991. The Law of the River establishes: (1) the legal
and institutional foundation for the interstate and international
management and allocation of the waters of the Basin; (2) the
underpinnings of relationships between the states, Indian tribes and
the federal government; and (3) the framework within which the
complex state/federal/tribal/water agency negotiations have taken
place.
Part II relates the major events and negotiations leading to the
adoption of the California Plan and the Guidelines, and the
subsequent collapse of the California Plan and suspension of the
Guidelines. As one might imagine, these events did not transpire in a
linear fashion. Politics, economic issues, technical input, changes in
personnel, and other factors influenced them. This article will attempt
to describe those events, and their effect on the changing courses,
ebbs, and flows of the states', the federal government's, and California
agencies' efforts to reach agreement on the outstanding issues before
them.
It should be noted at the outset, this article is not written by a
disinterested observer. The author has been continuously and directly
involved since the beginning of the negotiations, and has developed
strategy and policy on the matters discussed herein on behalf of the
state of Colorado, and subsequently on behalf of the major
municipalities and water districts in Colorado.5 The reader should
recognize this perspective and the inherent bias that may be so
reflected.
The progress and success of the efforts described in this article is
the product of incredible hard work, dedication, and good faith on the
part of the politicians, managers, board members and lawyers of the
federal agencies, states, and water agencies involved in these
negotiations. At the risk of failing to mention many of the fine people
with whom the author has worked, some of the major contributions
were made by Governor Roy Romer, Ken Salazar and Scott Balcomb of
Colorado; Betsy Rieke (later Assistant Secretary for Water and Science
for the Department of the Interior), Rita Pearson Maguire, Herb
Dishlip, and Mike Pearce of Arizona; Jerry Zimmerman, David
Kennedy, Tom Hannigan, Dennis Underwood, Tom Levy, Maureen
Stapleton, and John Carter of California and its water agencies; Pat
Mulroy and Richard Bunker of Nevada; Phil Mutz of New Mexico;
Larry Anderson of Utah; Jeff Fassett, John Shields, and Tom Davidson
of Wyoming; and Wayne Cook, Executive Director of the Upper
Colorado River Basin Commission. Numerous individuals from the
5. The source materials for this article consist primarily of correspondence,
meeting notes and materials, recollections, newspaper articles, government
publications, and other materials that are all on file with the author.
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DOI worked long and hard, and played key roles, in the bit of
Colorado River history outlined in this article. Secretary Bruce
Babbitt, Deputy Secretary David Hayes, and Assistant Secretary Patty
Beneke had intense hands-on involvement in shaping these events.
Bob Snow of the Department's Solicitor's office, and Bob Johnson,
Regional Director of the Lower Colorado Region, played critical roles.
Secretary Gale Norton and Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley
continued the initiatives of the prior administration and have provided
strong leadership on behalf of the DOI in the new "era of limits" on
the Colorado River.
II. THE SITUATION IN 1990 AND THE START OF THE
INTERSTATE DISCUSSIONS ON CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA
WATER SUPPLY ISSUES
The historical interests of the Upper Basin States in security of
supply and interstate allocations began to be tested in 1990, as the
Basin States and the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") prepared the
Annual Operating Plan ("AOP") for operation of federal Colorado
River system reservoirs.6 At that time, a number of factors converged
to challenge the legal and policy underpinnings of the Law of the
River. The states and federal government faced the following issues:
1. The construction of the Central Arizona Project ("CAP") was
nearing completion, water deliveries had commenced, and demand
for CAP water was projected to increase Arizona total consumptive
water use from the Colorado River mainstem to a level close to
Arizona's basic apportionment of 2.8 million acre-feet per year.'
2. Growth and development in southern Nevada caused the
cessation of "commitments to serve" water to new municipal growth in
the Las Vegas area. Nevada at that time expected to exceed its basic
apportionment of 300,000 acre-feet per year as early as 2002.8
3. For several years, California's consumption of Colorado River
water exceeded the state's basic apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet
per year.9 However, to this point, California's excess use had not been
a problem; total beneficial consumptive uses of water from the
Colorado River mainstem in the Lower Division States"° had not
6. SeePartI,supra note 3, at 314.
7. Id. at 291-92 n.4.
8. Gerald A. Lopez, Deputy Attorney Gen. for Nev., Speech at the American
Society for Public Administration 3 (Sept. 10, 1991).

9. In 1981, California used 4.839 million acre-feet of Colorado River water.
BuREAu OF RECLAMATION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

COLORADO

RIVER

SYSTEM

CONSUMPTIVE USES AND LOSES REPORT 1981-1985, at iv (1991). By 1991, California's use

of Colorado River water had increased to 5.163 million acre-feet.

BuREAu

OF

RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM CONSUMPTIVE USES

AND LOSSES REPORT 1986-1990, at iv (1998).

10. The "Lower Division States" are defined as "the States of Arizona, California,
and Nevada." Colorado River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101, art. II(d)
(2002).
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exceeded the total amount of consumptive use allowable in "normal"
years of 7.5 million acre-feet." Thus, California users had, to this
point, been able to use the apportioned but unused water of Arizona
and Nevada. However, projected uses in the Lower Basin for 1991
were about 7.8 million acre-feet, necessitating a decision by the
Secretary of the Interior under the Decree in Arizona v. California2 and
the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River
Reservoirs" ("Operating Criteria") as to whether to declare a surplus
condition and allow for all uses,
or to declare a normal condition and
14
limit water use in California.
4. The Colorado River Aqueduct operated by the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California ("MWD") for the municipal
water delivery to the California Coastal Plain, has a capacity of about
1.3 million acre-feet per year. 5 Of California's basic apportionment of
4.4 million acre-feet per year, the first 3.85 million acre-feet is
allocated, under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement, for use by irrigation
districts in the Imperial, Coachella, and Palo Verde Valleys. The next
550,000 acre-feet are allocated for use by MWD. MWD then has the
next priority for the water use in California over 4.4 million acre-feet,
which totals 0.662 million acre-feet. 6 Therefore, roughly one-half of
MWD's Colorado River supply exceeds California's basic
apportionment. Because of California's ability to use the unused
apportionments of Arizona and Nevada, MWD, until 1991, diverted
nearly the full capacity of its aqueduct. Any reduction in California's
ability to use water, however, would directly reduce the supply of water
to MWD - the entity most in need of a full and secure supply.
5. Recognizing the need to firm up its supply, in 1988 MWD and
the Imperial Irrigation District ("ID") negotiated an agreement to
transfer conserved water from IID to MWD. One of the primary
factors precipitating the shift from agricultural to urban uses in
California involved legal action commenced in 1980 by the California
Department of Water Resources and the State Water Resources
Control Board ("SWRCB") to enjoin wasteful irrigation practices by
IID."7 The SWRCB had ordered IID to undertake various measures to
11. Under the Criteriafor CoordinatedLong-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs
("Operating Criteria"), the Secretary determines each year in the AOP whether
"surplus," "normal" or "shortage" conditions exist with respect to the release of water
from Lake Mead for use in the Lower Division States. See Part I, supra note 3, at 291-92
n.4.
12. 376 U.S. 340, 342 (1964).
13. Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs,
35 Fed. Reg. 8951, 8951-52 (June 10, 1970).
14. Projected water uses as of July 1990 were 2.435 million acre-feet in Arizona,
5.194 million acre-feet in California, and 175,000 acre-feet in Nevada, totaling 7.804
million acre-feet. 1990 PROJECrED LOWER BASIN STATES WATER USE.
15. PLANNING & MGMT. CONSULTANTS, LTD., THE REGIONAL URBAN WATER
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

58 (1990) [hereinafter MVJD PLAN].
16. Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
17. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254
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stop the loss of water from sources such as canal spill, resulting in
losses of 53,000 to 135,000 acre-feet per year, and excessive tailwater,
resulting in losses of 312,000 to 559,000 acre-feet per year. 8 Under the
IID/MWD transfer agreement, MWD agreed to fund the necessary
water conservation improvements in the IID system.
These
improvements included lining existing canals, constructing local
reservoirs and spill interceptor canals, installing non-leak gates and
automation equipment, and instituting distribution system and onfarm management activities. Upon the completion of these measures,
IID agreed to reduce its diversions from the Colorado River by an
amount equal to the water saved. In theory, MWD could increase its
firm water supply from the Colorado River by one acre foot for every
acre foot saved, MWD would fund IID's improvements ordered by the
Water Resources Control Board, and no irrigated acreage would be
lost in the Imperial Valley. 9 Although the agreement was expected to
yield a total of 106,110 acre-feet per year upon full implementation,"' it
did not cover all of the possible areas of conserved water. Therefore,
MWD and IID began negotiations on a Phase II agreement, which
would save an additional 150,000 acre-feet per year." The parties
contemplated other measures to allow MWD greater firm yield within
California's basic apportionment. For example, MWD estimated that
All-American Canal and Coachella Branch lining would yield 100,000
acre-feet per year, and land-fallowing programs would result in
additional yield.22
6. California had experienced a five-year period of severe
drought.23 Moreover, the years 1988-90 were the driest three-year
period of record in the Upper Colorado River Basin. Thus, Colorado
River system reservoirs were in a declining storage condition,
increasing the sensitivity2of the other Basin States to more water being
withdrawn from storage. 4
7. The population of the service area of MWD in 1990 was about
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter lID II]; Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
18. lID II, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
19. However, for MWD to realize these benefits, both parties needed agreement
from the Coachella Valley Water District, as entitled to water under the third priority.
See Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
20. MWD PLAN, supra note 15, at 58.

21.

Id. at 62.

22. Id. at 62-63. In 1992, MWD entered into a pilot land fallowing program with
the Palo Verde Irrigation District. This agreement demonstrated the feasibility of land
fallowing programs in California.
23. In early 1991, before the 1991 "March Miracle" rains which put the drought on
temporary hold, there had been no significant precipitation since November of 1990.
California officials estimated that deliveries to the MWD through the State Water
Project would be only fifty percent of a requested order of 1.645 million acre-feet.
Agricultural water users received sixty-five percent cutbacks from State Water Project
deliveries. Memorandum from Clint Stevens, Chief Eng'r, Upper Colo. Water
Comm'n, to Wayne Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. Water Comm'n (Jan. 3, 1991).
24, In July 1990, storage levels in Upper Basin reservoirs were between forty-five
and sixty-four percent of normal. Reservoir Status as ofJuly 23, 1990.
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fifteen million people, and was projected to increase to 18.2 million
people by the year 2010, translating to an increased water demand of
about one million acre-feet by the year 2010.25 MWD projected
shortfalls in its water supply by the year 2010 of between 0.74 and 1.71
million acre-feet. 2 As a result, MWD perceived an urgent need to
"firm up" the yield of MWD's Colorado River water supply so as to
assure its ability to divert the full capacity of its Colorado River
Aqueduct.
8. In contrast to the Lower Basin situation, the Upper Division
States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming" had yet to
reach development of their entitlements to consumptive use of the
Colorado River System under the Compact, and were not expected to
reach full development for many years.
With the above circumstances in play, the draft AOP for 1991, for
the first time since the adoption of the Operating Criteria in 1970,20
proposed that the Secretary issue a normal declaration, thus limitin
deliveries to California water users to 4.4 million acre-feet per year.
Wanting to maintain deliveries of 5.1 million acre-feet per year, the
state of California took the position that the 1991 AOP should be
premised on a surplus declaration, allowing for a full water supply to
all water users in California, particularly MWD.31 California argued
that the amount of water remaining in storage in the Colorado River
system, together with the fact that the Upper Basin did not plan on
developing its entitlement for many years, was sufficient to meet
California's needs without significant adverse risk to the water supplies
of other Basin States. California also complained that the Secretary, in
proposing to issue a normal declaration involving application of the
25. MWD PLAN, supra note 15, at 11, 36.
26. Id. at 60 tbl.III-6.
27. Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-62-101, art. II(c) (2002).
28. At the time, provisional water consumption estimates for the Upper Division
States totaled about 3.7 million acre-feet. UPPER COLO. RIVER COMM'N, UPPER
COLORADO RIVER STATES' DEPLETION SCHEDULE (1994). When combined with the

estimated reservoir evaporation losses in the Upper Basin, total consumption in the
Upper Basin were at that time about 4.2 million acre-feet per year. Id. This compares
with the Bureau's estimate (with which the Upper Division States do not agree), of a
firm developable yield in the Upper Basin of 6.0 million acre-feet per year. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, HYDROLOGIC DETERMINATION, WATER
AVAILABILITY FROM NAVAJO RESERVOIR AND THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN FOR USE IN

NEW MEXICO (1987).

29. Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs,
35 Fed. Reg. 8951, 8951-52 (June 10, 1970).
30. See PartI, supranote 3, at 313-316.
31. California's position was that the "draft plan's limitation against meeting all
contracts with the United States and other California rights.., does not have a
technical or legal basis." Position paper of the Colorado River Bd. of California; Letter
from Carl Boronkay, Gen. Manager of Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., to Edward M.
Hallenbeck, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colo. Region (July 13, 1990);
RESOLUTION OF THE COLORADO RIVER BOARD OF CALIFORNIA REGARDING ADOPTION OF
THE 1991 ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN FOR THE COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS (Aug.

8, 1990).
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Operating Criteria, based his proposed decision on politics, rather
than technical criteria.
The Central Arizona Water Conservancy District ("CAWCD"), CAP
operator, along with the states of Arizona and Nevada, adamantly
opposed California's request. The CAWCD asserted that continuing to
meet all of California's demands with unused Arizona supply increased
the risk of long term shortage to Arizona (and in particular to the
CAP).'2 However, Bureau projections showed little, if any, risk of
future shortages to the other states if California's water needs were
met." Arizona responded that it was entitled to rely not only on not
increasing its risk of shortage, but also on the availability future
surpluses as part of the water supply for the CAP.3' Additionally, the
Upper Colorado River Commission opposed a surplus declaration,
asserting that a surplus declaration in 1991 would increase future risks
of shortages in the Upper Basin.35
With the Basin States deadlocked, the Bureau tentatively
recommended to the Secretary that he declare a normal condition and
limit California's water use, since there was "no clear basis in the
existing legal and institutional framework of the Colorado River to
allow consumptive uses in the Lower Basin greater than 7,500,000 acrefeet without the consensus of all seven Basin States." 6 However, the
Bureau also proposed that its recommendation to the Secretary
contain the separate views of the states, and given the severe drought
in California it was clear that California would lobby the Secretary
heavily to declare a surplus condition. The Basin States other than
California 7 thus faced the risk the Secretary would disagree with the
Bureau's recommendation. In the event of such a disagreement, the
states would have to decide whether to acquiesce in the decision, or
litigate the issue, asserting the Secretary was obligated under the
Operating Criteria to declare a normal condition on the Colorado
River. The prospects for success in such a lawsuit were doubtful. The
states, especially in the Upper Basin, would have difficulty proving
injury, because system reservoirs were relatively full. Moreover, the
Upper Basin States did not project full development of their compact

32. Letter from Thomas C. Clark, Gen. Manager of Cent. Ariz. Water Conservancy
Dist., to Edward M. Hallenbeck, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colo.
Region (June 18, 1990).
33. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, 1991 Annual Operating Plan Meeting, Las
Vegas, Nev., at 2 (Aug. 9, 1990).
34. Id. at 4. When the Central Arizona Project was authorized, the assumptions of
its water supply and financial feasibility were based on projections the Upper Basin
would not develop its Compact entitlement for several decades, thus allowing surplus
system water to be available to the CAP for continued agricultural diversions until
increasing urbanization and a shift of water from agricultural to urban use would allow
for a decreased water supply.
35. Letter from Jack Ross, Chairman of the Upper Colo. River Comm'n, to Roland
G. Robison & Edward M. Hallenbeck, Bureau of Reclamation 1-3 (Aug. 14, 1990).
36. Draft Memorandum from Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, to the Secretary,
U.S. Dep't of Interior 2 (Aug. 21, 1990).
37. Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.
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entitlement for many decades.
In view of this risk, and the severe drought conditions in
California, representatives of the Basin States met in San Diego in
August of 1990 to discuss a potential accommodation that would
provide California some relief, while creating a precedent that
California would not be entitled to endless surpluses. They discussed
several options, including a review of the Annual Operating Plan based
on snowpack conditions, and methods for California to assume risks of
shortages in the event of continued drought conditions. 38 The state
representatives adopted a tentative plan to allow California to receive
an additional 400,000 acre-feet of water in 1991. If runoff conditions
in subsequent years were not "above normal," California would be
required to pay this water back to the system by foregoing deliveries in
those years. If runoff conditions in subsequent years were "above
normal," California would be relieved of the payback obligation. 39 The
state representatives did not know it at the time, but this San Diego
meeting on a proposed system of credits and payback would launch
over ten years of meetings and negotiations between the states, the
DOI, and California water agencies, eventually cumulating in the
adoption of the Guidelines and the California Plan.
The states continued negotiations among themselves and also with
the Bureau as to the language of a memorandum from the
Commissioner of Reclamation to the Secretary of the Interior
outlining the Bureau's recommendation for an AOP. After several
drafts, California retreated from its initial insistence on a normal
declaration, and the states reached agreement on a recommendation
for a normal declaration.
To accommodate California, the
memorandum also referenced the ongoing discussions between the
Basin States toward a mechanism for allowing California to divert an
additional 400,000 acre-feet of water in 1991, and the possibility the
AOP would be re-opened in 1991 to allow for this additional use.
The 1991 AOP issued by the Secretary made a normal declaration,
providing that releases of water from Hoover Dam would be made to
satisfy up to 7.5 million acre-feet of consumptive use in the Lower
Basin in 1991.4' However, the AOP also provided that California would
be able to utilize the apportioned but unused water from Arizona and
Nevada. 2

38. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Colo. Water Conservation Bd.
Members 4 (Sept. 4,1990).
39. Memorandum from Clint Stevens, Chief Eng'r, Upper Colo. River Comm'n, to
Upper Colo. River Comm'rs & Eugene I. Jencsok, Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 2
(Aug. 28, 1990);James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 33.
40. Memorandum from Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, to the Secretary, U.S.
Dep't of Interior 1-3 (Sept. 28, 1990).
41. BUREAu OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OPERATION OF THE COLORADO
RIVERBASIN 1990, PROJEcTED OPERAIONS 1991, 20THANNUALREPORT4 (Jan. 1991).

42. Under the Decree in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), the Secretary
may make unused water in one Lower Division state available for use in another Lower
Division state, on a temporary basis. Part i, supra note 3, at 312.
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Encouraged by the Basin States, other than California, and in
anticipation of the new "era of limits," the Bureau also began a public
discussion of stricter administration and accounting of uses in the
Lower Basin.
These proposed measures included adoption of
regulations for administration of Colorado River entitlements in the
Lower Basin.43 Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, the Bureau
would not follow through on its desire to implement tighter
administration. The issue of administration and overrun accounting
remains of critical importance and significant debate in the Lower
Colorado River basin.
In early 1991, the Basin States continued to discuss a mechanism
by which California could access additional water from Lake Mead.
These discussions began to form the outlines of agreements that
would, ten years later, result in the adoption and anticipated
implementation of the California Plan. The Upper Basin States
suggested they would not oppose the release of up to 400,000 acre-feet
of water from Lake Mead, but stipulated the water be accounted as if it
were still in Lake Mead so as to avoid the potential for equalization
releases from Lake Powell." The proposal asked for California's
commitment to a program to reduce its use of Colorado River water to
4.4 million acre-feet per year within a reasonable time, to commit to
operations within the Law of the River, and not to engage in interbasin water marketing or transfers.5 There was mixed reaction by the
Lower Basin States. In particular, Arizona opposed the idea of credits,
because in its view, by keeping water in the Upper Basin, the Upper
Basin proposal only shifted the risk of shortage to Arizona. 6
However, the Upper Basin was not so interested in the idea of
credits per se, as it was in assuring that Lower Basin water supply issues
be resolved within the Lower Basin, and that the Lower Basin States
would assume any risk of shortage resulting from deliveries of surplus
water. 7 The genesis of the Upper Basin proposal was its historical
concern that California's growing dependence on surplus water would
one day ripen into a legal entitlement. Colorado, in particular, was
also adamantly opposed to inter-basin water marketing or leasing as
antithetical to the perpetual right to develop under the Compact, as
putting Colorado's future economic development up for bid, and as
perpetuating California's dependence on water in excess of its basic
apportionment. 4 Colorado's strategy was to use California's desire for
43. Bob Johnson & Walt Fite, Bureau of Reclamation, Presentation to the Upper
Basin States, Managing the Colorado River in the Lower Basin in an Era of Limits (Jan. 7,

1991).
44.

PartI, supranote 3, at 314.

45. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Meeting of Basin States, Las Vegas, Nev., at
4 (Jan. 16, 1991).
46. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado
and Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. 11 (Jan. 22, 1991).
47. See Letter from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River Comm'n, to
Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal. (Jan. 31, 1991).
48.

See PartI, supra note 3, at 322-29.
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short-term surpluses during the drought to obtain California's
commitment to live permanently within its means, and to implement
that commitment through programs and water transfers within
California. By doing so, Colorado could reduce the threat of interbasin water marketing, and achieve the security of solidifying the
framework of interstate apportionments that are the foundation of the
Law of the River.4
As discussed in Part I of this article, the biggest threat to the Upper
Basin's entitlement was Southern California municipal users'
If California
dependence on surplus Colorado River water.50
agricultural and municipal agencies could be convinced to expand on
the MWD/IID water conservation agreement, and thereby satisfy
MWD's Fifth Priority within an overall California water delivery of 4.4
million acre-feet, that dependence could be eliminated. MWD also
saw the opportunity presented by the Upper Basin proposal, and put
forward its own proposal to engage in a program of increased water
conservation-based transfers from the California agricultural agencies
to MWD, based on the MWD/IID water conservation agreement.
III. THE COLORADO INITIATIVE AND THE 1991 MEETING IN
TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA
As the Basin States continued their discussions with little result, the
drought in California worsened, prompting national attention. In
1991, the Senate Subcommittee on Water, Power, and Offshore
Resources held a hearing on the California drought. In California, the
state developed a water bank to facilitate agriculture to urban water
transfers within the State Water Project.52 MWD imposed watering
restrictions within its service area.53 IID was under increasing pressure
to either cut back on its water use or enter into additional water
conservation and transfer agreements with MWD . In Colorado, the
political pressure to market or lease water increased when Secretary of
the Interior, Manuel Lujan, suggested that Colorado and the other
Upper Basin States "donate" surplus water to California.55 Colorado
Congressman Ben Nighthorse Campbell responded with a letter to
Secretary Lujan offering to work together to transfer water rights
decrees for Congressionally authorized, but unbuilt, projects in the
Upper Basin to instream flows and then lease the water under such
49. Id. at 291-92.
50. See id. at 309.
51. Metropolitan's Planfor More Effective use of California'sColorado River Apportionment
(Jan. 15, 1991).
52. Wilson Unveils Water Transfer Battle Plan, IMPERIAL VALLEYPRESS, Feb. 19, 1991, at
Al.
53. Kathryn Dettman, Water Rationing.MWD OKs 50 Percent Cut for Farmers, IMPERIAL
VALLEY PRESS, Feb. 19, 1991, atA8.
54. P.A. Rice, Concrete Lining of All-American Canal Emotional Issue, IMPERIAL VALLEY
PRESS, Feb. 19,1991, at A5; P.A. Rice, MWD May Get FullRequest, IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS,

Feb. 19, 1991, at Al.
55. Mark Obmascik, Send CaliforniaOur Water?, DENVER POST, Feb. 13, 1991, at 1A.
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decrees to California."
Congressman Campbell proposed that
payments from the lease would be used to build water projects in
Colorado. 57
The pressure on the Upper Basin was more than political.
Secretary Lujan's comment carried with it the subtle implication that if
the Upper Basin States did not reach some accommodation with
California, there was a possibility the Secretary could - in the future accept California's arguments that additional surpluses would not
create increased risk of shortages to the other states, and declare
surplus conditions in the Lower Basin over the other states' objections.
This would force the states either to accept the delivery to California of
additional water, or sue to overturn the Secretary's determination.
With increasing pressure to do something before Congress or the
federal government acted, and out of frustration at the lack of
definitive progress in the interstate discussions on the mechanism for
providing additional Colorado River water to California, Governor Roy
Romer of Colorado sent a letter to Governor Pete Wilson of California5
that sent shockwaves through the Colorado River water community.
Governor Romer offered to "move quickly to work with the River Basin
states and the United States to reach accommodations to assure that
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California receives a full
supply of Colorado River water this year."59 He placed four conditions
on his offer: (1) that the discussions occur on a state-to-state basis, thus
repudiating private water marketing schemes; (2) that any agreement
be made and implemented within the current framework of the Law of
the River; (3) that the discussions identify how California would
reduce its dependence on surplus water; and (4) that other issues of
interest to the Upper Basin also be discussed, such as environmental
issues, river operations and continued development.0 The Governor's
proposal was intended to: (1) move the interstate discussions off "dead
center;" (2) firmly establish Colorado's opposition to inter-basin water
marketing; (3) maintain state control over discussions relative to
Colorado River operations (as opposed to federal intervention or
private water marketing schemes); (4) promote Colorado's desire to
affirm interstate allocations, and; (5) achieve a reduction in California
water use to its basic apportionment through internal California
programs.

56. Press Release, Ben Nighthorse Campbell, United States Representative, Colo.
(Feb. 15, 1991) (quoting Letter from Ben Nighthorse Campbell, United States

Representative, Colo., to Manuel Lujan, Sec'y of the Interior).
57. Id.

58. Letter from Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, to Pete Wilson, Governor of
California (Feb. 21, 1991); Statement, Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, California's

Request for Colorado River Water (Feb. 21, 1991); Letter from Roy Romer, Governor
of Colorado, to Members of the Colorado General Assembly (Feb. 25, 1991).
59.

Letter from Roy Romer to Pete Wilson, supra note 58, at 1.

60. Id. at 1-2.
61. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Members of the Colo. Water
Conservation Bd. (Feb. 24, 1991).
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In the meantime, the Basin States and the Bureau continued to
discuss 1991 Colorado River operations, and whether all of California's
needs could be accommodated within a total Lower Basin use of 7.5
million acre-feet through the allocation of unused apportionment
water from Arizona and Nevada. 2 Given the difficulty in predicting
precipitation and water demands in the other states, the amount of
unused water that would be available to California was uncertain.
Therefore, with the support of the other Basin States, the Bureau
began a campaign to bring IID "to the table" to agree to water
conservation and transfers that would, in both the short and longterm, bring California's water use within its apportionment."' Dennis
Underwood,64 United States Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner,
met with the IID Board to urge the Imperial Valley to undertake
voluntary water conservation or "have somebody do it for you."65
Commissioner Underwood then wrote to the governors of the Basin
States, informing them MWD's full delivery requirement would be
honored.66 But, the Bureau would also undertake efforts to keep total
Lower Basin uses below 7.5 million acre-feet, and would require MWD
to pay back to the Colorado 6River
any overuse by the Lower Basin in
7
excess of 7.5 million acre-feet.
Within Colorado, as part of the strategy behind Governor Romer's
initiative, officials privately discussed a negotiating concept that would
later be instituted as part of the Law of the River in the Interim
Surplus Guidelines adopted by Secretary Babbitt in 2001. The concept
was that in exchange for California's commitment to reduce its use of
water in normal years from 5.2 million acre-feet to 4.4 million acre-feet
over fifteen years on a fixed schedule, the other Basin States would
agree not to oppose surplus deliveries of Colorado River water to
California in accordance with that schedule. 8 Part of this strategy was
62. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to David Walker, Deputy Dir., Colo.
Water Conservation Bd. 1-2 (Feb. 28, 1991).
63. Id. at 1.
64. Before his appointment as commissioner of the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, Dennis Underwood was the director of the Colorado River Board of
California. He later became a vice president of MWD, and spearheaded MWD's efforts
to negotiate and implement the California Plan.
65. P.A. Rice, Underwood Requests Huge Water Cuts, IMPERIAL VAL.LEY PRESs, Mar. 3,
1991, at Al.
66. Letter from Dennis B. Underwood, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation, to Pete
Wilson, California Governor 1-2 (Mar. 11, 1991).
67. Id. at 2. The letter would find an echo in 2002. Faced with the prospect that
overuse of water by California agricultural agencies would exceed the quantities
approved in the 2002 AOP, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton wrote to the
Governors a letter amending the AOP, but requiring repayment of any excess water
use. Letter from Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, to Gray Davis, Governor of
California (Nov. 22, 2002), at http://www/usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
2002suppaop.pdf.
68.Memorandum from Eric Kuhn, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., to Roland C.
Fischer, Sec'y, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., David Merritt, Eng'r, Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist, Mike Gross, Eng'r, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist, Ray
Tenney, Eng'r, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist, & Donald Hamburg, Gen.
Counsel, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist 1-3 (Apr. 1, 1991); Memorandum from
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to achieve an actual reduction of water use in California. The other
part of the strategy was for California to explicitly recognize the
limitation on its water use imposed by the Law of the River, and at least
attempt to achieve such a reduction. If the states and the DOI agreed
to the concept, California would be bound not just by its 1929
commitment to limit its use to 4.4 million acre-feet per year, 9 but also
by a defined and enforceable program to reduce its uses to its basic
apportionment over a specific period of time. Therefore, if California
were unsuccessful in its effort to reduce its water use, the limitation
could more easily be imposed upon California by operation of law and,
as importantly, as a matter of politics. The proposal had a further
underlying purpose: providing the Secretary of the Interior with the
non-discretionary obligation to enforce a scheduled reduction in
California's water use, thus eliminating any threat that political or legal
pressure by California would cause the Secretary to declare surpluses
and perpetuate California's overuse of water to the detriment of the
other states. If California failed to adhere to its obligation to reduce
its use, the Secretary would have to enforce that obligation.
On March 11, 1991, Governor Wilson responded to Governor
Romer's letter." Governor Wilson recognized that discussions should
occur at the state level, and offered California's willingness to "fully
discuss the issues raised in your letter, as well as any other of interest to
the Basin [S]tates."71 In response to the letters from Commissioner
Underwood and Governor Wilson, Governor Romer contacted the
governors of all the Basin States, asking each governor to designate a
high-level negotiating team to begin state-to-state discussions.2 A
delegation of Colorado representatives then met with each state
individually. Although the reaction from some of the other states was
guarded
(if not suspicious), the other states did agree to a meeting in
71
June. Colorado presented to the other states an outline of issues for
Eric Kuhn, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., to Jim Lochhead, David Walker, Dir.,

Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Eugene I. Jencsok, Colo. Water Conservation Bd.
(Apr. 19, 1991); Memorandum from Wayne Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River

Comm'n, to Upper Colo. River Comm'rs (May 24, 1991).
69. In 1929, in order to secure the construction of Hoover Dam, the State of
California through its legislature, irrevocably and unconditionally, and as a covenant

for the benefit of the other Basin States, limited its use of Colorado River water to 4.4
million acre-feet per year. Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 16, 48 Cal. Stat. 38, 38-39 (1929).

70. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Roy Romer, Governor of
Colorado (Mar. 11, 1991).

71.

Id. at 1.

72. Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, Statement Regarding the Colorado River 1

(Mar. 19, 1991); Memorandum from Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, to Ken
Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., David Walker, Dir., Colo. Water
Conservation Bd., Jeris Danielson, State Eng'r & Jim Lochhead, Upper Colo. River
Comm'r I (Mar. 20, 1991).
73. See Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., David Walker, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Jeris

Danielson, State Eng'r (May 20, 1991) (discussing meetings with New Mexico and
Utah representatives); See also Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar,
Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., David Walker, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,
& Jeris Danielson, State Eng'r (May 30, 1991) (discussing meetings with Arizona,
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resolution at the June meeting.
Consistent with other
communications from Colorado, the framework proposal was that:
1. California would agree to reduce its use of water from the
Colorado River in normal years to 4.4 million acre-feet over a
reasonable time.
2. During this time, the Secretary of the Interior would deliver
Colorado River water to the full capacity of MWD's aqueduct.
3. The states would explore the concept of consideration and
mitigation of impacts associated with MWD's continued use of water
during the specified period.
4. Beneficial consumptive use in the Upper Basin would not be
curtailed.
5. The Basin States would confirm the respective entitlements to
use water under the Law of the River and agree not to deal with private
interests in the interstate marketing of water.74
The meeting of the state representatives, together with a number
of the California water agencies, took place in Torrance, California
over three days in June 1991." s
At this meeting, the state
representatives - other than California's - expressed their concern

about California's reliance on water in excess of its basic
apportionment. The states expressed their willingness to find ways to
accommodate the continued needs of California.
Arizona, in
particular, insisted the risk of shortage be on California, and that
California water agencies be willing to commit to a program to reduce
normal year water use to 4.4 million acre-feet per year. At one point in
the meeting, the state representatives put the question to California
and the California water agencies of whether they would be willing to
engage in discussions based on the Colorado framework.
The
California parties adjourned to an animated outdoor caucus, and
returned to the meeting to announce they would agree to such
discussions.
However, California continued to insist the definition of "surplus"
under the Operating Criteria be more specifically defined. This
definition proposed by California would increase fluctuation in the
federal reservoirs on the Colorado River, make more water available
for use in California, and maximize the use of water within the United
States by reducing the risk of surplus deliveries of water to Mexico

Nevada, and California representatives).
74. Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to
Colorado State Senator Tilman Bishop, Chairman, Senate Agric., Nat. Res. Energy
Comm. & Colorado State Representative Danny Williams, Chairman, House Agric.,
Livestock & Nat. Res. Comm. (June 4, 1991).
75. Included at the meeting were representatives of MWD, IID, the Coachella
Valley Water District ("CVWD"), and the Palo Verde Irrigation District ("Palo Verde").
Attendance List, Meeting of the Seven Colorado River Basin States on Long-term
Issues on the Colorado River (June 24, 1991).
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under the Mexican Treaty. 76 California also presented a conceptual
proposal to create a seven state interstate water bank, patterned after
the water bank instituted in California during the 1991 drought in the
Central Valley - through which water could be purchased from willing
sellers by willing buyers on an interstate basis. Although the other
states applauded burgeoning negotiations within California to transfer
water from agricultural to municipal uses, they were wary of
California's water bank proposal.
The meeting ended with a general consensus that if California
would agree to an enforceable program over a defined period of time
to reduce its use of Colorado River water in normal years to 4.4 million
acre-feet, the other states would agree to discuss a potential
mechanism that would assure California of additional water during
that period of time. California agreed to take this concept under
advisement and develop a proposed approach in response to the
position of the other states.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA WATER BANK PROPOSAL
At a meeting of the state representatives in Denver in August 1991,
California, in response to the agreements reached at the Torrance
meeting, formally presented its "Conceptual Approach" for a Colorado
River Basin water bank. 78 The approach contained a number of
proposals that are relevant to current discussions and issues among the
states. California presented three principle elements to its proposal.
The first element was an "escrow account" concept. 79 MWD would

undertake a program of agricultural water conservation measures and
water transfers within a twenty-year timeframe, resulting in it being
able to divert water to the full capacity of its Colorado River Aqueduct
within California's overall 4.4 million acre-feet limitation. In its
proposal, California offered general descriptions of programs that
eventually would result in anticipated reductions in agricultural water
use in California by 721,000 acre-feet per year." In exchange for the
California commitment to embark on this program, California
proposed the other states agree not to oppose MWD receiving a full
supply during the twenty-year period."
The escrow account part of the proposal allowed California to buy
its way out of non-compliance with its commitment to reduce its use of
76. Letter from James S. Lochhead, to Eric Kuhn, Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. (July 11, 1991).
77.

P.A. Rice, States Wary About Proposalfor Water Bank, IMPERIAL VALLEYPREsS, June

26, 1991, at Al.
78.

See generally STATE

AGREEMENT

ON

OF CAL., CONCEPTUAL APPROACH FOR REACHING BASIN STATES
INTERIM OPERATION OF COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS,

BAsic APPORTIONMENT, AND
(Aug. 28, 1991) [hereinafter

CALIFORNIA'S USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER ABOVE ITS

IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERSTATE WATER
CALIFORNIA CONCEPTUALAPPROACH].

79. Id. at 15.
80. Id. at 9.
81. See id. at 13.
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water within the twenty-year period. California proposed that if MWD
caused California's total water use to exceed the sum of 4.4 million
acre-feet, plus unused apportionments from Arizona and Nevada, plus
any surplus water, then MWD would place a specified sum of money
into an escrow account for each acre-foot of water over such amount to
compensate the other states for any impact or risk of future shortage
occasioned by MWD's excess water use.82 California proposed the
states support the adoption by the Secretary of the Interior of Interim
Operating Criteria for Colorado River system reservoirs that would
recognize MWD's right to receive an assured supply of water under the
above terms. The escrow account concept followed the lines of the
Colorado framework proposal made at the Torrance meeting, and,
except for the actual establishment of an escrow account, was
consistent in concept with the approach eventually taken by California,
the other states, and the DOI in the adoption of the California Plan
and the Guidelines.
The second element of the California approach was a seven-state
interstate water bank. Under this concept, any state could deposit
water with the bank for sale or lease to other states. This would be
water presently being consumed in the depositing state, what is
referred to as "wet water." The bank would then broker the water to
other states wishing to purchase this water. 3 A version of this water
banking concept would eventually be implemented in the Lower
Basin, through the Arizona groundwater bank, in which other Lower
Division States could participate.
The third element of California's approach was for the states and
the DOI to agree on clearer (in California's view) definitions of the
circumstances under which the Secretary would declare surplus
conditions under the Operating Criteria.84 California continued to
express that it wanted more surplus water to become available to
California than under the current determinations made by the
Secretary.85 This element would later be implemented through the
Guidelines adopted by the Secretary in 2001.
Although the Basin States' representatives discussed the California
Conceptual Approach for some time, the reaction to the proposal by
the other states over the next several months was mixed. There was,
not surprisingly, unanimous support for a California commitment to
reduce its uses to its basic apportionment. Most of the states were
interested in the escrow account concept (although not necessarily in
the exchange of money). However, the states were concerned the
water banking concept would erode the security of their entitlements
and violate the Law of the River.
In Colorado's view, the California Conceptual Approach provided
a "responsible and comprehensive response to the issues raised in
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 15.
CALIFORNIA CONcEPTUAL APPROACH, supra note 78, at 15-19.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 1-3.
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Torrance.""6 Colorado found favor with the escrow account concept,
as generally consistent with and responsive to the framework Colorado
had proposed at the Torrance meeting."
Although Colorado
remained open to discussions of a water bank, it expressed a number
of reservations and questions as to how such a bank could operate
consistently with the Law of the River and the protection of the
entitlements of future development of the other states.88 Colorado
Governor Roy Romer stated the water bank concept would not "offer
the necessary incentive to California to solve its own water supply
problems." 9
Because of its own need for additional water over its entitlement,
Nevada expressed interest in the concepts of banking, wheeling,
conservation investments, exchanges and transfers of water, on both
an inter- and intra-basin basis. However, Nevada's major concern was
its view that the combination of redefined surplus and water banking
as proposed by California would increase the risk of shortages shortages Nevada could not tolerate. Nevada was only interested in
water, not money in an escrow account arrangement. 90
Arizona seemed less receptive. Arizona's basic concern was that
the California
proposal would result in California continuing to
0
request and receive water in excess of its basic apportionment.
Arizona urged California to resolve its problems within its own state,
and not at the expense of future risk of shortages to the other states.
In Arizona's view, California's priority established under the 1968 Act
increased Arizona's risk of shortages and heightened Arizona's
concern about surplus water use in California.9 ' Arizona expressed no
interest in either the monetary aspect of the escrow account or the
water bank, and insisted that any program allowing California to use
any Colorado River water over its basic normal entitlement give
"absolute assurance" to Arizona that its future water supplies not be
impaired. 92
Utah posited that unused Colorado River system water should be
available for use by states with a need, so long as such use did not

86. STATE OF COLO., COMMENTS OF THE STATE OF COLORADO ON THE CONCEPTUAL
APPROACH FOR REACHING BASIN STATES AGREEMENT ON INTERIM OPERATION OF
COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS, CALIFORNIA'S USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER
ABOVE ITS BASIC APPORTIONMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERSTATE WATER BANK 6
(Oct. 23, 1991).
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Mark Obmascik, Romer Douses California's Water Request, DENVER POST, Oct. 24,

1991, at 3B (quoting Colorado Governor Roy Romer).
90. Letter from Jack L. Stonehocker, Dir., Colo. River Comm'n of Nevada, to
Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California 1-3, 8 (Oct. 22, 1991);

James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Meeting of Basin States, Phoenix, Ariz. 2 (Nov. 6,
1991).
91. See PartI, supranote 3, at 313.
92.

Letter, Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to Gerald R.

Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California, 1-2 (Oct. 23, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 1.
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increase risk or injury to other states. Utah expressed interest in
continued discussions of the escrow account and water banking
concepts, although it expressed that legal, institutional, political, and
practical obstacles to implementation of a water bank would be
"virtually insurmountable."3
However, Utah expressed continued
interest in a credit system similar to that which had been discussed by
the states in relation to the development of the 1991 AOP.
New Mexico expressed appreciation for California's offer to
commit to reduce its uses over a period of time to its basic
apportionment, and interest in continued discussions over the escrow
account concept. However it was "nervous" about the monetary aspect
of the escrow account proposal, and opposed the water bank
proposal.94
Wyoming supported an enforceable schedule of reductions in
California's use of water to its basic apportionment, and found the
escrow concept worthy of further discussion. However, Wyoming
offered "no encouragement or support" on the water banking concept
"until the in-state and regional (lower basin) opportunities of this
concept have been fully exhausted."'
V. A HIATUS IN THE SEVEN STATE PROCESS: LOWER BASIN
DISCUSSIONS
Despite the fact that the states apparently agreed to the substantive
elements of the framework proposal made by Colorado and the escrow
account concept proposed by California, progress of the seven state
negotiations stalled. The states could not reach consensus on a basis
for moving forward with discussions. California and Arizona expressed
a desire to address issues between themselves, and, due to internal
political issues, Nevada asked for additional time to develop its
position." Arizona Director of Water Resources, Betsy Rieke, then
criticized the original Colorado proposal as "playing fast and loose
with Arizona's water," and asserted that, with increasing Arizona uses,
California should be required to reduce its use of water as a matter of
law, not agreement."
93. Letter, D. Larry Anderson, Dir., Utah Div. of Water Res., to Gerald R.
Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California (Oct. 24, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 4. Utah's position is curious, given its

later advocacy of interbasin water marketing. See Memorandum from D. Larry
Anderson, Dir., Utah Div. of Water Res., to Upper Basin State Comm'rs 1-3 (Dec. 13,
1994).
94. Letter from Eluid L. Martinez, New Mexico State Eng'r, to Gerald R.

Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California (Oct. 25, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 3.

95. Letter from Gordon W. Fassett, Wyoming State Eng'r, to Gerald R.
Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of California 2 (Oct. 28, 1991); James S.
Lochhead, Personal Notes, supra note 90, at 5.
96. Heather McGregor, Water Talks Delay 7-State Negotiations,GRAND JUNCrION DAILY
SENTINEL, Dec. 23, 1991; Letter fromJack L. Stonehocker, Dir., Colo.River Comm'n of
Nevada, to James S. Lochhead (Dec. 10, 1991).
97. Heather McGregor, Arizona Rips Romer's Water Offer, GRAND JUNCrION DAILY
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As a result, the states agreed the Lower Division States should meet
among themselves to discuss river operations. The Lower Division
States discussed issues beyond the use of water in California including:
(1) Nevada's anticipated growth and demands for water; (2) the
worsening agricultural economic conditions in Arizona;9 and (3) the
resulting decreased demand for CAP water that was threatening the
viability of local irrigation districts. 99 The states also discussed issues
such as redefining "surplus," wheeling of tributary water, and interstate
transfers and exchanges. ' 00

Of particular note, the states discussed a concept of groundwater
storage in Arizona as an element of Colorado River management. The
discussion included proposals to store underground Colorado River
water as a supplement to storage in Lake Mead, and to store Arizona's
unused entitlement in exchange for allowing California and Nevada to
exceed their apportionments.' ' Through these discussions, California
and Arizona developed a pilot groundwater recharge program, by
which MWD would be allowed to store water in Arizona groundwater
aquifers for recovery in later years.
MWD also pursued a pilot land fallowing program with the Palo
Verde Irrigation District ("PVID"). Under this program, MWD paid
farmers in PVID to fallow portions of their fields for no more than two
years. MWD proposed the Bureau store the water saved by the
program in Lake Mead. There the water would be banked under
defined terms for subsequent release for use by MWD.' 2 Although
both Arizona and Nevada opposed the proposed Lake Mead banking
03
arrangement as illegal under the decree in Arizona v. California1
the
Bureau executed an agreement with MWD and PVID that allowed "top
banking" in Lake Mead of water saved from fallowed land in the PVID.
Under this arrangement, the banked water would be the first to spill in
the event of flood releases from Lake Mead.1 4 MWD also entered into
SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 1992, at LB (quoting Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Dir., Arizona Dep't of
Water Res.).
98. STATUS REPORT: ARIZONA-NEVADA-CALIFORNIA DISCUSSIONS, LOWER BASIN USE OF
COLORADO RIVER WATER (Apr. 8, 1992) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].

99. Joel Nilsson, Perspective, Use it or Lose it, THE ARIZONA
at C1-C2.
100.

REPUBLIC,

May 10, 1992,

STATUS REPORT, supra note 98, at 1, 3.

101. ARIZ. DEP'T OF WATER RES., SCOPING REPORT: POTENTIAL FOR GROUNDWATER
STORAGE AS AN ELEMENT OF COLORADO RIVER MANAGEMENT 2-3 (Mar. 10, 1992); CENT.
ARIZ. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST., OVERVIEW OF CAWCD/MWD DEMONSTRATION
PROJECT ON INTERSTATE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF UNUSED COLORADO RIVER WATER 1
(June 18, 1992).
102. Agreement between MWD and PVID Regarding Test Land Fallowing Program
§ 5 (undated); Revised Agreement between MWD and PVID Regarding Test Land
Fallowing Program § 5 (undated).
103. Letter from Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to Robert
Towles, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation 1 (Apr. 8, 1992); Thomas E. Cahill, Dir.,
Colo. River Comm'n of Nevada, to RobertJ. Towles, Reg' Dir., Bureau of Reclamation
1-2 (May 22, 1992).

104. Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't
of Nat. Res., Hal D. Simpson, State Eng'r, Eugene I. Jencsok, Colo. Water
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a similar test land fallowing and water banking agreement with IID. 05
The Basin States' discussions, and particularly the California
proposal for a Colorado River water bank, piqued the interest of inBasin Indian tribes and private interests attracted to the idea of interbasin water marketing. With its need for additional water, the State of
Nevada was more than happy to accommodate them.
VI. THE TEN COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES
In reaction to the state discussions concerning the California and
Nevada issues, and in particular to the California water bank proposal,
ten Colorado River Indian Tribes... formed a "Tribal Partnership" to
participate in the discussions. In the Tribes' view, the California
escrow proposal would compensate the Basin States for California's
use of unused water that the Tribes were entitled to under their
unused (and, in many cases, unquantified) reserved rights. The Tribal
Partnership presented to the states a position paper expressing the
Tribes' desire to engage in off-reservation marketing of both unused
tribal entitlements as well as water currently being put to use onreservation.0
Following a meeting between the states and tribes in
September 1992, the Tribal Partnership presented to the states a
proposed memorandum of understanding between the states and the
tribes that outlined a framework for endorsing off-reservation leasing
of Tribal reserved water rights.' 8
Nevada was interested in the proposal, but the Upper Basin States
and Arizona expressed concern, for much the same reasons as they
were concerned about the California water bank - the proposal would
violate the Law of the River, erode the entitlements to use water within
the states, and lead to wholesale inter-basin water marketing. These
states preferred to seek ways to resolve the California and Nevada
issues through operational mechanisms sanctioned within the Law of
the River, and thus drifted back to the type of operational
arrangement first proposed by Colorado and fleshed out in the

Conservation Bd. & Wendy Weiss, 1st Assistant Attorney Gen., Colo. (July 13, 1992).
105. Letter from Robert J. Towles, Reg'l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation, to Wayne
Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River Comm'n (Dec. 23, 1992) (with attached
AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A TEST WATER SAVINGS PROGRAM AND USE OF
SAVED WATER).

106. The ten tribes included the Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, the Cocopah Indian
Tribe, the Colorado River Indian Tribes, the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, the Jicarilla

Apache Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the Northern Ute Indian Tribe, the Quechan Indian
Tribe, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, and the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe.
POSITION PAPER OF THE TEN INDIAN TRIBES WITH WATER RIGHTS IN THE COLORADO RIVER
BASIN 5-7 (undated).

107.

Letter from Scott B. McElroy, Partner, Greene, Meyer & McElroy, to James S.

Lochhead (May 11, 1992) (with attached POSITION PAPER OF THE TEN INDIAN TRIBES

(undated)).
108. Draft Memorandum of Understanding between the Ten Tribes of the Colorado
River Basin Tribes Partnership and the Seven Basin States of the Colorado River
Regarding Tribal Water Leasing Proposals (Sept. 23, 1992).
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California escrow account proposal." 9
At a meeting of the states and tribes in Newport Beach, California,
in November 1992, the parties agreed to a process for continuing
discussions based on needs in California and Nevada, economic needs
of the tribes, preservation of the entitlements of the states and tribes,
and preservation of state/tribal control of the water resources within
their borders. l0 Thus began a series of communications and meetings
between representatives of states and tribes called the "7/10 Process."
Although the tribes continued to present various proposals to the
states, the process failed to produce specific agreements. The broad
scope of the proposals by some of the participants, such as the tribes
and Nevada, would have resulted in such major changes to the
institutional and operational framework governing the Colorado River
that neither the states nor the tribes could have effectively dealt with
those changes.
In contrast, Upper Basin States based their proposals on the
principle that Lower Basin water supply problems should be solved
within the Lower Basin. As a result, the Upper Basin proposals were
much more modest (and, in the opinion of the Upper Basin, more
doable) than some of the other, more aggressive, proposals. m Two
additional factors contributed to the disruption and failure of the 7/10
Process: Chevron Shale Oil Company's proposal to develop a reservoir
in Colorado and lease Colorado water to Nevada;11 2 and the financial
crises in Arizona associated with the repayment obligations of the CAP.
VII. NEVADA'S AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO ACQUIRING
WATER
With pressing demands in excess of Nevada's basic entitlement of
300,000 acre-feet per year, southern Nevada embarked on an
ambitious campaign to obtain water from any source. The following
factors pressured the Southern Nevada Water Authority ("SNWA"),
which encompassed a consortium of water districts in the Las Vegas
area, to take some action: (1) its policy of not extending taps without a
long-term supply of water to support new growth; (2) the speculative
purchasing and holding of taps by developers; and (3) increasing
political pressure from the casino industry to develop additional water
supplies. Nevada made the intentions of its new campaign known
109. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't
of Nat. Res., Hal D. Simpson, State Eng'r, Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation
Bd., & Trish Bangert, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo. (Oct. 13, 1992) (with attached
Draft Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, to Upper Colorado River Comm'rs discussing
Indian Water Rights and the Law of the River) (Oct. 7, 1992).
110. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Meeting of Basin States and Tribes,
Newport Beach, Cal., at 3 (Nov. 17, 1992).
111. See Memorandum from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River
Comm'n, to Lower Colo. River Basin States Representatives & Colo. River Tribal
P'ship Representatives (Mar. 3, 1993).
112. For a discussion of the Roan Creek proposal, and some of the reasons why
Colorado was adamantly opposed to the proposal, see PartI, supra note 3, at 322-29.
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shortly after the Newport Beach meeting. Nevada then proposed
state/tribal discussions over several controversial alternatives
including: interstate banking; fallowing and conservation transactions
in the Lower Basin; Upper-to-Lower Basin water marketing; tribal
river commission; and
leasing and marketing; creation of a basin-wide
3
Lake Mead and Lake Powell water banks."
Southern Nevada expanded its campaign in late 1993, when the
Colorado River Commission of Nevada held a hearing - the "Southern
Nevada Water Summit" - inviting anyone with water to sell to make a
proposal. Over two days, the Commission heard proposals by water
speculators for schemes such as shipping glacial water from Alaska,
exchanging water with Mexico, leasing water from the Upper Basin,
transferring water from northern Nevada, and establishing "water
ranches" in Arizona."4 Nevada also invited the other Basin States to
make presentations. However, the other states were not willing to
encourage Nevada to work outside the context of state-to-state
institutional discussions and arrangements. For example, the State of
Colorado warned Nevada that "[e]mbracing, or even considering,
private interbasin water marketing proposals may be destructive of the
process to resolve long term issues on the River.""' Even California,
which also needed additional water, commented that Nevada's need
for additional water "can only be accomplished through joint,
cooperative efforts among the states. " " '
These cautions did not deter the Nevada interests. Nevada and
Utah officials met to discuss exchanges of water on the Virgin and
Colorado Rivers, and a proposed pipeline from Lake Powell to St.
George, Utah, which could serve the needs of both southern Utah and
southern Nevada."' At a follow-up summit on February 8, 1994, the
boards of the Colorado River Commission of Nevada and the SNWA
asked their staffs to prepare a white paper on "wheeling" Virgin River
and Colorado River water to Nevada."' Board members expressed
113. Memorandum from Thomas E. Cahill, Dir., Colo. River Comm'n of Nev., to
7/10 Committee Representatives 7-8 (Jan. 22, 1993).
114. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Exec. Dir., Dep't of
Nat. Res. & Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1993); See
generally

COLO. RIVER COMM'N &

SUMMIT, WATER CATEGORYANALYSIS

S.

NEV. WATER

AUTH., SOUTHERN

NEVADA WATER

3-37 (Feb. 8, 1994).

115. James S. Lochhead, Colo. Comm'r, Upper Colo. River Comm'n, Presentation
of the State of Colorado Before the Colorado River Commission of Nevada and the
Southern Nevada Water Authority 5 (Nov. 5, 1993).
116. Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal., Presentation at the
Nevada Water Summit 1 (Nov. 5, 1993).
117. Letter from James S. Lochhead, to Ken Salazar, Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. &
Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. 1-2 (Feb. 8, 1994).

118. Memorandum from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo.River Comm'n, to
Upper Colo. River Comm'rs 1 (Feb. 11, 1994). The term "wheeling" as applied to the
Virgin River referred to obtaining the legal right to use, or a physical supply of water

from, the Virgin River. However, instead of developing an intake or wells from the
Virgin River watershed and pipeline to Las Vegas, Las Vegas would let the Virgin River
water flow into Lake Mead, and would take the water through its existing intake.
California and Arizona opposed the wheeling concept, on the basis that under the
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frustration that the Law of the River was an apparent impediment to
their access to additional water. One board member stated, "[w]e
must change the 'Law of the River.' Congressional people listening
take note. The 'Law of the River' is blocking most of the best
proposals because they cannot be delivered." "'
Nevada officials
followed the summit with public calls for changing the allocations
among the states.' ° Nevada then piqued the interest of Congress, and
convinced Senator Bill Bradley of New Jersey, Chair of the
Subcommittee on Water and Power of the Senate Energy Committee,
to schedule oversight hearings on Colorado River management.
However, because of progress in the Lower Basin interstate discussions
on water banking, Nevada did not follow-up on its threats to try to
redefine the Law of the River, and quickly moderated its approach.
VIII. FINANCIAL CRISES IN ARIZONA
In the early stages of the negotiations between the states on the
issue of California's reliance on surplus water from the Colorado River,
Arizona was a reluctant participant. Arizona took the position that
California's obligation to reduce its use of water was a legal
requirement that was not subject to negotiation, and openly criticized
Colorado's approach. However, in 1991, Arizona began facing a
critical financial problem in the operation of the CAP that was a factor
in causing it to look at financial alternatives, including striking a "deal
with the devil" - California.
Due primarily to low agricultural demand for CAP water, deliveries
of CAP water dropped significantly in 1991.121 Contracts obligated
agricultural districts to continue to pay for CAP water even though
they were not receiving it, causing some of these districts to file for
bankruptcy. At the same time, the Secretary of the Interior prepared
to declare the construction of the CAP substantially complete, which
would trigger additional payments and financial hardship.
Contributing to the crises, the DOI and the CAWCD disputed the
amount that CAWCD would owe the United States once the Secretary
declared substantial completion declaration.
These problems forced Arizona to look for potential alternative
solutions. A task force, appointed by the governor, looked at
opportunities to increase agricultural water use, and also considered
Decree in Arizona v. California,once water from the Virgin River entered Lake Mead, it
became subject to federal control and allocation pursuant to the Decree. See Part I,
supra note 3, at 328-29.
119. Memorandum from Wayne E. Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo.River Comm'n, to
Upper Colo. River Comm'rs 1 (Feb. 11, 1994) (quoting Tom Coward, Colo. River
Comm'n of Nev.).
120. Timothy Egan, Las Vegas Stakes Claim in 90's Water War, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10,
1994, at Al.
121. Central Arizona Project deliveries dropped from 745,000 acre-feet in 1990 to
420,000 acre-feet in 1991.
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CENT. Axiz. PROJECr,
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT ISSUES: REPORT TO GOVERNOR

FiFE SYMINGTON 1 (1992).
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the possibility of interstate marketing of CAP water. Early in 1993, a
report by the Arizona Department of Water Resources rejected the
idea of interstate water marketing, stating:
[A]rizona faces considerable risks by pursuing a marketing
agreement. If Arizona attempts to market a share of its low priority
CAP water, other parties will likely demand the right to market their
water, including currently unused water. Arizona may find that once
this currently unused water is marketed, its low priority supply is
diminished and it no longer has any water to market. If Arizona seeks
to negotiate a change in the Law of the River that allows a direct
marketing of water, it may find, after the negotiations, that the state
has lost more than it is willing and can afford to give up.122

However, by the end of 1993, Arizona was more willing to discuss
the subject. A Governor's Task Force report stated that "[the Arizona
Department of Water Resources] should study the feasibility of
arrangements in which California and Nevada take advantage of
unused entitlement and canal capacity to store water in Arizona in
exchange for the right to increased Colorado River diversions in the
future."1 23 Arizona, Nevada, and MWD entered into a demonstration
project allowing for Nevada or MWD to pay the CAWCD to deliver
Colorado River water to farmers who normally used groundwater. In
exchange, Nevada or MfWD would then receive rights to the
groundwater the farmers did not pump. When necessary, Nevada or
MWD could later gain access to this "in-lieu" storage through a
forbearance agreement whereby Arizona agreed to forbear, in the
future, the use of an equal portion of its Colorado River entitlement to
124
Nevada or MWD.
This arrangement increased the use and financial
feasibility of the CAP, gave to Arizona farmers water at a cheaper price
than their pumped groundwater, and created a storage water bank for
Nevada and MWD.
Negotiations between Arizona and the DOI over the repayment
obligation of the CAWCD for the CAP eventually broke down in 1995;
the matter then went to litigation.12 5
However, the concepts of
developing a market for Arizona's unused entitlement and canal
capacity became important components in developing an incentive for
California to develop the California Plan, and for Arizona to develop
122. ARiz.

DEP'T OF WATER RES.,

GOVERNOR'S CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT ADVISORY

COMMITTEE: PRELIMINARY DRAFT, MARKETING COLORADO RIVER WATER TO CALIFORNIA OR

NEVADA USERS 27 (1993).
123. ARIZ. DEP'T OF WATER RES., GOVERNOR'S CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29 (1993).

124. Jon Christensen, Las Vegas Wheels and Deals for Colorado River Water, HIGH
COUNTRYNEwS, Feb. 21, 1994, at 12-13. The vehicle for implementing the forbearance

arrangement is Article II (B)(6) of the Decree in Arizona, which authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to make unused water in one state available for use in another
state, on a temporary basis. See Part I, supra note 3, at 312.
125. Editorial, CAP Agreement Collapses: Playing Politics With Water, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, June 21, 1995, at B8. See also Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, Exec.
Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado (June 23, 1995).
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its groundwater bank. Additionally, the concept of Arizona forbearing
a portion of its unused apportionment would find utility in the
Guidelines that were later developed by the DOI, and in the
implementation of the California Plan.
IX. DISCUSSIONS ON A LOWER BASIN WATER BANK AND
LOWER BASIN OPERATIONS
In 1994, in the context of renewed discussions among the seven
Basin States, Nevada proposed to form a publicly controlled water
bank in the Lower Basin. The bank would collect and allocate unused
and voluntarily contributed water "to assure a full aqueduct for
[MWD], an effective end to the [CAP] subordination, and a long-term
augmentation of the water supply of the [SNWA] (starting with the
transportation of appropriated Virgin River water in Lake Mead) .
Nevada proposed that a commission, composed of representatives
of
27
each of the three Lower Division States, operate the bank.
The proposal was generally well received by the other states. In
particular, the Upper Division States felt the proposal was consistent
with two of their fundamental principles - that the Lower Basin resolve
its water allocation issues within the Lower Basin, and that no private
2
water marketing occur between the Upper and Lower Basins. 1
Arizona responded that a Lower Basin Commission might be
appropriate, but suggested that, instead of a central water bank, the
states allow for the creation of individual state water banks.1 29 In
Arizona, the legislature would create the bank with the authority to
secure long-term supplies through sources such as underground water
storage credits, Colorado River water available through land fallowing,
and interim contracts with CAWCD for excess CAP water for
groundwater storage.1 30 The bank could then contract with other
126. Nevada's Approach to a Lower Division Regional Solution 1 (Apr. 29, 1994).
127. Id. at 1, 4; Janet F. Rogers, Chair, Colo. River Comm'n of Nev., Statement
before the Subcommittee on Water and Power of the Senate Energy Committee for
the Lower Colorado River Oversight Hearings 4-8 (June 8 & 9, 1994); COLO. RIVER
COMM'N OF NEV.,

AMPLIFICATION OF NEVADA's APPROACH TO A LOWER DVIsION/BASIN

(July 8, 1994).
128. Heather McGregor, "Water Bank" Could Help State Rivers, GRANDJUNCnON DAILY
SENTINEL, May 6, 1994, at 1B; Memorandum from D. Larry Anderson, Div. Dir., Utah
Div. of Water Res., to Basin States Representatives 1 (May 25, 1994); Memorandum
from Philip B. Mutz, Upper Colo. River Comm'r for New Mexico & Eluid L. Martinez,
Sec'y, New Mexico Interstate Stream Comm'n, to Colo. River Basin States
Representatives & Wayne Cook, Exec. Dir., Upper Colo. River Comm'n 1 (May 26,
1994); Memorandum from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal.,
to Colo. River Basin States Representatives 1 (May 26, 1994); Memorandum from
Gordon W. Fassett, Wyoming State Eng'r, to Seven Colo. Basin States Representatives 1
(May 31, 1994).
129. Memorandum from Rita P. Pearson, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to Seven
Colo. Basin States Representatives 1 (May 27, 1994); See generally ARIz. DEP'T OF WATER
REGIONAL SOLUTION 1-2

RES.,

ARIZONA WATER BANK PROPOSAL (July 14, 1994).

130. See Larry Linser, Deputy Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., Testimony Before the
Water and Power Subcommittee of the United States Senate Energy and Nat. Res.
Committee 6 (June 8-9, 1994).
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states for their acquisition of such supplies, and arrange to store those
supplies (including underground storage). The transfer of water from
the bank to California or Nevada would be made through a
"forbearance agreement" entered into under the provisions of Article
II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v. California, under which the
Secretary can deliver the unused entitlement of one Lower Division
state in any one year for use in another Lower Division state."'
Arizona recognized the Secretary would have to promulgate
regulations to implement transfers between the states under Article
II(B) (6).32

The DOI also put forth a proposal for improving the management
of Lower Basin supplies. In early 1994, the DOI circulated draft
regulations for managing Colorado River water entitlements in the
Lower Basin. The regulations addressed many of the issues being
discussed by the states, including marketing Colorado River in the
Lower Basin, banking conserved water in Lake Mead, administering
reasonable beneficial use, imposing fees, and wheeling non-project
water.1 33 The Lower Division States expressed numerous reservations
and concerns as to these draft regulations, resulting in the DOI
agreeing to suspend publication pending further discussion.
In response to the seeming progress on state water banking
discussions and the suspension of draft regulations, the Lower Division
States appointed a technical committee charged to develop
alternatives to more efficient management of the Colorado River
system in the Lower Basin. The committee discussed the operation of
an interstate water bank, surplus and shortage operating criteria,
overrun criteria, transfers of Tribal water, modeling, establishment of a
"Lower Basin Forum," facilitators, public involvement, and other
issues.'3

5

Throughout these discussions, Nevada continued to push the idea
that the states not oppose the wheeling of 60,000 acre-feet of water per
year from the Virgin River through Lake Mead for use in Nevada.
Nevada felt that this wheeling could be in lieu of a water development
project on the Virgin River. Arizona and California opposed the idea,
however, on the basis that once water entered Lake Mead, it became
subject to the allocation scheme under the Boulder Canyon Project
131. See id.; Memorandum from Daries C. Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,
to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. Members & Colo. River Policy Advisory Council 1-2
(June 14,1994).

132. See Larry Linser, supra note 130.
133. Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, Dep't of the Interior,
Statement Before the Water and Power Subcommittee of the United States Senate
Energy and Nat. Res. Committee 12-14 (June 8, 1994).
134.

COLO. RIVER LOWER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM., PROGRESS REPORT 1 (Oct. 11,

1994).
135. LOWER CoLo. RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM., PROGRESS REPORT No. 4, at 2-6, 810 (June 1, 1995); LOWER COLO. RIVER BASIN TEHNIcAL COMM., PROGRESS REPORT No.
3, at 1-5 (Mar. 22, 1995); LOWER COLO. RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM., PROGRESS
REPORT No. 2, at 2, 4-9, 11 (Jan. 19, 1995); COLO. RIVER LOWER BASIN TECHNICAL
COMM., PROGRESS REPORT 3-4, 6 (Oct. 11, 1994).
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Act and the Decree in Arizona v. California. Also, MWD pushed the
idea of a water bank in Lake Mead. Arizona opposed this idea as
well. 36 These disagreements effectively stalled the discussions for
about a year.
Further complicating the negotiations, similar to earlier proposals
for interstate transactions, other interests on the Colorado River
desired to "get in on the action." The Colorado River Basin Tribes
Partnership presented its own water banking proposal to the states.'37
Much to the consternation of the other Upper Division States, the
State of Utah broke ranks by proposing an Upper Basin water bank
that could market Upper Basin water to the Lower Basin. 38 The other
Upper Basin States expressed no interest in the proposal. After
meeting with the governor's representatives of each of the other
Upper Division States, the Utah Director of Natural Resources
characterized the reaction of the other states as "'Not interested. No.
Hell no.' Depending on the state.', 39 One might view this as a kneejerk response to a progressive proposal, but the reasons for the Upper
Basin's historical opposition to Upper-to-Lower Basin water marketing
have their roots in the very foundation of the Law of the River for the
Upper Basin-the protection in perpetuity under the Compact to
develop the Upper Basin's share of the Colorado River. 40
After more than a year of negotiations, the Lower Basin technical
committee failed to reach any substantive agreement. In apparent
frustration over the lack of progress, the Bureau wrote a paper to the
committee outlining Bureau proposals for managing surpluses,
shortages, and unused apportionment "until a lower basin consensus
on these issues is achieved."''
The paper proposed to declare more
surpluses, resulting in more and deeper drawdowns in Lake Mead than
had historically occurred. 42 Although MWD supported the proposal,

136. Letter from Rita P. Pearson, Dir., Ariz. Dep't of Water Res., to Bruce Babbitt,
Sec'y of the Interior (June 2, 1995); LOWER COLO. RIVER BASIN TECHNICAL COMM.,
PROGRESS REPORT No. 4, at 4-6, 9 (June 1, 1995).
137. COLO. RIVER BASIN TRIBES P'SHIP, PROPOSED FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS OF
COLORADO RIVER MARKETING/BANING (Oct. 11, 1994).
138. Memorandum from D. Larry Anderson, Dir., Div. of Water Res., to Upper Basin
State Comm'rs (Dec. 13, 1994) (including Upper Basin Water Bank Working Paper).
139. Utah PondersSelling Las Vegas $20 Million in Water Annually, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb.
12, 1995 (quoting Ted Stewart, Exec. Dir., Dep't of Nat. Res.).
140. See PartI, supra note 3, at 322-29.
141. Letter from V. LeGrand Neilson, Dir., Office of Colo. River Water & Power
Mgmt., Bureau of Reclamation, to Abraham Sofaer, Facilitator, Lower Colo. River
Basin Technical Comm. (Sept. 29, 1995).
142. The Bureau recommended a shortage criterion of eighty percent assurance of
protecting Lake Mead elevation of 1050 feet and a surplus criterion of eighty percent
assurance of not triggering a shortage. This was opposed to the historic operational
surplus strategy based on a seventy percent assurance of avoiding flood control
releases (the so-called "70R strategy"). These criteria are of vital importance to the
states. The six states other than California favored the 70R strategy because it keeps
system reservoirs fuller than other strategies and minimizes risks of shortages.
California had argued for greater reservoir fluctuations, which would give it greater
access to surpluses.
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IID and other agencies opposed it.
In late 1995, Arizona set forth its position with respect to the
technical committee discussions. It explained that it would view any
proposals against two basic criteria. Would the proposal: (1) "increase
the risk of shortage to the CAP?"; or (2) "in any way threaten Arizona's
entitlement to consumptively use 2.8 million acre-feet per year from
Against these criteria, Arizona announced its
the mainstream?"14
willingness to discuss a number of proposals, but its unwillingness to
discuss water banking in Lake Mead (a proposal of much interest to
MWD) or144party-to-party transfers of water not authorized by the states
Faced with proposals by the other two states that it did not
involved.
support, and the Bureau proposal to increase surplus releases of water
to California, Arizona also presented a proposal that would put
additional pressure on California and Nevada by hastening the day
when Arizona would fully utilize its apportionment.
The Arizona Department of Water Resources proposed that the
Arizona legislature enact legislation to: (1) provide state funding and
mechanisms to divert Arizona's unused apportionment through the
CAP and store the water in groundwater basins for future use during
times of CAP water shortages; and (2) replace some existing uses of
groundwater by central Arizona agricultural entities with CAP water
Arizona also
that would otherwise be unused and unstored.14
proposed creation of an "Arizona State Water Bank" through which
California and Nevada could store additional amounts of Arizona's
unused apportionment. In the future, California and Nevada would
be able to exchange the unused apportionment stored in Arizona for
limited amounts of Colorado River water-amounts additional to their
decreed apportionments. 6 This proposal sought to put Arizona out in
front of the other states by adopting a banking plan acceptable to
Arizona, increasing Arizona's use of its apportionment, and
developing a mechanism to create a market, and thus a repayment
source for the financially troubled CAP. The proposal would achieve
all of these goals.
X. THE DREAM TEAM
But Nevada and MWD had other ideas. As the discussions in the
technical committee broke down, MWD and the SNWA entered into
secret negotiations and formed an alliance they called the "Dream
Team.",4 7

MWD and the SNWA proposed a "long-term partnership"

under which they agreed to explore and develop programs to enhance
their water supplies and support the Bureau's recommendations

143. COLORADO RIVER ISSUES, THE ARIZONAPERSPECTIVE 2 (Nov. 7, 1995).
144. Id. at 2, 13-14.
145. ARiz. DEP'T OF WATER RES., DISCUSSION PAPER: A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE USE
OF COLORADO RIVER WATER IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA 2 (Oct. 1995).

146.

Id.

147.

Susan Greene, Pact may Bring More Water, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 22, 1995.
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concerning surplus and shortage criteria.148 MWD also agreed to pay
for lining of the All-American Canal, which diverts water to IID. Part
of this water would be sold at a discounted rate to the San Luis Rey
Indian Tribe in settlement of its reserved rights claims.
Nevada
would fund a portion of the canal lining, and MWD would forbear use
of up to 30,000 acre-feet per year to the benefit of Nevada.5 ° Both
states would seek to bank water not needed in any one year in Lake
Mead for later release. 51
However, the forbearance would have to be approved and
implemented by the Secretary of the Interior, and the secret nature of
the negotiations had a poisonous influence on MWD's and SNWA's
relationship with the Lower Basin States and agencies within Southern
California. Governor Symington of Arizona blasted the proposed deal,
in particular the Lake Mead "top-banking" proposal that Arizona had
opposed in the technical committee discussions, in letters to the
governors of California and Nevada and to Secretary of the Interior
Babbitt. 5 ' Governor Symington illustrated the bitterness of the
political atmosphere, stating that the secret negotiations "[have]
severely undermined our confidence in the ability of Nevada to
negotiate in good faith ...Arizona will not sit idly by while such a
disingenuous plan is put into operation."' Governor Miller of Nevada
responded "Arizona's been kicking sand in our face for a long time.
And now with the political might of Southern California, it's like we've
got a big brother to stand behind us.'

54

MWD moved quickly to assuage the concerns of Arizona. In a
meeting between the General Manager of MWD and the Arizona
Director of Water Resources, MWD offered to discuss giving up
California's priority to the first 4.4 million acre-feet of water in the
Lower River. 5 California's priority had been a burr under Arizona's
saddle since 1968, and MWD's
overture caused Arizona to inch back
56
toward the negotiating table.
However, the MWD/SNWA deal had created greater problems
within California. In addition to leaving Arizona out of the mix, MWD
and the SNWA had not involved the agricultural districts in Southern
California from whom the water would be generated. The Coachella
148. Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the Southern Nevada Water
Authority and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 1, 3 (Nov. 16,
1995).
149. See id.
at 2.
150. Id.at 4.
151. Id.at 5.
152. Letter from Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona, to Pete Wilson, Governor of
California 2 (Nov. 17, 1995); Letter from Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona, to
Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 1 (Nov. 22, 1995).
153. Susan Greene, Arizona Raps Water Alliance, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 23, 1995
(quoting Fife Symington, Governor of Arizona).
154. Id.(quoting Bob Miller, Governor of Nevada).
155. See Part I,supra note 3, at 313.
156. Letter from Rita P. Pearson, Dir., Arizona Dep't of Water Res., to John R.
Wodraska, Gen. Manager, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Dec. 5, 1995).

Issue 2

AN UPPER BASIN PERSPECTIVE PART II

Valley Water District ("CVWD"), IID, and Palo Verde Irrigation District
jointly complained to MWD that MWD's actions would jeopardize the
Districts' water rights. 57 The San Diego County Water Authority
("SDCWA"), which is a member agency of MWD and was engaged in
water transfer negotiations with IID and also negotiations with MWD
for "wheeling" conserved IID water through MWD's Colorado River
Aqueduct to San Diego, expressed its concern to MWD that it should
have a "right of first refusal" to participate in conservation
California Governor Pete Wilson quickly backed away
transactions.
from any implication that the State had any part in the negotiations.
He then went further, writing a letter to the Chairman of MWD
chastising the agency for "usurping the authority of the State of
California in dealing independently with Arizona and Nevada. In
particular, Metropolitan is acting as though it has the authority to sell
Colorado River water to Nevada and to potentially ve up California's
statutory priority over the Central Arizona Project."
The DOI also took a step back from the proposal, stating that it
would not approve any forbearance until it received a formal proposal
and analyzed the impacts on the rest of the states. 61 Secretary Babbitt,
in what would become an annual ritual, then appeared before the
December 1995 meeting of the Colorado River Water Users'
Association meeting in Las Vegas. He noted the efforts the DOI had
undertaken to work with the states in formulating new management
strategies, and his preference for consensus solutions to be developed
Noting further that the Seven-Party
by mutual agreement.162
Agreement of 1931163 authorizes MWD, Los Angeles, and SDCWA to
bank in Lake Mead an aggregate of up to five million acre-feet of water
by reason of diversions reduced below their entitlements, he called
He went on to state his
such banking "vintage Law-of-the-River."'
support for voluntary market transactions within the legal framework
of the Law of the River, and announced that it was his responsibility, as
River Master, to consider applications for willing buyer-seller transfers

157. Letter from Tellis Codekas, President Coachella Valley Water Dist., William R.
Condit, President, Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Virgil Jones, President, Palo Verde
Irrigation Dist., to Jack Foley, Chairman, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Nov. 28, 1995).
158. Letter from Mark Watton, Chair, Bd. of Dirs., San Diego County Water Auth.,
to jack Foley, Chairman, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Dec. 12, 1995).
159. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Fife Symington, Governor
of Arizona (Dec. 4, 1995).
160. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Jack Foley, Chairman, Bd.
of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Jan. 24, 1996); see also Steve La Rue, Water Deal
Assailed by Wilson, SAN DIEGO UNION, Jan. 27, 1996, at A3.
161. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Statement of the Department of the
Interior (Nov. 24, 1995); Jeffrey Cohen, Water Decision on Hold, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Nov.
25, 1995.
162. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1995 Annual Conference 9-12 (Dec. 8, 1995).
163. SeePartI,supra note 3, at 307.
164. Bruce Babbitt 1995 Address, supra note 162, at 8.
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of conserved water between the Lower Basin States. 65 Stating he would
"move cautiously," he nonetheless signaled he would not wait for the
three states to arrive at final agreements before he approved individual
Lower Basin interstate transfers.'6
The controversy within California precipitated a new facilitated
consensus-building process. The six major Southern California water
agencies - MWD, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the
SDCWA, IID, Coachella, and PVID - convened the Six Agency
Committee closed-door discussions to try and close the gap on their
positions relative to issues such as interstate transactions, the
IID/SDCWA conservation transfer, and wheeling of IID water through
MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct to San Diego.
Finally, the political
pressure was enough to break up the "Dream Team." In March 1996,
the General Manager of MWD announced to a California General
Assembly hearing the MWD/SNWA proposal was "off the table."' 8
In 1996, the SNWA created some relief for itself by reversing its
previous policy requiring a permanent water supply to be in place to
support the issuance of new water taps, and that had allowed
developers to hoard taps for speculative purposes. The new policy
allowed SNMA to issue taps that contemplated a need for water in
excess of Nevada's basic apportionment. Thus, Nevada "defined" its
way out of the current political crises, but still had not come up with
real water beyond the limitation of its entitlement.
XI. THE ARIZONA WATER BANK AND INCREASING TENSIONS
(AND WATER USE) IN CALIFORNIA
In response to the ongoing discussions and positions of California
and Nevada, Arizona went on the offensive by implementing the plan
for water banking that it had proposed earlier. The Arizona legislature
enacted a groundwater banking law creating a state-run water banking
authority.'
The Arizona Water Banking Authority ("Banking
Authority") is a state government organization authorized to purchase
unused Colorado River water. The Banking Authority diverts water
through the CAP for storage directly or indirectly in groundwater
aquifers in Arizona in order to protect against future shortages and
provide water supply augmentation opportunities to meet state water
management objectives. The Banking Authority can then sell and
recover the water. Additionally, the Banking Authority is able to store
water on behalf of California or Nevada, and guarantee a mechanism
to allow the states to recover the stored water. The storage and
banking arrangements are operated under Arizona's Underground
165.
166.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 18-21, 24.

167. Sue McClurg, ColoradoRiver Controversies,W. WATER, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 4-5.
168. Id. at 13.
169. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-105, -107, -421(7), -566(A)(13)(a)-(c), 567(A) (11) (a)-(c), -611 (C) (3), -615(4), -802.01, -852.01, -896.01, -2401 to -2472 (West
2003); Id. §§ 48-3710, -3713, -3715.
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Water Storage statutes 7 ' and Article II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona
v. California.7' The Banking Authority immediately began diverting
Colorado River water through the CAP, causing diversions to increase
dramatically7 2 towards Arizona's full 2.8 million acre-feet per year
entitlement.
Meanwhile, in California, interagency disagreements broke out as
water use in the Imperial Valley also increased. The Six Agency
Committee negotiations broke down. IID did not renew its water
conservation agreement with the MWD, but did enter into a letter of
intent with the SDCWA (which, as the largest but mostjunior member
of MWD, was trying to establish a degree of water independence),
under which water conserved in IID and paid for by SDCWA would be
transferred either through MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct or
through a new aqueduct to be constructed from the Colorado River.'73
MWD objected to the agreement, arguing that SDCWA had no right
independent of MWD to "wheel" water through the Aqueduct, and
raised several other obstacles and legal arguments.'7 4
Coachella, which holds an unquantified right to Colorado River
water junior to IID but senior to MWD, also joined the fray. CVWD
faced its own problems in the form of groundwater overdraft.
Coachella argued that any water saved by conservation in the IID
should go to it, not to MWD. CVWD asserted that only after its needs
were satisfied should water then be allowed to go to ajunior user."
The combination of increasing water use in IID and diversions by
Arizona to bank water pushed total Lower Basin mainstream water use
to about eight million acre-feet in 1996.176 The clear prospect was that
this use would continue. However, Colorado River system reservoirs
were full enough, and runoff was large enough, that the Secretary was
justified in declaring surplus conditions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. If a
normal year were justified, the Secretary would have been forced to
reduce MWD's diversions, to return total California water use to 774.4
million acre-feet and total Lower Basin use to 7.5 million acre-feet.
170.

Id. §§ 45-801.01 to -836.01.

171. 376 U.S. 340, 342 (1964).
172. Arizona projected its diversions of Colorado River water would increase from
2.15 million acre-feet in 1994 to 2.59 million acre-feet in 1996 and 2.7 million acre-feet
in 1997. Memorandum from Chuck Lile, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., to James
S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. 2 (May 16, 1996).
173. Press Release, San Diego County Water Auth., Directors Release Summary of

Draft Terms for Water Transfer 2-4 (July 23, 1996).
174. See generally Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., Preliminary Comments Re:
Cooperative Water Conservation and Transfer Proposal Summary of Draft Terms
(Sept. 30, 1996).
175. Letter from Tom Levy, Gen. Manager, Coachella Valley Water Dist., to Michael
J. Clinton, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist. 2-3 (Oct. 16, 1996). See also PartI,

supra note 3, at 307-09.
176. Letter from Governor's Representatives on the Colorado River Operations,
States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, to David

Kennedy, Dir., California Dep't of Water Res. & Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir.,
Colo. River Bd. of Cal. 2 (Dec. 9,1996).
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XII. THE SIX-STATE ALLIANCE
Sitting on the sidelines, the representatives of the six Basin States
other than California became increasingly concerned that, despite
nearly continuous discussions among the states and water agencies
since 1991, there was no measurable progress in achieving a reduction
in California water use.
Despite the MWD/IID water transfer
agreement, not only were agricultural uses in California increasing,
but also California agencies apparently were also under the
assumption that California's demands would continue to be met into
the foreseeable future by surplus releases."" The states requested a
meeting with California water agency representatives, which took place
in San Diego on November 22, 1996. The six states made a
comprehensive presentation of their concerns to the California
agencies. The states reviewed the lack of progress in the discussions
that had taken place since 1991, and the concurrent increase in uses in
the Lower Basin in that same period.'79 The states presented to
California a choice: either commit to a defined and enforceable
program to reduce its water use to its 4.4 million acre-feet
apportionment, or face the risk the states would ask the Secretary of
the Interior to reduce California's use to its basic apportionment on a
year-to-year basis. Going back to the positions developed by Colorado
in 1991, the states told California:
We are available to engage in serious discussions toward the
development of multiple year surplus and shortage criteria, that will
meet, for an interim period only, at least part of the demand for
surplus water in the Lower Basin, and will allow for more secure water
planning and more efficient use in the United States.
These discussions must be preceded by, and based upon, California's
commitment to enter into a defined, enforceable program to reduce

its dependence on Colorado River water over its basic entitlement, in
a way that avoids undue risk of shortage to the other Basin States. We
are also interested in moving forward with the steps necessary to
implement the interstate storage component of the Arizona Water
Bank. However, the states are extremely concerned with proposals in
California to bank surplus system water within Lake Mead in a "top
water bank" or a "transitional water bank."

CALIFORNIA's ANNUAL COLORADo RIVER APPORTIONMENT 3 (1997).

178. Letter from Governor's Representatives on the Colorado River Operations,
supra note 176, at 2.

179. Id. at 1-2. Summarizing Lower Basin States' water use, the letter stated:
Nevada's use of Colorado River water increased from about 175,000 [acrefeet] in 1992 to about 245,000 [acre-feet] in 1996. Arizona's use of Colorado
River water increased from about 1.8 [million acre-feet] in 1992 to about 2.6
[million acre-feet] in 1996 ....

[U]se of Colorado River water by California

agriculture increased from about 3.2 [million acre-feet] in 1992 to over 4
[million acre-feet] in 1996-despite the purported conservation of up to
106,000 [acre-feet] of water under the ID/MWND [water conservation and
transfer] agreement.
Id at 2.
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If we cannot proceed on this basis, our states will continue to review
Colorado River operations on a year-to-year basis.
Under this
approach, conditions change rapidly. However, it is possible that a
surplus condition will not be justified in 1998. Therefore, we will
expect use of Colorado River water in California will be reduced to or
toward 4.4 [million acre-feet] in 1998, if the Secretary makes a
normal or limited surplus declaration.' 0
The six states had coordinated their position statement with the
Secretary of the Interior. Immediately following the six-state letter,
Secretary Babbitt addressed the situation in his annual speech to the
Colorado River Water Users' Association in Las Vegas."" The Secretary
underscored the concerns expressed in the six-state letter and
announced several actions he would take.
He instructed the Bureau to work with IID to quantify beneficial
use within IID. 2 This action would serve to limit deliveries to IID, and
establish a baseline for the quantification of conservation savings that
could be transferred to MWD. He also instructed the Bureau to
develop targeted management regulations in the Lower Basin. These
regulations would focus on intrastate water marketing and
implementation of the Arizona Water Bank.'
The Secretary then
announced his desire to clarify the relative rights of California
agricultural agencies, in order to resolve the CVWD/IID dispute."' He
announced his intent to proceed with the development of surplus
criteria, but stated he would defer finalizing any such guidelines
pending the development of a California strategy to reduce its
dependence on surplus water.8 5 Finally, he recognized the concerns
of the six states over surplus top-water banking proposals, and stated
88
he would defer consideration of top-water banking proposals.
Echoing the six-state letter, he warned California water agencies that
California could expect cutbacks in water deliveries at any time, if he
declared a normal condition on the Colorado River.
It was a
warning that Secretaries Babbitt and Norton would frequently repeat.
Shortly after the Secretary's speech, the Bureau denied IID's
request for a water order of 3.3 million acre-feet of water in 1997.
"This action was taken despite the anticipation of surplus conditions in
the [Colorado] River, and therefore represent[ed] a first step in
placing beneficial use limitations on [California agriculture] .,,88
180. Id. at 2-3.
181. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1996 Annual Conference (Dec. 19, 1996).

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.

186. Bruce Babbitt 1996 Address, supra note 181, at 7.

187. Id. at 7-8.
188. Letter from James S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to Don
Ament, Chairman, Colo. State Senate Agric., Nat. Res. and Energy Comm. & Lewis H.
Entz, Chairman, Colo. House Agric. Comm. 2 (Dec. 20, 1996).
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XIII. THE CALIFORNIA 4.4 PLAN
Following the six-state letter and the Secretary's speech, the IID
and CVWD began discussions over an issue they had not been able to
resolve since 1931 - the quantification of California agricultural
priorities within the first 3.85 million acre-feet of water to which
California is entitled.' 9 IID made a proposal to CVWD that included a
limit on ID's uses of 3.1 million acre-feet per year, and a limit on
CVWD's uses of 330,000 acre-feet per year. This started discussions
over one of the most basic issues that had hampered any proposal to
transfer conserved water from IID to the Colorado River Aqueduct,
quantification of IID's and CVWD's priorities. 90 Additionally, the
California agencies began discussions over the development of a
"California Plan."
At a meeting of the Basin States in Las Vegas on March 31-April 1,
1997, California agency representatives outlined to the six states the
status of their internal negotiations toward the development of a
California Plan. Overall, under State of California facilitation, the
California agencies were negotiating five issues: (1) quantification of
the liD and CVWD priorities; (2) the meaning of "conservation" as
against reasonable beneficial use requirements; (3) the amount and
administration of any transfers of conservation savings from
agricultural to municipal agencies; (4) issues of wheeling SDCWA
water through MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct; and (5)
administration and accounting of overruns in use by California
agencies.""
California designed the California Plan to respond directly to the
concerns of the states and the Secretary by articulating a water budget,
timetable, and program to reduce total California water use to 4.4
million acre-feet. The Plan contained components on conservation
measures that would support additional water for MWD, dry year land189. See PartI, supra note 3, at 307-09.
190. In her 1994 testimony before Congress, Assistant Secretary for Water and
Science, Betsy Rieke, had summarized the problem as follows:
The administration problem stems from the fact that the separate rights
of the California agricultural entitlement holders have not been quantified.
Rather, the irrigation districts share ajoint entitlement to 3.85 [million acrefeet] of California's 4.4 [million acre-feet] apportionment. The separate
rights are prioritized so it is clear who has the prior right in normal and
shortage years. However, each district has the right to utilize all the water it
can put to reasonable beneficial use within its service area as long as the 3.85
[million acre-feet] is not exceeded. Such a system of elastic water rights will
make it difficult to assign responsibility for overruns if the 3.85 [million acrefeet] entitlement is exceeded, and places extreme pressure on the junior
entitlement holders. Such a system also hampers water marketing and
transfers when a high priority user tries to transfer water to lower priority
users; users with intervening priorities generally take action to block any
transfers.
Elizabeth Ann Rieke, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Statement Before the Water and Power Subcommittee of the United States Senate
Energy & Nat. Res. Comm. 15 (June 8,1994).
191. Minutes, Record of the Colorado River Basin States Meeting, Las Vegas, Nev. 12 (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1997).
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fallowing options, accounting, administration, overrun accounting,
credit for unmeasured return flows, reasonable and beneficial use,
seepage recovery, settlement of the San Luis Rey claims, conjunctive
use of groundwater, desalinization of drainage water, Salton Sea
impacts, Colorado River impacts, surplus water criteria, Lake Mead
water banking, and use of the Arizona groundwater bank, all of which
were designed to keep MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct essentially full
within California's basic apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet of
water per year.192
However, there were many unresolved issues. First, the plan did
not deal with present perfected rights within California's 4.4 million
acre-feet per year basic apportionment. These rights included Indian
and non-Indian claims totaling about 85,000 acre-feet per year.
Second, the transfers from agricultural agencies to MWD identified in
the Plan (referred to as "core transfers") totaled only about 600,000
acre-feet per year, about 200,000 acre-feet per year short of that
needed for California to get down to 4.4 million acre-feet per year.
Third, perhaps as a result of this shortfall, the Plan relied heavily on
surplus operations and Lake Mead water banking - the very issues that
had precipitated the six-state letter of concern in 1996. Fourth, the
plan did not have a schedule for implementation."' The Director of
the California Department of Water Resources characterized the Plan
as a "work in progress.,194
The California agencies had not reached agreement on many
fundamental issues necessary to implement the core transfers. The
agencies began working on three "lynchpin" issues: (1) SDCWA and
M WD had to finalize an agreement to wheel water, conserved under
the SDCWA/IID agreement, through the Colorado River Aqueduct;
(2) IID and CVWD had to agree on the relative quantification of their
entitlements within California's third priority; and (3) the California
agencies, the DOI, and the Basin States had to agree on the
implementation of surplus and shortage criteria on the Colorado River
- identified as a critical component of establishing a "soft landing" for
California to reduce its water uses to 4.4 million acre-feet per year.
Additionally, the issue of environmental compliance associated
with the implementation of the California Plan came to the forefront.
The implementation of conservation measures in the Imperial Valley
would reduce agricultural return flows to the Salton Sea, thus
increasing salinity levels and hastening the decline of the fishery
resource in the Sea, impacting several listed or candidate species of
192.

See generally Colo. River Bd. of Cal., Draft Policy and Principles of the Colorado

River Board of California: California's Colorado River Plan (Apr. 17, 1997).
193. Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to
Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, Don Ament, Colorado State Senator, Lewis Entz,
Colorado State Representative, Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Colo. River Advisory
Council (Aug. 20, 1997).
194. Alec Rosenberg, Water Plan Doesn't Float, yet, IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS, Aug. 12,

1997, at Al.
195.

FiRsT QUARTERLYPROGRESS REPORT, supra note 177, at 3.
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wildlife under the federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The
United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") requested that no
action be taken for three years, so the impacts to the Sea could be
studied.
Moreover, the California agencies recognized that
implementation of the California Plan required environmental
compliance under both California and federal law.196 These clearly
were complex issues.
Therefore, although the outline of the
California Plan was a start, California was still a significant distance
from having a plan it was ready to implement.
With continued work, the California Plan did get a bit more
specific. For example, a revised plan released in November 1997
established a goal of reaching 4.7 million acre-feetper year by the year
2010 or 2015, with an unspecified second phase.
However, the six
states were not satisfied, and continued to ask questions and seek
specificity to the plan.
In his 1997 speech to the Colorado River Water Users' Association,
Secretary Babbitt highlighted a number of the concerns the six states
had expressed with regard to the lack of specificity and definition in
the California Plan. He stated he would not approve water transfers
from agriculture to urban uses within California unless the agricultural
uses had been quantified. He reiterated his warning to the California
agricultural agencies that they faced reductions based on beneficial
use limitations. He also assured the six states he would support and
implement their proposal for river operating criteria that would
provide California with a soft landing to 4.4 million acre-feet per year,
but only if and when the California Plan was ready to be implemented,
and only if the Plan provided enforceable mechanisms to assure
California stayed on track in its water use reduction program. The
Secretary stated:
When further steps are taken so that firm commitments are in place

for implementation of [Phase I of the California Plan], including the
execution of binding contracts, agreed-on arrangements for
transportation, and resolution of quantification and beneficial use
issues, I will adopt surplus criteria that will permit California to

continue to meet its beneficial use needs from the Colorado River. I
anticipate that these criteria will be effective for a specified number

of years, at which time they will expire of their own terms, and will be
reviewed before they are renewed, in order to ensure that California
continues to make
9 8 reasonable forward progress in implementation of
its strategic plan.

196. Memorandum fromJames S. Lochhead, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res., to
Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, Don Ament, Colorado State Senator, Lewis Entz,
Colorado State Representative, CWCB Members & Colo. River Advisory Council 1-2
(Nov. 3, 1997).
197. COLO. RIVER Bo. OF CAL., DRAFT COLORADO RIrVER BoARD 4.4 PLAN, CAUFORNIA'S
USE OFITS COLORADORIVERALLOCATION 5, 14-15 (Oct. 8, 1997).

198. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1997 Annual Conference 6 (Dec. 18, 1997).
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Following up on his previous year's commitment, the Secretary
also announced the Bureau would publish regulations allowing for
offstream storage of Colorado River water and interstate redemption
or transfer of storage credits in the Lower Basin. Essentially, the
proposed rule would provide a framework and authority for the
implementation of the interstate aspects of the Arizona Groundwater
Banking regulations, primarily between Arizona and Nevada. 99 Under
the regulations, Arizona could store to Nevada's account surplus or
unused Nevada entitlement. In later years, Arizona would then forego
the use of Colorado River water to Nevada's credit, and would take the
stored groundwater in exchange, under the authority of Article
II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v. California.
Although the states supported the regulations as a small but
important step in achieving greater flexibility under the Law of the
River, the Bureau did not adopt the regulations. The Bureau withheld
the regulations over the dispute between the DOI and the State of
Arizona over whether the regulations required a separate federal
contract for contractors to receive and deliver water, or whether the
regulations necessitated only a state contract. The Bureau finally
adopted regulations in 1999.0
The California agencies continued to work on negotiating the
lynchpin issues, but with little to show for their efforts. The California
agencies also presented, and the states discussed, concepts for
applying surplus criteria for Colorado River operations during the
implementation phases of the California Plan. Surplus criteria were
not the focus of any real negotiation, as the basic components of the
California Plan still were not in place.
In April 1998, SDCWA and IID finalized the water conservation
and transfer agreement they had been working on for several years.
The agreement provided for incremental increases in transfers to up
to 200,000 acre-feet, with a possible additional 100,000 acre-feet
available, over a term of up to seventy-five years. IID's statement in the
agreement that land "fallowing will not be a permitted Water
Conservation effort" 2°1 posed one of the most significant issues later
frustrating negotiations to finalize the California Plan. Previous
versions of the IID/SDCWA agreement had included land fallowing as
a source of water to be transferred. However, the agreement had a
number of contingencies such as the need for the SDCWA to reach
agreement with MWD over a wheeling arrangement through the
Colorado River Aqueduct and the requirement for the parties to
mitigate environmental impacts and obtain necessary federal and state
199. Id. at 3; Offstream Storage of Colorado River Water and Interstate Redemption
of Storage Credits in the Lower Division States, 62 Fed. Reg. 68492 (Dec. 31, 1997).
200. Offstream Storage of Colorado River Water and Development and Lease of
Intentionally Created Unused Apportionment in the Lower Division States, 43 C.F.R.
pt.414 (2003).
201. David E. Lindgren, Colorado River Update: The Cliff-Hanger Continues, But is it all
Motion or is There Real ProgressBeneath the Surface?, 3 W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 237, 239
(1999).
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approvals. °2
The six states were becoming increasingly frustrated that the
California agencies were not making any progress in resolving the
lynchpin issues and developing a specific California Plan. In May
1998, the six states sent a letter to Secretary Babbitt expressing their
position that, despite the ongoing negotiations in California, the
Secretary should implement the Law of the River by reducing
California water use to 4.4 million acre-feet in the first year in which he
did not declare a surplus.0 3 Reservoirs on the River had been relatively
full, allowing the Secretary to declare surplus conditions, and enabling
MWD to continue to receive a full supply. Concerned these conditions
would not last, the states wanted to put California on notice that time
was wasting. If reservoir conditions turned less favorable, the states
again would not hesitate to ask the Secretary to make a normal
declaration and enforce reductions in MWD's supply. The states told
the Secretary:
The state of California has taken aggressive steps to facilitate
discussions, but the California 4.4 Plan has not progressed beyond
the concept stage. Southern California agencies have been unable to
bridge internal disagreements over details in the implementation of
the proposed Plan. In the meantime, as each year goes by, we all face
the risk of inevitable drought conditions, which will necessitate the
drawdown of system reservoirs. In short, we are concerned that the
California agencies are squandering the opportunity and the
flexibility the system is currently providing to reduce their excessive
reliance on the Colorado River.
Our states will continue to cooperate in and support the development
of the California 4.4 Plan. However, we also have the obligation to
minimize the risk of shortage and protect for our citizens the right to
use water, now and in the future, under the Law of the River. Our
states continue to rely, among other things, on the limitations
imposed on California under the Self-Limitation Act of 1929.
Absent a California Plan, our states will insist on the enforcement of
normal or shortage conditions on the River when conditions warrant.
Our states also may insist on appropriate limitations on surplus
declarations that support the operational integrity of system
reservoirs and the appropriate beneficial use of water.
In August 1998, SDCWA and MWD reached agreement over the

wheeling issue. The agreement established a mechanism for MWD to
take conserved IID water through the Colorado River Aqueduct for
which SDCWA paid. MWD would then deliver a like amount to San

202. Press Release, San Diego County Water Auth., Landmark Water Conservation
and Transfer Agreement Ratified 3 (Apr. 29, 1998).
203. Letter from the Governor's Representatives on Colorado River Operations,

States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, to Bruce
Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 1-2 (May 27, 1998).
204. Id.
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Diego. A legislative appropriation of $235 million to line IID's canals
assisted the deal.2 0 5 However, the California agencies remained stuck
on the quantification issue, and discussions on the development of
surplus Colorado River criteria remained on hold.
The
SDCWA/MWD wheeling agreement was specifically contingent on:
A. The promulgation and application by the Secretary of the
Interior (the "Secretary") of surplus criteria, including river reoperations, that are sufficient, together with those other water
supplies that are under the control of MWD, to assure that the
Colorado River Aqueduct is full at least through 2015; and
B. The establishment and completion of a process, acceptable to
the Secretary and the State of California, in which the Colorado River
Board and the California public agencies that hold contracts with the
Secretary for delivery of Colorado River water would participate,
which quantifies or otherwise resolves Colorado River agricultural
water entidements in a manner that will assure that water conserved
from reasonable and beneficial uses can be transferred from an

agricultural to an urban agency.206

The six states did not find the first contingency acceptable, that
new surplus criteria "assure" the Colorado River Aqueduct would
remain full through 2015. At a Basin States meeting in San Diego in

September 1998, the six states expressed their opposition to such a
concept, stating that any guarantee of a firm supply for MWD would
create an unreasonable risk of shortage to the other states, and
objecting that, in any event,
the Secretary did not have the authority to
207
make such a guarantee.
The states also laid out some principles to
develop surplus criteria, which they would later put in writing. Equally
discouraging, David Hayes, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, who had
been attempting to facilitate discussions between IID and CVWD on
the quantification issue, reported the negotiations were at an
impasse. 201
XIV. THE SIX STATES TAKE THE INITIATIVE ON INTERIM
SURPLUS GUIDELINES
The six states found the contingency in the IID/SDCWA transfer

agreement concerning surplus criteria substantively unacceptable. In
addition, the states realized they did not want to be pressured by
contingencies in California agency agreements into accepting surplus
criteria put forward by California. The states felt it was important that
205.
MWD
206.
207.

Memorandum of Understanding of Essential Terms of a Contract Between
and SDCWA 5 (Aug. 12, 1998).
Id. at 2-3.
Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to the Governor's Representatives on

Colorado River Operations, States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming 2 (Sept. 11, 1998).

208. James S. Lochhead, Personal Notes, Seven States Meeting, San Diego, Cal., at 1
(Sept. 21, 1998).
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they, rather than California, control the agenda as to the terms of any
criteria the Secretary might adopt. Therefore, in October 1998 the six
states prepared and forwarded to California and to the DOI their

Background and Principles for Negotiation - Special Interim Criteria for
Releases of Water From Lake Mead During Implementation of the California
4.4 Plan.209 The states designed the document to "lay down a marker"
by them as to the bottom-line positions they were willing to negotiate.
Stated below, the document articulated principles under which the
states would negotiate interim surplus criteria.
There is no need or justification for the Secretary to modify the
existing Operating Criteria to accommodate the California 4.4 Plan.
The existing Operating Criteria should remain in effect during
implementation of the 4.4 Plan, and upon termination or expiration
of the special interim criteria. Instead of modifying the Operating
Criteria, the Secretary should adopt special interim criteria for
releases of water from Lake Mead. The six states will prepare a more
detailed proposal that describes acceptable interim Lake Mead
operating criteria. The following elements should be addressed in
the adoption of the special interim criteria:
1. No water user, including MWD and SDCWA, can be
guaranteed or assured of a firm supply for any specified period. Any
assurance or guarantee of supply to MWD and SDCWA will create
unreasonable risk to other states. Moreover, the Secretary of the
Interior does not have the authority to adopt any criteria that would
assure any water user of a full supply. Any risk created by the
implementation of the interim criteria shall be borne by the Lower
Division State(s) which benefited from the additional water made
available.
2. The interim criteria will not take effect until firm commitments
are in place in California to implement Phase I of the 4.4 Plan,
including the execution of binding contracts, agreed-on
arrangements for transportation, and resolution of the quantification
and beneficial use issues.
3. Any interim criteria will be effective only for a specified period
of years, after which the interim criteria will expire on their own
terms. The states and Interior will need to discuss the time-frame for
the interim criteria suggested in the MWD/SDCWA agreement. After
expiration of the interim criteria, the existing Operating Criteria will
continue to control operations, unless the Secretary modifies the
Operating Criteria pursuant to his authority and under the process
set out in the Criteria.
4. Any interim criteria should include triggers that will implement
different surplus or shortage deliveries at specified target elevations
of storage. Such triggers may need to include an assessment of the

209. STATES OF ARIZ., COLO., NEv., N.M., UTAH AND WYo., BACKGROUND AND
PRINCIPLES FOR NEGOTIATION - SPECIAL INTERIM CRITERIA FOR RELEASES OF WATER FROM
LAKE MEAD DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA 4.4 PLAN
[hereinafter SIX STATES PRINCIPLES].

(Oct. 20, 1998)
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water available to MWD and SDCWA from all sources of supply. The
criteria should also include benchmarks, reporting mechanisms, and
reviews, by which California will demonstrate measurable and defined
progress in meeting the goals of the 4.4 Plan. If sufficient progress is
not being made, the interim criteria should automatically and by
their own terms terminate or suspend, and operations will revert back
to the existing Operating Criteria under a 70R strategy with no lookahead.
5. Interim criteria should expire by 2015. Phase I of the Plan
does not achieve a reduction in use in California to 4.4 [million acrefeet per year]. California should identify how Phase II will be
developed and implemented concurrently with Phase I, such that use
in California in normal years will be reduced to 4.4 [million acre-feet]
by 2015.
6. Any amount declared by the Secretary as surplus above the 7.5
[million acre-feet per year] basic apportionment available to the
Lower Division States must be apportioned 50% to California, unless
Arizona and Nevada choose not to divert and use the 46% and 4% of
the surplus amount that is available to those states, respectively. Any
interim criteria should address the conditions under which Arizona
and Nevada would agree not to divert and use their respective 46%
and 4% interests in such surplus.
7. The interim criteria should address use of water during
shortage and surplus conditions by the states of Arizona and Nevada,
in order to optimize operations agreed to by those states under the
Arizona Water Bank.
8. The interim criteria may need to address the issue of off-stream
storage, whether during surplus or flood control release conditions,
and whether such storage should be accounted under the
equalization and 602(a) storage requirements of the Operating
Criteria.
9. The Secretary of the Interior should implement measures to
water in the
curtail all illegal uses
.210of mainstream Colorado River
Lower Basin by
In December 1998, the six states issued a detailed proposal for
interim surplus criteria that would meet the articulated principles.
The states based the proposal on making surplus water available not
only to MWD, but also to Southern Nevada. The states predicated the
proposal on the agreement of Arizona to temporarily waive, under
defined circumstances, all or a portion of its legal entitlement to fortysix percent of any surplus.1
The states proposed that the Secretary declare surplus conditions
in tiers, depending on the water level in Lake Mead. In a normal year,
the proposal limited each state to its basic apportionment. In a year of

210. Id. at 2-4.
211. SeePartIl, supra note 3, at 309, 312.
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partial municipal and industrial ("M&I") surplus, the proposal allowed
MWD and the SNWA to meet a portion of their needs, but no other
surplus water would be available from the system to any other water
user. In a full M&I surplus year, the proposal allowed MWD and
Southern Nevada to meet all their needs, but again no other water
user would receive surplus water.
The Secretary would make
additional surplus water available in years when warranted based on a
70R strategy.
The six states preferred the 70R strategy because it results in fuller
reservoirs, and thus creates less risk of shortage when drought
conditions exist. California preferred strategies that resulted in more
frequent and deeper surpluses, providing more water to MWD,
drawing system reservoirs down further. The six states viewed these
strategies as increasing risks of shortage conditions, elevating delivery
costs, potentially degrading water quality, and losing recreational
benefits. Moreover, the Upper Basin States opposed other operating
strategies supported by California because they would receive no direct
benefit from surplus declarations, but must bear the negative impacts
of having Lake Powell lowered as a result of equalization requirement
in the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act and the Operating
Criteria.Y
XV. THE IID/COACHIELLA PEACE ACCORD AND THE MWD/IID
MELTDOWN
As the six states worked on their interim surplus guideline
proposal, the DOI and the California agricultural agencies re-engaged
in intense negotiations. However, neglecting to include MWD in these
negotiations turned out to be one of the major flaws in this new round
of negotiations. In December 1998, Secretary Babbitt made his annual
speech to the Colorado River Water Users Association. He spoke on
four basic subject areas: (1) a newly negotiated quantification
memorandum of understanding between IID and CVWD;114 (2) the
development of interim surplus criteria; (3) the Lower Basin water
banking regulation; and (4) the Salton Sea.21
First,
Secretary
Babbitt outlined
the
terms of the
Interior/IID/CVWD
agreement.
This
memorandum
of
understanding established the basis for more detailed negotiations
212. This operational strategy is based on providing adequate reservoir storage
capacity necessary to capture an assumed runoff without spilling, rather than an actual
annual forecast. The 70R strategy is based on an assumed runoff value of the
seventieth percentile of excedance based on the historic period of record.
213. See PartI, supra note 3, at 314.
214. Memorandum of Understanding between IID/CVWD/DOI Regarding
Quantification of Colorado River Rights (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter IID/CVWD/DOI
MOU].
215. Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 1998 Annual Conference (Dec. 17, 1998); Memorandum from James S.
Lochhead, to Colo. Water Conservation Bd. & Colo. River Advisory Council 2 (Dec.
26, 1998).
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over the next six months, but was subject to a number of
contingencies. Nonetheless, the agreement appeared to represent
significant progress by the California agencies in the resolution of
three "lynchpin issues" on which they had been working. Some of the
key provisions of the agreement were as follows:
The agreement would cap IID's entitlement under Priority 3 of
the 1931 Seven Party Agreement at 3.1 million acre-feet per
year (which was about its current level of use), from which
would be deducted conserved water transferred under the 1988
MWD agreement and the IID/SDCWA agreement. This cap
would provide the necessary baseline from which to measure
the conservation transfers to MWD and SDCWA.
CVWD would have a base entitlement of 330,000 acre-feet per
year under Priority 3, plus another 50,000 acre-feet per year
under a 1989 agreement that otherwise would have been
available to MWD, plus the right to another 138,000 acre-feet
per year of conserved water when the 1989 agreement
terminated.
Under the Seven Party Agreement, the PVID and Yuma Project
rights under Priorities 1 and 2 are quantified by acreage, not by
amount of water. To the extent that diversions under those
priorities exceeded an average of 420,000 acre-feet per year
and caused total diversions under the first three priorities to
exceed 3.85 million acre-feet, IID and CVWD would absorb
that excess on a 90/10 basis.
IID and CVWD entered into a "peace agreement," by which
they would agree not to challenge each other's water practices,
i.e. assert they are wasting or not beneficially using water.
The agreement recognized that MWD was not a party and was
not involved in the negotiations. The agreement obligated the
parties to a six-month period not only to finalize an agreement
with MWD's participation, but also to allow for a period for the
DOI to develop surplus operating criteria for the Colorado
River reservoirs.
IID and CVWD also wanted a "peace
agreement" with MWD, by which MWD would agree to allow
conserved water to be transferred from IID to CVWD and not
challenge IID's or CVWD's use of water. CVWD also wanted
MWD to invest in groundwater
recharge
facilities within the
• .
_
217
Coachella Valley, to store its wet-year water.
Second, Secretary Babbitt turned to interim surplus criteria. The
Secretary stated his desire to move forward with the development of
interim criteria through an "open public process."1 8 Although he
216.
217.
MOU,
218.

Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, supra note 215, at 2; IID/CVWD/DOI
supra note 214, at 2-5.
Bruce Babbitt 1998 Address, supranote 215, at 4.
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noted the six-state proposal and urged the states to reach agreement,
he stated that if the states did not reach agreement, he would move
unilaterally after the six month period referenced in the IID/CVWD
agreement, giving "due regard" to the views of the states.1 9
Significantly, he also seemed to accept California's proposal that the
California Plan be developed in two phases, reducing its use of water
only half way to 4.4 million acre-feet by the year 2015 - as opposed to
all the way as proposed by the six states.20 The Secretary's position on
this issue troubled the other states. If it were implemented, in light of
the "peace agreement" proposed' in the Interior/IID/CVWD
agreement, the other states would be the only parties left to make
beneficial use challenges to California agencies, with California still
400,000 acre-feet short of its goal.
Third, the Secretary referred to the deadlock between the DOI
and Arizona over the proposed Lower Basin banking regulations that
had been published a year earlier. The DOI had not finalized the
regulations because of disagreement between the DOI and Arizona
over whether the Arizona water bank would need to enter into a new,
separate contact with the Secretary, or whether the existing agreement
with the CAWCD, which runs the CAP, would suffice. The Secretary
stated that if these regulations were not finalized, he would look at
"other possibilities" to meet the needs of Nevada.2
Finally, the Secretary reported on the status of the Salton Sea.22
He noted the passage of the Salton Sea Reclamation Act,223 and
reminded the audience of the difficulty of implementing water
conservation in the Imperial Valley in a way that resolved the Salton
Sea environmental problems.22 ' This statement was prophetic, as the
environmental issues surrounding the Salton Sea would be one of the
major reasons why the negotiations over the finalization of the
California Plan would ultimately fail.
The "peace accord" began to unravel almost immediately. Shortly
after the Secretary's speech, the MWD Board of Directors considered a
proposed policy that questioned some of the basic premises of the
IID/CVWD agreement. It questioned whether MWD should give up
its right to judicially challenge waste and beneficial use in the Imperial
Valley, whether urban rate payers should be required to pay for
agricultural water that federal taxpayers had already subsidized, and
whether the Secretary of the Interior should simply unilaterally 2re25
allocate water among the parties to the 1931 Seven Party Agreement.
The IID became aware of the policy questions and fired off a letter to
219. Id.
220. See id.
at 3.
221. Id. at 4.
222. Id.
223. Salton Sea Reclamation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-372, 112 Stat. 3377, 33773380.
224. Bruce Babbitt 1998 Address, supra note 215, at 5.
225. Memorandum from Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. Negotiating Team, to Bd. of
Dirs. 3-4 (Jan. 6, 1999).
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MWD asserting that relinquishing beneficial use claims was indeed
necessary to reach an accord on the quantification of agricultural
priorities within Southern California, and denied receiving subsidized
water, having paid the debt on its diversion facilities. 26
Secretary Babbitt met with MWD in an attempt to diffuse the
impending breakdown in negotiations. He denied that he had the
2 27
authority to reallocate water under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement.
Refusing to back down, in a letter to the Secretary immediately after
the meeting, MWD stated, "the Department owes a duty to urban
Southern California water users to determine whether the public
interest warrants continuing the 1931 allocations of Colorado River
water made available through federal reclamation programs among
agricultural and urban users within California."2 ' The letter went on
to express a concern that was shared by the six states, the proposed
quantification agreement would not achieve a full reduction in
California water use, and would therefore "leave urban Southern
California with assurances of only half the water it needs to fill its
Colorado Aqueduct in the long run."22
MWD then circulated a draft resolution to its member agencies
urging the Secretary to "review and adjust California's Colorado River
allocations for the highest and best use of this precious public
resource."2 0 The Secretary responded that "MET's newly-articulated
interest in reappropriating Colorado River water undercuts the basic
policy commitment and approach adopted by California in its 4.4 Plan,
and undermines the actions that many California entities and the
[DOI] have been making to implement the California Plan."2 1 IID
went on a spirited defense of its water rights and the permanency of its
allocation under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement, writing letters,
generating articles, and articulating its legal position. Following
another exchange of letters between MWD, IID, and the Secretary's
office, Secretary Babbitt decided he had had enough. Expressing his
hope the disagreements would not "signal the onset of yet another
western water war," the Secretary backed out of any further meetings
with the California agencies. 2

226. Letter from Bruce Kuhn, President, Imperial Irrigation Dist., to Phil Pace,
Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Jan. 11, 1999).
227. Tony Perry, Babbitt Deals Setback to MWD, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at A3.
228. Letter from PhillipJ. Pace, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.,
to Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 1 (Jan. 25, 1999).
229. Id. at 2.
230. See Letter from Tellis Codekas, President, Coachella Valley Water Dist., Bruce
Kuhn, Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Robert Micalizio, President, Palo Verde Irrigation
Dist., to Phillip J. Pace, Chairman, Bd. of Dirs., Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal.
(Feb. 2, 1999) (quoting parts of the resolution).
231. Letter from DavidJ. Hayes, Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
to Phillip J. Pace, Chairman-Elect, Bd. of Dirs., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. 3 (Feb. 1,
1999).
232. Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior, to Phillip J. Pace, Chairman,
Bd. of Dirs., Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. (Feb. 10, 1999).
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XVI. RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS: THE "KEY TERMS"
AGREEMENT
In March of 1998, the California legislature held a hearing on
Southern California water issues. 3 Several legislators were openly
critical of MWD's approach to water negotiations, even threatening to
pass legislation that would dismantle MWD or strip it of a significant
amount of its powers. Legislators also urged IID and the SDCWA to4
press forward in the negotiation of their water transfer agreement.2
Secretary Babbitt testified at the hearing, and announced that he
would initiate a "process" to seek input to the development of surplus
criteria on the Colorado River.2 5 The Secretary attempted to instill a
sense of urgency in California, stating, "' [i]t is past time for California
to get suited up, out of the locker room and into the game .... Unless
we can get together on the terms of this contract, the whole thing will
collapse.' He continued, '[y]ou'll be sitting on the bench... I can't
wait any longer.'"2 3' 6 Babbitt warned that "within [thirty] days he would
begin the process of promulgating new criteria for the operation of
Colorado River facilities, the declaration of 'surpluses,' and the
apportionment of its waters. He added that the rules would be 'less
favorable 2to37 California unless a [IID/SDCWA] transfer plan is
approved.'
Shortly thereafter, at a meeting with state representatives, he
explained his proposal. He stated that he had no preconceived notion
as to the form or substance of what he might do, or whether he would
even do anything at all. He announced that the DOI would publish a
federal register notice soliciting comment as to whether, and if so
what, it should do with respect to surplus criteria. The Secretary
intended the proposal as a way to put additional pressure on California
to resolve and finalize the California 4.4 Plan.2 " The DOI worked with
the Basin States to develop the notice, which was worded so as to warn
California it could either be included in the process or left out.23 9
233. MIWD's Policy Toward the California4.4 Plan: HearingBefore the Senate Select Comm.
on S. Cal. Water Districts'Expenditures& Governance, 1999 Leg. (Cal. Mar. 17, 1999).
234. Rudy Yniguez, Water Districts Told to Move Ahead With Transfer, IMPERIAL VALLEY
PRESS, Apr. 28, 1999, at Al.

235. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., Peter Evans, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Randy Seaholm,
Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,Jennifer Gimbel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., & Carol
Angel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., at 1 (Apr. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Colo. River
Update].
236. W. States Water Council, Water Resources, California/ColoradoRiver, W. STATES
WATER, Apr. 2, 1999, at 2.
237. Id.
238. Colo. River Update, supranote 235, at 1-2.
239. The notice stated, in part:
[R]eclamation intends to scope and, if appropriate, to develop and
implement specific criteria under which "surplus" determinations will be
made for the Lower Basin States.
Reclamation may implement the surplus criteria by revising the LongRange Operating Criteria set forth in Article 111(3) or by developing interim
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Secretary Babbitt, through his Deputy Secretary David Hayes, also
entered back into the California agency negotiations on the 4.4 Plan as
a mediator. 240 The internal negotiations immediately focused on the

most important and contentious issue: quantification of the California
agricultural priorities, specifically IID's. The core issue remained the
same - what was the appropriate cap on IID's right, as compared to the
amount of water that was reasonably required to meet the beneficial
use needs of Imperial Valley farmers? 2 Also at issue were: (1) a
proposal to eventually transfer 500,000 acre-feet from IID to SDCWA
2 42
and MWD; and (2) the impacts to the Imperial Valley economy.
However, this time, the reluctant party was the Coachella Valley
Water District. Under the Seven Party Agreement, CVWD shared
priority 3(a) with LID. 242 It faced a continuing groundwater overdraft
problem, and its leverage was its threat to assert its legal right under
the Seven Party Agreement to take and use ahead of MWD and
SDCWA any conserved water that MWD or SDCWA might pay for
within IID. Using its leverage, CVWD bargained for its share of a
shrinking California pie.
After months of intense negotiation, Secretary Babbitt and the
California agencies announced they had reached agreement on the
critical issue of quantifying the California agricultural priorities. In
October 1999, the DOI, IID, CVWD, MWD and the State of California
signed what became known as the "Key Terms Agreement.

44

The

Agreement was conceptual and not legally binding, and was also
subject to several contingencies, but nevertheless represented a
significant step forward in finalizing the California Plan. It filled in the
missing pieces of the IID/CVWD "peace accord" of nearly a year
earlier. Notably, the Agreement established a "quantification period"
of seventy-five years from the date of the first water transfer under the
implementing criteria pursuant to Article 111(3)
Operating Criteria....

of the Long-Range

...Reclamation recognizes that efforts are currently underway to reduce
California's reliance on surplus deliveries.
Reclamation will take account of progress in that effort, or lack thereof,
in the decision-making process regarding specific surplus criteria.
Reclamation also intends to make full use of technical information and
approaches that have been developed through on-going discussions with the
Basin States.
Intent to Solicit Comments on the Development of Surplus Criteria for Management
of the Colorado River and to Initiate National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,008, 27,009 (May 18, 1999).

240. Tony Perry, Mediator Will try to Keep Water war From Boiling Over, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1999, at A3; Colo. River Update, supra note 235, at 2.
241. See generally Michael Gardner, Agreement on Colorado River Water use Nears, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRiB., May 29, 1999, at A3-4 (summarizing discussions between water
users about quantification of their water rights, and 3.1 million acre-feet cap for IID).
242. See Rudy Yniguez, IID Puts 500,000 acre-feet on Table, IMPERIAL VALLEY PRESS, June
4, 1999, at Al.
243. See PartI, supra note 3, at 308.
244. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES. ET AL., KEY TERMS FOR QUANTIFICATION SETTILEMENT
AMONGTHE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, lID, CVWD AND MWD (Oct. 15, 1999).
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1998 IID/SDCWA water transfer agreement.15 Also, it established a
"water budget" for the agencies during the quantification period
consisting of a 3.1 million acre-foot cap on IID's water use and a
330,000 acre-foot cap on CVWD's water use."'
The Agreement provided a basis for quantifying transfers of water
between the three agencies. It not only allowed MWD and SDCWA
access to conserved IID water, but also allowed CVWD access to IID
water in order to resolve its groundwater overdraft problem. 47 If the
parties implemented all the transfers, at times when California would
be limited to its 4.4 million acre-foot basic apportionment, IID would
be limited to 2.61 to 2.69 million acre-feet, CVWD would receive
456,000 acre-feet, and MWD would have the ability to run a full
Colorado River Aqueduct, with 771-851,000 acre-feet of Priority 4
water combined with obligations to the San Luis Rey Indian water
rights settlement, and water made available from water put into
groundwater storage in MWD's Hayfield, Cadiz, or other projects when
surplus water was available. 8
The parties also honored what was now becoming a California
tradition of making agreements subject to a wide array of conditions
precedent or subsequent. The effectiveness of the Agreement was
subject to a dozen conditions precedent drafted to the advantage of
the California agencies that allowed them discretion to terminate the
agreement if matters did not work out to their satisfaction. Four such
conditions precedent included: (1) completion of environmental
reviews with an ESA Section 10(a) "no surprises" assurance; (2) DOI
adoption of revised surplus criteria for Colorado River operations that
would "assure" MWD a full Colorado River Aqueduct for fifteen years;
(3) Bureau adoption of standards and procedures for decree
accounting and "inadvertent overruns" of the caps to which the parties
had agreed; and (4) California State Water Resources Control Board
approval of the contemplated water transfers.4
Following a briefing by California and the DOI in Ontario,
California in December 1999, the six states submitted their written
reaction to the Key Terms Agreement. In particular, they stated they
would not back down from the principles for negotiation and the
proposed interim operating criteria they had submitted to California
and the DOI a year earlier. The states also made clear they felt the
California agencies still had a long way to go in the development of a
California Plan. The states wanted to make their views known before
Secretary Babbitt gave his annual speech to the Colorado River Water
Users Association in Las Vegas. The states said:

245. Id. at 23.
246. Id. at 3-4, 12.
247. Id. at 5-10.

248. Id. at 16A.
249.

CAL. DEP'T OF WATERRES. ET AL., supra note 244, at 17-19.
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The Ontario briefing made it clear that while the Quantification
Agreement was an integral part of the 4.4 Plan, it is not the 4.4 Plan.
That document is still being developed. It is apparent from the text
of the Quantification Agreement and the responses to our questions,
that the proposed conservation transfers will not, by themselves, allow
MWD to maintain a full aqueduct within California's 4.4 [million
acre-feet] basic apportionment.
We cannot over-emphasize the need for California to commit to
reduce its Colorado River uses to 4.4 [million acre-feet] in order to
gain support within our states for the more flexible operating criteria
California desires....
As the representatives of our states' governors, we must be able to
explain the benefits, and justify the risks, of adopting more liberal
operating criteria to our legislators, congressional members, water
users and the general citizenry. The sole benefit to our states is
California's guarantee that it will reduce its basic demands for
Colorado River water to 4.4 [million acre-feet]. This issue has
concerned the Basin States for over seventy years. The temporary use
of some surplus water to provide a 'soft landing' to California may
well be worth the risks created but without the promise of a 'light at
the end of the tunnel' through the implementation of a 4.4 Plan,
there is very little hope that we can muster support within our states
to liberalize the operating criteria.

All six states have repeatedly stated that we are willing to engage in
serious discussions about the development of multi-year surplus and
shortage criteria that will meet, for an interim period only, at least
part of the demand for surplus water in California. In order for those
discussions to be fruitful, however, certain steps must be taken by
your water agencies. First and foremost, a 4.4 Plan must be adopted
that commits California to an enforceable program to reduce its
dependence on Colorado River water. Second, we expect that any
operating criteria will be focused on meeting California's objective of
protecting its M&I economy within the 4.4 [million acre-feet] base
apportionment. Third, any criteria must be of an interim nature
only, sufficient to provide a cushion to California while it steps down
its use through meaningful conservation measures and water
transfers. Fourth, we expect that in the development of interim
operating criteria, full consideration will be given to the impacts and
risks that extraordinary releases from Lake Mead may create. And
finally, we expect that the direct beneficiaries of the "soft landing"
interim surplus criteria should be responsible for bearing the risks,
and mitigating the impacts on others caused by those critena."O

250. Letter from Governors' Representatives on Colorado River Operations, States
of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, to Tom Hannigan,
Dir., Cal. Dep't of Water Res.,Jerry Zimmerman, Dir., Colo. River Bd. of Cal. 1-3 (Dec.
6, 1999).
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XVII. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERIM SURPLUS GUIDELINES
The pieces were finally in place. California was working on the
development of a specific California Plan, and the DOI had begun the
scoping process necessary to comply with NEPA in preparation of
surplus criteria and was preparing alternative sets of criteria for
analysis in an environmental impact statement ("EIS"). The DOI
broadcasted to the states that they should develop a "consensus" set of
surplus guidelines to include in the NEPA analysis, or the DOI would
make its own assumptions and determination.
With that impetus, the states - this time including California began to negotiate. California prepared a set of interim surplus
criteria as a counter proposal to the six-state proposal prepared in
October 1998. The California agencies tied their criteria to the
implementation schedule of the 4.4 Plan. The California criteria
agreed with the six-state criteria in allowing a fifteen-year period for
California to implement its Plan and prepare to live within its basic
apportionment. But the Plan did not provide for enough water
transfers for MWD's priority to be fully met within California's basic
apportionment for the fifteen-year period.
California based its criteria, like the six-state criteria, on a tiered
approach under which the Secretary would make different types of
surplus declarations based on the water elevation in Lake Mead, with
more restrictive surpluses, and finally a normal declaration, as Lake
Mead levels dropped. However, the California criteria contemplated
more anticipated surpluses, which would allow MWD to put some two
million acre-feet of surplus water into groundwater storage during the
fifteen-year period. That groundwater storage would then allow MWD
time to implement the Phase II portion of the California Plan to
effectuate enough transfers to actually get its priority within
California's basic apportionment. Both sets of criteria also allowed
Nevada access to surplus water during the fifteen-year period, in order
to put some surplus water away into groundwater storage.2 5 1
Concurrently with the state negotiations to develop consensus
criteria, California produced a new Colorado River Water Use Plan in
May 2000. Unfortunately, there was not much new in the Plan. It
outlined a menu of water conservation based transfers within Southern
California that would reduce demand for Colorado River water of
about 480,000 acre-feet over a fifteen-year period, thus resulting not in
a "4.4 Plan" but a "4.8 Plan." The Plan also reiterated the "Lynchpin
Components" - key elements needed to be in place for the Plan to be
effective. In particular, the Plan recognized, as essential, the Key
Terms for Quantification Settlement. The Plan stated:

251.

See Memorandum from Dennis B. Underwood, Vice-Pres. Metro. Water Dist. of

S. Cal., to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. (Mar. 15, 2000); Notes
from Seven States Meeting - Phoenix (Mar. 22, 2000). See generally S. NEv. WATER
AuTH., COMPARISON OF INTERIM CRITERIA PROPOSALS (Mar. 22, 2000) (showing tiered

plan based on Lake Mead elevations, graphically comparing proposals).
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The lack of further quantification of the third priority would make it
difficult to develop and implement cooperative water supply
programs and can cast uncertainty as to water supply reliability.
Further quantification of the third priority also can provide the
needed quantum baseline
which conservation and transfer
programs can be measured. 2 by
To their credit, the California agencies were working hard on the
enormously complex array of agreements and environmental
compliance processes necessary to implement the California 253
Plan.
The California agencies identified some thirty-two such elements.
A. ISSUE RESOLUTION TO FINALIZE THE INTERIM SURPLUS GUIDELINE
PROPOSAL
Through their negotiations, the state representatives neared
agreement on a seven-state interim surplus guidelines proposal. In
essence, California agreed to the six-state proposal, and, of particular
importance to the six states, to the adoption of the 70R strategy as
guiding baseline operations and operations after the termination of
the Guidelines after fifteen years. The states, working with the DOI,
also identified several issues they needed to resolve to finalize the
Guidelines.
1. Mitigation
The basic principle of the mitigation approach was that those who
would benefit from the interim surplus criteria must also mitigate for
the incremental harm to others attributable to their use of surplus
water under interim criteria as compared to a base case (70R)
operating strategy for making surplus water available. This concept
was consistent with the 1998 six-state letter setting forth their
principles of negotiation.254
California proposed two potential
approaches to mitigation: a "volume-based approach" by which the
incremental difference in reservoir volume as compared to the base
case would be mitigated; and a "risk based approach" by which
mitigation would be provided up front for the risk of shortages.
The other states preferred volume-based approach, and also
suggested an approach by which mitigation would be measured in
three forms: a shortage being triggered sooner than would otherwise
252.

COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFT: CALIFORNIA'S COLORADO RIVER WATER USE PLAN

25-26 (May 11, 2000).
253. CAL. DEP'T OF

WATER

RES.,

CALIFORNIA'S

QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT MILESTONES

COLORADO

RIVER

WATER

USE

(June 13, 2000) (provided to

Senate Agriculture & Water Committee and Assembly Water, Parks & Wildlife
Committee). Among the required elements were the QSA Agreement; four water
transfer agreements among IID, CVWD, MWD and San Diego; a federal approval
agreement for each of the transfer agreements; construction and funding agreements
for implementation of canal lining and other construction activities; Indian reserved

rights settlement agreements; and California and federal environmental and
endangered species compliance.

254.

See SIx STATES PRINCIPLES, supra note

209, at 3.
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be the case under 70R; a "deeper" shortage than would otherwise be
the case under 70R; and a longer shortage than would otherwise be
the case under 70R. California would mitigate this impact by actually
foregoing the delivery of water in the year of the shortage in the
amount of the incremental difference by which California had
benefited. The obligation to mitigate would extend beyond the
interim surplus period, since the risk also would extend beyond this
period. The mitigation obligation would terminate either when
reservoir levels converged with a 70R operation, or in the event of a
spill, whichever occurred first. The states also discussed mitigation for
impacts to Las Vegas Wash, including erosion and water quality
impacts as well as recreation impacts at Lake Mead resulting from
lower lake levels. 55
2. Enforcement
Both the six states and the DOI insisted the Guidelines should be
enforceable. In other words, they wanted California's water use
reduction to be placed on a schedule, and measures in place to assure
California would not benefit from the interim criteria unless it met the
schedule. This was also consistent with the 1998 six-state principles.2 5 6
The states and the DOI discussed and rejected alternative enforcement
mechanisms, such as federal legislation or a stipulation in Arizona v.
Californiathat would embody the schedule for California to step down
to 4.4 million acre-feet over the fifteen-year period. State discussions
centered on enforcement mechanisms within the Guidelines
themselves, such as automatic termination and reversion to 70R
operating criteria at the end of the fifteen-year period and automatic
reversion to 70R criteria if California did not meet identified water use
reduction benchmarks. 7
3. Overrun Accounting and Averaging
The California agencies had, throughout the negotiation process,
linked their desire for a mechanism to pay back "inadvertent overruns"
in their use of water to the implementation of the California Plan.
The agencies proposed the DOI approve "inadvertent overrun
accounts" for each of the California agencies equal to ten percent of
the quantities specified in the Key Terms agreement, with a five-year
period to pay back such overruns. 258 The states and the DOI discussed
255. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., Peter Evans, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Randy Seaholm,
Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,Jennifer Gimbel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., & Carol
Angel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., at 1-2 (June 8, 2000).
256. See SIx STATES PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 3.
257. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFT: ENFORCEABIUT OF INTERIM LAKE MEAD
OPERATING CRITERIA 1-4 (June 15, 2000); See Six STATES PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 3.
258. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CUMULATIVE INADVERTENT
OVERRUN ACCOUNTS FOR THE IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, COACHELLA VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT, AND THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 6-7 (June

7, 2000).
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a draft federal register notice that would solicit comments on the
development of an administrative policy to deal with these issues.259
Additionally, MWD presented the states a paper outlining a
proposal concerning decree averaging. The paper described the
difficulty of MWD's position as being junior to the unquantified senior
260
rights of the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Yuma Project.
For example, deliveries to PVID varied between 314,000 and 504,000
acre-feet per year, resulting in uncertainty in scheduling for MWD.
The paper proposed allowing these senior rights to be accounted, for
purposes of scheduling water deliveries, based on a defined historic
average as opposed to actual use in any one year, thus allowing MWD
to schedule a firm delivery for any particular year. This operation
would, however, also result in California exceeding 4.4 million acrefeet even in normal years, with MWD being required to "pay back" any
overruns through the "inadvertent overrun" procedures. 2 ' The six
states opposed this proposal as inconsistent with the Decree in Arizona

v. California,since the Decree and the Operating Criteria contemplate
only annual determinations and operations.
4. Environmental Mitigation
The California agencies and the DOI had underway, on parallel
tracks, a multitude of environmental compliance processes, in addition
to the EIS process underway to develop Guidelines. These included a
programmatic environmental impact review ("EIR") under California
law to implement the Key Terms agreement, a joint EIR/EIS for the
implementation of the IID/SDWCA water transfer, an EIR for
Coachella groundwater management, ESA section 10(a) no surprises
assurance and section 7 consultation, and an environmental
assessment to settle the San Luis Rey Tribal reserved rights
Settlement. 62 Consultation with the USFWS began regarding potential
impacts of reduced water use in the Imperial Valley on the Salton Sea.
Reduced return flows would increase salinity levels, accelerating the
decline of the Salton Sea ecosystem. IID insisted on a $15 million
limitation on the amount of money it would spend on mitigation
measures,
and looked to other agencies to pick up all costs above this
263
amount.

259. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT DEFINITION AND
PAYBACK OF INADVERTENT OVERRUNS, AND USE OF LONG TERM AVERAGING METHOD FOR
DELIVERY OF COLORADO RIVER WATER (Aug. 17, 2000).
260. Part I, supra note 3, at 307-09.
261. COLO. RIVER BD. OF CAL., DRAFr:

ACCOUNTING OF CONSUMPTIVE USES AS THE
AVERAGE ANNUAL CONSUMPTIVE USE OVER PRECEDINGYEARS 3-4, 7 (Aug. 16, 2000).

262. CAL. DEP'T OF WATERRES., supra note 253, at 3-4.
263. Sue McClurg, A Colorado River Compromise, W. WATER, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 4,13.
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B. ISSUES ARISING DURING THE EIS PROCESS
In July 2000, the DOI published a draft EIS ("DEIS") on the
proposed adoption of interim surplus criteria.Y" The DEIS analyzed
four alternatives: a baseline (no action) alternative premised on a 75R
strategy; 6" a "flood control" alternative that limited surpluses to times
when the Bureau made flood control releases from Lake Mead; a "sixstates alternative" that was a modified version of the Guidelines
proposed by the six states; and a "California Alternative" based on the
criteria proposed as part of the Key Terms Agreement.
At about the time the DOI published the DEIS, the seven states

completed negotiations on their draft of proposed interim surplus
criteria, and forwarded the draft to the DOI. After discussing the draft
with the states, the DOI published the states' alternative in the federal
register as "supplementary information" received in the EIS process,

paving the way for the alternative to be incorporated within the final
EIS ("FEIS"). 2 6
The Bureau issued the FEIS in December 2000, which described
six alternatives: no action; the preferred Basin States Alternative; the

Flood Control Alternative; the Six States Alternative; the California
Alternative; and the Shortage Protection Alternative.2 67 The preferred
alternative was based on the criteria the seven states had jointly

proposed to the DOI in July.
The FEIS included a summary
description of the preferred alternative, and attached a "Draft Interim

264. The proposed federal action was described as:
[T]he adoption of specific interim surplus criteria pursuant to Article
III(3) (b) of the [Operating Criteria]. The interim surplus criteria would be
used annually to determine whether the conditions exist under which the
Secretary may declare the availability of "surplus" water, as defined, for use
within the states of Arizona, California and Nevada. The criteria must be
consistent with both the Decree entered by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1964
in the case of Arizona v. California (Decree) and the [Operating Criteria].
The interim surplus criteria would remain in effect through calendar year
2015, subject to five-year reviews, concurrent with the [Operating Criteria]
reviews, and applied each year as part of the Annual Operating Plan.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Draft EnvironmentalImpact Statement
Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, at S-1 (filed July 7, 2000), at
http://www.lc.usbr.gov/g4000/surplus/SURPLUS_DEIS.HTML.
265. A 75R strategy:
[R]efers to a value for which 75 percent of the historic natural flow at Lee
Ferry is less than this value (18.1 [million acre-feet]).
Spill avoidance
strategies assume a particular percentile historical runoff, along with normal
depletion projections for the next year .... If the calculated space available at
the end of the next year is less than the space required by flood control
criteria, then [the Secretary determines a surplus condition].
Id. at S-4. This is contrasted to the 70R strategy that the six states advocated as the
proper baseline, which was based on a seventy percent of the historic natural flow.
266. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,531, 48,531 (Aug. 8,
2000); Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria; Correction, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,371 (Sept.
22, 2000).
267. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, FinalEnvironmental Impact
Statement, Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria § 2.2 (Dec. 2000), at
http://www.lc.usbr.gov/g4000/surplus/SURPLUS_FEIS.HTML [hereinafter FEIS].
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Surplus Guidelines." Significantly, neither the description of the
preferred alternative nor the draft guidelines in the FEIS included
several elements that were in the seven states proposal, and which were
important to the six states in particular. With these differences noted,
and with the end of the Clinton administration approaching in
January, the states and the DOI immediately began discussions as to
what to include within the record of decision. Following these
negotiations, at a ceremony in San Diego under a banner proclaiming
"Peace on the River," Secretary Babbitt signed the Record of Decision
adopting the Guidelines as his last official act as Secretary of the
Interior.
The issues of importance to the states in the Guidelines are
summarized below, together with a description of how the issues were
handled by the DOI in the final Record of Decision.6 8
1. Effective Date
The states' alternative provided that the guidelines would not
become effective until the California settlement agreements become
effective. 26" This was important to the states because the guidelines

were not necessary or desirable unless California was implementing
the California Plan. In contrast, the draft guidelines in the FEIS would
become effective thirty days after the Secretary of the Interior issued
publication of the Record of Decision. The Record of Decision was still
effective thirty days after publication, as previously provided. However,
the interrelationship of the effective date of the Guidelines and the
California implementation agreements was handled by language in the
enforcement, benchmark and termination provisions, discussed below.
2. Relationship of the Interim Surplus Guidelines to the Existing Law
of the River
The draft guidelines in the FEIS did not include statements,
particularly important to the six states, which were in the authority and
purpose section of the seven-state proposal.
However, these
statements and disclaimers were restored in total into the Record of
Decision. 70
These Guidelines are not intended to do, and do not
a. Guarantee or assure any water user a firm supply for any specified
period.
b. Change or expand existing authorities under [the Law of the
River] ....

268. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001).

269. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,535.
270. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7780 (Jan.

25, 2001).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

c. Address intrastate storage or intrastate distribution of water ....
d. Change the apportionments made for use within individual States,
or in any way impair or impede the right of the Upper Basin to
consumptively use water available to that Basin under the Compact.
e. Affect any obligation of any Upper Division State under the
[Compact].
f. Affect any right of any State or of the United States under Sec. 14
of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956; Sec. 601(c) of the
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968; the California Limitation
Act; or any other provision of [the Law of the River].
g. Affect the rights of any holder of present perfected rights or
reserved rights, which shall be satisfied within the apportionment of
the State within which the use is made in accordance with the
Decree7
3. Allocation of Unused Apportionment Water
Before surplus water is available, the Secretary allocates water
apportioned to one of the Lower Division States, but unused by that
state, pursuant to Article I1(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v.
7
California."
' The seven-states proposal provided that the Secretary
would allocate this water in a specified order of priority, before
allocating any surplus water. The draft guidelines in the FEIS did not
address this issue, instead leaving this matter up to the Secretary's
discretion each year. The Record of Decision restored the states'
priority allocation. The Guidelines provided the Secretary would
allocate unused water from basic apportionments first to meet the
requirements of MWD and the SNWA, second to meet off-stream water
banking needs of MWD and SNWA, and third to meet other needs in
California in accordance with the Seven Party Agreement as modified

by the Quantification Settlement Agreement ("QSA").173 This priority
provision is of critical importance to the SNWA. Nevada is at its basic
apportionment, and has no buffer of a "bank" of irrigated agriculture
within Nevada to which to turn to meet municipal demands.
Therefore, this provision allows Southern Nevada first access to
unused apportionment water together with MWD.
4. Allocation of Surplus Water
The draft guidelines in the FEIS used the same trigger elevations
in Lake Mead as in the seven-state proposal, but did not provide for
the allocation of such surplus water to the specific uses contemplated
in the seven-state plan. This was because the Decree in Arizona v.
271. Id. at 7780 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
272. 376 U.S. 340, 343 (1964); see also PartI, supra note 3, at 311-12.
273. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7780.
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Californiasimply provided the Secretary will allocate surplus water 50%
to California, 46% to Arizona and 4% to Nevada, leaving the Secretary
with no discretion to allocate water in any other manner absent
agreement with and among the states. 74 The Record of Decision
contains much more detailed language than the draft guidelines in the
FEIS concerning the allocation of the surplus water under the various
triggers in the guidelines, based on the states' proposal.
In summary, the Guidelines make surplus water available when the
water elevation in Lake Mead is above 1125 feet. Then, depending on
the Lake Mead elevation, surplus water is made available to an
increasing number of different uses, starting with limited domestic
uses in the three states, then full domestic uses, then water banking,
and then finally, all other uses. 2" The Record of Decision recognized
the allocation of surplus water and unused apportionment water, as set
forth in the Guidelines, can be implemented by the Secretary only
through forbearance agreements and water orders submitted by Lower
Colorado River water users. It stated the Secretary will honor such
arrangements, but will allocate surplus water according to the
percentages in the Arizona v. California Decree if such agreements are
not executed.276
5. Mexican Treaty Deliveries
The states' proposal provided that in a flood control release, the
Secretary would make surplus water available for release in excess of
delivery only after all uses in
the 1.5 million acre-foot Mexican Treaty
•
277
This provision was not
the United States had been satisfied.
included in the draft guidelines or in the Record of Decision. The
DOI determined this proposal was beyond the purpose and need of
the proposed action, since it dealt with a different question of
"surplus" (i.e., Mexican Treaty surplus) than that being considered in
the interim surplus criteria. However, the Record of Decision did
contain a statement that the modeling upon which the Record of
Decision was based assumed that water is released to Mexico in excess
of 1.5 million acre-feet only in a flood control release situation.278

274. Id. at 7781.
275. Id. at 7780-81.

276. Id. at 7780.
277.

See Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,351, 48,357 (Aug.

8, 2000).
278. The Record of Decision states:
Under current practice, surplus declarations under the Treaty for Mexico are
declared when flood control releases are made. Modeling assumptions used
in the FEIS are based on this practice. The proposed action is not intended
to identify, or change in any manner, conditions when Mexico may schedule
up to an additional 0.2 [million acre-feet]. Any issues relating to the
implementation of the Treaty, including any potential changes in approach
relating to surplus declarations under the Treaty, must be addressed in a
bilateral fashion with the Republic of Mexico.
Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7781.
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6. 602 (a) Storage Levels for Lake Powell
The states' proposal included a provision that during the interim
period, 602 (a) storage requirements for Lake Powell would use a value
of not less than 14.85 million acre-feet. 79 For the same scoping reason
the Record of Decision did not include reference to Mexican Treaty
deliveries, the DOI did not include this provision in the Record of
Decision. Instead, the states and the DOI agreed to include reference
to the 602(a) trigger of 14.85 million acre-feet in all operating plans
during the fifteen-year interim period.28 °
7. Termination
The states' proposal provided the surplus guidelines would
terminate in 2016, and that upon termination, Lake Mead operations,
for the purpose of determining surplus, would immediately revert to a
70R strategy. 8 ' In contrast, the draft guidelines were not as specific on
termination, and were not automatic in their operation. They did not
provide that surplus determinations would be based on a 70R
operation upon termination. In the Record of Decision, the DOI
specifically strengthened the termination provisions. The Record of
Decision provided the interim guidelines terminate on December 31,
2015 (with the 2016 AOP). The guidelines did not specify that 70R
would be the guiding criteria upon termination of the guidelines.
However, the Record of Decision contained a statement that all the
modeling assumptions of the Record of Decision were based on a 70R
strategy upon termination, and that the entire purpose of the
guidelines and the "California Plan is that California shall have
implemented sufficient measures to be able to limit total uses" within
California to 4.4 million acre-feet unless a surplus is determined under
the 70R strategy.282
8. Benchmarks and Reparations
The states' proposal included enforcement and mitigation
measures that provided the guidelines would terminate in the event
California did not implement conservation measures as set forth in the
279. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,357; see PartI, supra
note 3, at 314.
280. The 2003 Annual Operating Plan states:

The Secretary is considering information submitted to the Department of the
Interior by the Colorado River Basin States whereby 602(a) storage
requirements determined in accordance with Article II(1) of the Operating
Criteria would utilize a value of not less than 14.85 [million acre-feet]
(elevation 3630 feet) for Lake Powell through the year 2016. The Secretary,

through Reclamation, may initiate a NEPA process in 2003 to determine the
impacts of the Basin States proposed 602(a) storage.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 2003 Annual Operating Plan For
at
Reservoirs
15
(Dec.
2002),
Colorado
River
System
http://www.uc.usbr.gov/wrg/aop/aop03-final.pdf (citation omitted).

281. Colorado River Interim Surplus Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. at 48,357-48,358.
282. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7782.
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California Plan, which actually would reduce its need for surplus
Colorado River water by specific amounts on given dates, called
"benchmarks." The states' proposal went on to provide an accounting
of water that MWD proposed to groundwater bank during this period.
This provision, referred to by the states as "reparations," required
MWD to pay this water back to the river. MWD would thus lose the
benefit of the Guidelines if California did not meet its conservation
benchmarks. The draft guidelines did not include the MWD payback
provision, although they did provide that if California did not meet the
benchmarks, operations would revert to 70R for the interim period
only.
The Record of Decision strengthened the benchmark and
reparations provisions. Of critical importance to the states was a
requirement the Secretary would suspend the Guidelines if the
California agencies have not executed the agreements necessary to
implement the California Plan (including specifically the QSA) by
December 31, 2002, and would be reinstated when and if the
California agencies do so.23 This issue was important because the QSA
was the basis upon which conservation measures and water transfer
agreements could be measured and implemented. The Guidelines
clearly set forth the ultimate goal: "At the conclusion of the effective
period of these Guidelines, California shall have implemented
sufficient measures to be able to limit total uses of Colorado River
water within California to 4.4 [million acre-feet], unless a surplus is
determined under a 70R strategy., 284 The guidelines contained threeyear benchmarks to reduce California agricultural agencies' use by and
transfer such use to MWD. If any benchmark is not met, the
guidelines suspend until California meets the benchmark. Upon
suspension of the guidelines, the system operates under the 70R
strategy, and California water use must be limited to 4.4 million acrefeet in any normal year under such a strategy. If the guidelines remain
suspended, 70R will be the strategy for the entire fifteen-year period. 85
XVIII. THE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENTS
In order to implement the California Plan and the Interim Surplus
Guidelines, state and local water agencies in the Lower Basin had to
prepare several implementation agreements. Important components
of the negotiation between the states and with the DOI on the
Guidelines were arrangements in the Lower Basin: (1) the types of use
and specific agencies to whom surplus water would be delivered; (2)
shortage criteria; (3) the allocation of apportioned but unused water
under Article II(B) (6) of the Decree in Arizona v. California; and (4)
283. The Guidelines provide: "In the event that the California contractors and the
Secretary have not executed [the QSA (and its related documents)] by Dec. 31, 2002,
the interim surplus determinations under sections 2(B)(1) and 2(B)(2) of these
Guidelines will be suspended and will instead be based on the 70R Strategy .. " Id.
284. Id.

285. Id.
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reparations by MWD in the event that they did not implement the
California Plan on schedule. In December 2000, the California
agencies released drafts of the key agreements that had to be in place
for the Guidelines and the California Plan to be effective. After the
Record of Decision on the Guidelines, the California agencies
intensified their negotiations on these agreements and efforts to
undertake environmental permitting and financing of the elements of
the California Plan. The major intra-California agreements are
discussed below.
A. QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This agreement, between IID, MWD and CVWD, also known as the
QSA, established the "water budget" for each agency necessary to
implement the water transfers contemplated in the California Plan.
The agencies patterned this agreement after the Key Terms
agreement. For example, IID would limit its use to 3.1 million acrefeet per year, and CVWD would limit its use to 330,000 acre-feet per
year. Saved water transferred to MWD would reduce deliveries to that
agency by an equal amount. The parties agreed on the amount of
water to be saved by All American and Coachella Canal lining projects,
and made a portion of that water available to the Secretary in
settlement of the San Luis Rey Indian Rights Settlement Act.
This agreement would not be effective until several contingencies
were satisfied, before December 31, 2002. The contingencies included
finalization of all federal and California administrative, environmental
and ESA compliance approvals; adoption by the Bureau of an
inadvertent overrun program, decree averaging, and the Guidelines.
Once effective, the term of the agreement was for seventy-five years.286
B. AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF CONSERVED WATER BETWEEN
IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND COACHELLA VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT

This agreement provided for Coachella to acquire up to 100,000
acre-feet of IID saved water per year, in 5,000 acre-foot annual
increments.287
C. AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF CONSERVED WATER BETWEEN
IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND THE METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

This agreement amended the 1988 IID/MWD agreement, by
which MWD paid for conservation measures in the IID to acquire
110,000 acre-feet of water per year, to provide an additional right of
first refusal to MWD for any water referenced above in the IID/CVWD
286.

Imperial Irrigation Dist. et al., Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement 2

(Dec. 12, 2000).
287. Draft Agreement for Acquisition of Conserved Water Between Imperial
Irrigation District and Coachella Valley Water District 5 (Oct. 17, 2000).
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agreement and not acquired by CVWD, together with an option to
acquire up to 85,000 acre-feet of conserved water from IID. The 88time
frames and contingencies were the same as the other agreements.2
D. AGREEMENT FOR ACQUISITION OF WATER BETWEEN COACHELLA
VALLEY WATER DISTRICT AND THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In this agreement, MWD agreed to reimburse CVWD for a portion
of its costs in acquiring the second 50,000 acre-feet of water from IID
under the IID/CVWD agreement, and to keep CVWD whole in its
ability to acquire that water, by providing replacement water if the IID
agreement expires.
E. IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT
This agreement was to be executed between the Secretary of the
Interior, IID, CVWD, MWD, and the SDCWA. In this agreement, the
Secretary would agree to exercise his authority to: implement the
terms and limit water deliveries to IID to not more than 3.1 million
acre-feet per year under Priority 3 (a), less conserved water transferred
to others; implement the IID/MWD agreement, the SDCWA/IID
agreement, and the IID/CVWD agreement; make conserved water
from the All-American Canal and Coachella Canal lining projects
available to the San Luis Rey Tribe under its settlement; deliver not
more than 330,000 acre-feet per year to CVWD under Priority 3(a),
less conserved water transferred to others; deliver to or withhold water
from MWD so that MWD bears the burden if total use under Priorities
1 and 2 (the PVID and the Yuma Project) exceed 420,000 acre-feet,
and the benefit if such use is less than 420,000 acre-feet (the effect of
this provision is that Priorities 1 and 2 are effectively quantified, and
IID and CVWD waive their rights to take any excess water over 420,000
acre-feet); deliver to CVWVD any water by MWD as set forth in the
MWD/CVWD agreement; deliver Priority 6(a) water as agreed by the
agencies; take no action against IID concerning whether IID has made
reasonable and beneficial use of water, and to take IID's water
conservation activities into account in future assessments on that issue.
The Secretary would agree in this agreement to implement a Decree
Accounting Program and Inadvertent Overrun Program, and not
modify them for thirty years. The Secretary would also "acknowledge"
the importance of the Guidelines.2 0
In sum, the implementation agreements would provide the
baseline by which conservation and water transfer agreements under
288. Draft Agreement for Acquisition of Conserved Water Between Imperial
Irrigation District and the Metropolitan Water District Southern California 5, 6 (Dec.
12, 2000).
289. Draft Agreement for Acquisition of Water Between Coachella Valley Water
District and the Metropolitan Water District Southern California 5, 6 (Dec. 12, 2000).
290. U.S. Dep't of the Interior et al., Draft Implementation Agreement (Dec. 12,
2000).
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the California Plan would be implemented and accounted. The
agreements would also alter the structure of priorities established by
the 1931 Seven Party Agreement.2 1' This structural alteration would be
the key to California limiting its use to its 4.4 million acre-foot basic
apportionment in normal years. Table I below shows the difference
between the priorities established under the 1931 Seven Party
Agreement and the quantified priorities that would be established
under the various California implementation agreements.
TABLE I: CALIFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT PRIORITIES BEFORE
AND AFTER THE CALIFORNIA IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENTS

Priority

Description

Acre-feet

Comment

Annually

2

Palo Verde
Irrigation
District C gross
area of 104,500
acres

420,000

Palo Verde is not limited to
420,000 acre-feet under the
Seven-Party Agreement, but
only to the amount of water
necessary to irrigate 104,500
acres. Under the QSA,
MWD benefits if water use in
Palo Verde is less than
420,000 acre-feet, and must
bear the burden or shortfall
if Palo Verde is over 420,000
acre-feet.

Yuma Project

no

Under either agreement, here

(Reservation
Division) not
exceeding a
gross area of

specific
limitation

is no specific limitation. This
project uses about 125,000
acre-feet per year.

Imperial

Imperial

Under the Seven-Party

Irrigation
District and
lands in
Imperial and

3,100,000
Coachella
300,000

Agreement there is no
quantification between IID
and Coachella. In 1934,
Coachella agreed that IID

25,000 acres

3(a)

Coachella

291.

would have first priority, but

See PALO VERDE IRRIGATION DIST. ET AL., BOULDER CANYON PROJECT AGREEMENT

(Aug. 18, 1931), at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/gl000/pdfiles/ca7pty.pdf (apportioning

California's share of the waters of the Colorado River among the applicants in the
State).

Issue 2

Priority

AN UPPERBASIN PERSPECTIVEPART I

Description

Acre-feet
Annually

Valleys to be
served by the
All-American
Canal

3(b)

Palo Verde

Comment
the amount is unquantified.
Under the implementation
agreements, IID's limitation
would decline over the fifteenyear period of the California
Plan, to 2.72 million acre-feet.
Coachella's limit would
increase slightly, because of
transfers from IID.

see above

see above

Irrigation
District C
16,000 acres of
mesa lands
Metropolitan

550,000

Water District
and/or City of
Los Angeles
and/or others
on coastal plain
5(a)
and (b)

Metropolitan
Water District
and/or City of
Los Angeles
and/or others
on coastal plain

662,000

Under the Seven-Party
Agreement, this priority was
over California's basic
apportionment of 4.4 million
acre-feet per year. After the
implementation agreements
and the California Plan were
realized, about 260,000 acrefeet of this priority would be
over California's basic
apportionment on a
permanent basis. MWD was
to be prepared to have this
water available only in surplus
years under a 70R Strategy.

In addition to the intra-California agreements necessary to
implement the California Plan, the California agencies and Lower
Division States began negotiations on the interstate arrangements
necessary to implement the Guidelines. MWD and the State of
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Arizona signed a reparation/forbearance agreement 29 2
This
agreement was necessary to implement two aspects of the guidelines.
First, Arizona agreed to forebear its entitlement to forty-six percent of
any surplus declared in the Lower Basin under the Decree in Arizona v.
California,so that MWD could take that surplus under the various tiers
of surplus that will be declared by the Secretary. 3
Second, MWD agreed to implement the California Plan, to limit its
orders for water to comply with the California Plan, and to provide
reparations to Arizona, in the form of paybacks to the River, in the
event the Secretary terminates or suspends the Guidelines for
California's failure to meet the benchmarks in the 4.4 Plan.
Significantly, as a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
Forbearance Agreement, California agencies had to execute the QSA
before December 31, 2003. If this condition was not met or waived,
the Forbearance Agreement would be void. 4
XIX. THE MEXICAN CONNECTION
Further complicating matters, due to the implications of the
development of surplus criteria on relations with Mexico, the United
States, through the International Boundary and Water Commission
("IBWC"), consulted with Mexico on the development of the
Guidelines. The information developed through this consultation
could then be incorporated into any NEPA process the Bureau might
undertake. In the early 1990s, the IBWC held a consultation on the
effect of the lining of the All-American Canal, one of the conservation
measures identified in the California 4.4 Plan as providing water for
transfer to MWD. The lining would affect Mexican irrigation interests
dependent on seepage from the canal to supply groundwater and
seeps for the irrigation of about 60,000 acres of land, much of which
was under lease to United States interests. 5
The new consultation jumpstarted a Mexican interest letter writing
campaign to protest the canal lining2 6 However, the United States
side of the IBWC took the position that the consultation on the lining
had already taken place, the issue was closed and could not be
reopened, and in any event there was nothing Mexico could do or that
the United States was obligated to do under international law to
292. Interim Surplus Guidelines Agreement Between the State of Arizona and the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (May 23, 2001).
293. Id. §§ 5, 6. This forbearance was accomplished through a Joint Resolution of
the Arizona Legislature. S.J. Res. 1001, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001).
294. Id. §§ 2.1.2, 5.6, 7.

295. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to Greg Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Dep't of Nat. Res., Peter Evans, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Randy Seaholm,
Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Jennifer Gimbel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., Carol
Angel, Deputy Attorney Gen., Colo., at 1 (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Status Meeting].
296. Letter from Lic. Federico Diaz Gallego, President, Econ. Devel. Council of
Mex., to Patricia Mulroy, S. Nev. Water Auth. (Apr. 5, 2000). Letter from Arq. Victor
Hermosillo Celada, Mayor, Mexicali City, to Patricia Mulroy, S. Nev. Water Auth. (Apr.
5, 2000).
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prevent the efficient use of water in the United States. Moreover, both
the United States side and the Bureau asserted that the canal lining
issues and the surplus criteria issues were separate, and should not be
joined.29 7
The United States' position in the consultation on the idea of a
new surplus criteria was that: (1) United States has the right to make
maximum use of the waters within its boundaries; (2) under the
United States-Mexican water treaty, Mexico has the right to 1.5 million
acre-feet per year, plus 200,000 acre-feet in surplus years, and no
more;" (3) a flood control release constitutes a surplus for Mexican
Treaty purposes, but the United States can develop surplus criteria for99
another purpose, operating federal facilities under United States law;

(4) there is a need for surplus criteria to resolve issues in the United
States, and the United States can implement spill avoidance measures
so long as it meets its Treaty obligations; (5) the United States is under
no obligation to mitigate the impacts of such operations in Mexico;
but (6) under principles of international comity, there may be
circumstances in which the United States would agree to provide
mitigation.0 0
During the EIS process for the Guidelines, the Bureau consulted
with the USFWS on the "discretionary action" of the Bureau in
adopting interim surplus criteria and the California water transfers. 0 '
The USFWS identified the action area for the biological assessment as
the 100-year flood plain below Lake Mead and the full pool elevations
of the Lower Basin reservoirs, within the United States.
It also
consulted on the following species: southwestern willow flycatcher,
brown pelican, Yuma clapper rail, razorback sucker, bonytail chub,
Desert tortoise, Bald eagle, and Desert Pupfish.3 3
Ongoing consultation between the Bureau and USFWS and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (now NOAA Fisheries) affected the
consultation on the Guidelines with respect to ongoing operations of
Lower Colorado River Reservoirs. In this consultation, the Bureau
initially defined the action area for its biological assessment as

297. Status Meeting, supra note 295, at 1.
298. See PartI, supra note 3, at 309-10.
299. Id.
300. Status Meeting, supranote 295, at 2.
301. The consultation requirements of section 7(a) (2) of the ESA only apply if an
agency action may affect the continued existence of a listed species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a) (2) (2000). The ESA regulations define agency action to mean "all activities
or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies .. " 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). The regulation further states that
section 7 applies to "all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or
control." Id. § 402.03. The regulation gives several examples of an ESA agency action,

including the granting of licenses, contracts, easements, leases, right-of-ways and
permits. Id. § 402.02.

302. "Action area [is] all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal
action and not merely the immediate area involved in the action." Id.
303. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7777 (Jan. 25,
2001).
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extending from Lake Mead to the Southern International Boundary.
In response to comment from the USFWS, the Bureau expanded its
biological assessment to include analysis of impacts on species in
Mexico. However, despite a "may affect" determination as to the
Totoaba Bass (a species located only in Mexico), the Bureau did not
seek formal consultation, asserting that it lacked any discretion over
water deliveries to or within Mexico.
On June 28, 2000, Defenders of Wildlife and a number of other
United States and Mexican organizations sued the Secretary,
challenging his failure during the consultation to consider the adverse
effects of his actions in operating Lower Colorado River reservoirs on
endangered species in the United States and Mexico that depend on
the Colorado River delta in Mexico for their survival and recovery. 304
Species alleged to have been adversely affected included species found
only in Mexico, such as the Totoaba Bass and the Vaquita Harbor
Porpoise. The Lower Basin States and several water user organizations
in the Lower Basin filed a motion to intervene, which the court
denied. No Upper Basin state sought intervention. The lawsuit raised
the significant and heretofore unanswered legal question as to the
scope of the ESA, whether the Act requires federal agencies to consult
on the extraterritorial effects on listed species of actions undertaken
within the United States.
In response to the lawsuit, DOI Solicitor John Leshy sent a
memorandum to the Commissioner of Reclamation, asking the
Bureau to continue consultations with the USFWS and the National
Marine Fisheries Service on effects in Mexico.3

5

The carefully worded

memorandum stated:
The continuation of consultation does not reflect any conclusion on
our part that the consultation is required, as a matter of law or
regulation, on any possible impact the adoption of interim surplus
guidelines may have on United States-listed species in Mexico.
Rather, Reclamation's consultation on these effects should proceed
with the express understanding that it may exceed what is required
under applicable federal law and regulations and does not establish a
legal or policy precedent....

The ongoing discussions with the consulting agencies should also
take into consideration the fact that the United States cannot
unilaterally control hydrologic conditions in the Colorado River
south of the international boundary.... Finally, the discussions
should take into account mandates and limitations on Reclamation's
actions pursuant to the Supreme Court's 1964 Decree. 6

304. Plaintiff's Complaint at 17, Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 1:00CV01544
(D.D.C. filed June 28, 2000).
305. Memorandum from John Leshy, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Eluid

L. Martinez, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 14, 2000).

306. Id. at 2.
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The FEIS on the Guidelines undertook an analysis of effects on
listed species and species of concern in Mexico, including the desert
pupfish, Vaquita Harbor Porpoise, Yuma clapper rail, California black
rail, Clark's grebe, Totoaba Bass, southwestern willow flycatcher,
yellow-billed cuckoo, elf owl, and Bell's vireo. 7 In general summary,
the FEIS concluded that under both baseline conditions and all
alternatives, the United States Treaty deliveries to Mexico will be the
same: 1.5 million acre-feet per year. It noted that Mexico has
complete discretion and sovereignty over this water, and the Bureau
has no discretion or authority over how that water is used in Mexico.
According to the FEIS, each of the alternatives would slightly decrease
the frequency of surplus flow events into Mexico, including flows in
excess of 250,000 acre-feet, which had been identified by
environmental organizations as beneficial for environmental
restoration. However, it found "there are only minor differences in
the potential magnitudes and potential frequencies of excess flows
between baseline conditions and the Basin States Alternative."3 8
It is important to note that Colorado River deliveries to Mexico are
diverted at Morelos Dam, just below the border, and from there are
distributed to farming operations. Irrigation return flow patterns may
serve to maintain groundwater table levels and maintain riparian
vegetation more than channel deliveries from the United States. Flows
to the Cien6ga de Santa Clara, an important wetland, are delivered
directly from irrigation return flows from the United States not
currently counted as part of the Treaty delivery obligation, and are
therefore unaffected by Lower Basin Colorado River reservoir
operations. Also, irrigation return flows, not Colorado River deliveries,
maintain flows in the Rio Hardy. Therefore, the Bureau concluded
that other factors affect all of the species by a much greater degree,
such as over fishing, habitat alteration, and irrigation operations in
Mexico, than by whether the interim surplus criteria were
implemented. The Bureau thus concluded there would either be a
"no effect" or "not likely to be any adverse effect" on all the species
considered.3 9
In the FEIS, the Bureau did not analyze an alternative Pacific
Institute proposed that was based on the Six State Alternative, but
which in addition proposed the Bureau provide 32,000 acre-feet of
water each year to Mexico in addition to its Treaty obligation, and
260,000 acre-feet periodic flow, for environmental restoration
purposes in the delta, in addition to United States Mexican Treaty
deliveries. As it did with the states' request that Mexican Treaty
deliveries be specifically referenced in the Record of Decision as
limited to 1.5 million acre-feet per year, the Bureau determined the
Pacific Institute proposal was beyond the purpose and need of the
proposed action, since it dealt with a different question of "surplus"
307. FEIS, supra note 267, at 3.8-1.
308. Id. at 3.16-18.
309. Id. at 3.8-24 to 3.8-27.
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(i.e., Mexican Treaty surplus) than that being considered in the
interim surplus criteria. The Bureau also determined that the Pacific
Institute proposal would cause the Bureau to violate the mandatory
operating injunctions in Arizona v. California.
The Guidelines articulated the official position of the United
States. The Guidelines state:
Though it is the position of the United States through the United
States International Boundary and Water Commission that the
United States does not mitigate for impacts in a foreign country, the
United States is committed to participate with Mexico through the
IBWC Technical Work Groups to develop cooperative projects
beneficial to both countries concerning the issues expressed by
Mexico. 10

The DOI argued that consideration of additional flows to Mexico
was further inappropriate because Mexico has sovereign control and

authority over water once it crosses the international boundary, and
the United States was not in a position to dictate to Mexico whether it
directed the additional water for use for environmental restoration

purposes in the delta, or developed the water for irrigation or
municipal use. Moreover, the DOI asserted, that without additional
Treaty authorization, it lacked the authority to exceed the required
deliveries set forth in the Treaty."'
In January 2001, the Government of Mexico sent to the United
States a diplomatic note, expressing concern with respect to
anticipated reductions in deliveries of surplus water to Mexico.312 The
United States responded with a continued reaffirmation

that it is

under not obligation to deliver313 any water to Mexico beyond that

expressly required by the Treaty.

310. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001).
311. FEIS, supra note 267, at 2-3 to 2-4, 3.16 to 3.23.
312. Alberto Sz~kely, Advisor to the Sec'y of Foreign Relations, Address at the
Colorado River Delta Bi-National Symposium
16
(Sep. 11-12, 2001);
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/FAO/CRDS0901/EnglishSymposium.pdf.
313. In Sept. 2001, Paula Dobrioski, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, State Dep't,
prepared a statement to be read by Dennis Linsky, which said:
[T]he Department of State is aware of Mexico's concerns that certain U.S.
actions with respect to the management of the Colorado River system within
the United States have failed to take into account the potential impacts on
our neighbor Mexico.
However, the Department of State believes,
nonetheless, that the United States carefully considered such transboundary
impacts during a series of consultations held with Mexico under the auspices
of International Boundary and Water Commission over the past year, as well
as during the development of the Environmental Impact Statement called for
by the United States National Environmental Policy Act.
The Department of State also believes that in taking these actions the
Unites states is acting in a manner that is consistent with the 1983 La Paz
agreement.
The United States concluded that adjustments to the
management of the Colorado River system within the United States [sic].
Those adjustments which have occurred will not result in appreciable adverse
impacts on Mexico.
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In 2003, the Federal District Court made its determination in
Finding that "Mexico is an
Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton. 4
independent sovereign not answerable to this Court,"3 15 the court held
that the Bureau did not have a duty to consult with the USFWS under
the Endangered Species Act, since its actions with regard to the
delivery of water to Mexico and over the use of water within Mexico
were nondiscretionary. 31' The court found that "[t]he formulas
established by the Law of the River strictly limit Reclamation's
authority to release additional waters to Mexico, and Section 7(a) (2)
of the ESA does not loosen those limitations or expand Reclamation's
authority. 3 1 7 The Court went on to hold that even discretionary
actions by the Secretary with regard to water deliveries within the
United States, such as adoption or implementation of the Guidelines
or orders with respect to deliveries of water in the United States, do
not implicate any duty under the Endangered Species Act to address
the impacts of such actions to species or habitat in Mexico. The Court
held that, "Reclamation does not have the discretion to manipulate
water delivery in the United States in order to create excess releases
for the delta."3 8 Nor can the Secretary:
interpret the Law of the River in a way that will divert or somehow
'indirectly result' in excess flows to Mexico.... [I]t seems unlikely
that any case will present facts that more clearly make any agency's
actions nondiscretionary than this one: a Supreme Court injunction,
an international treaty, federal statutes, and contracts between the
government and water 9users that account for every acre foot of lower
Colorado River water.31

XX. THE BEGINNING OF THE END (OR THE END OF THE
BEGINNING): THE UNWINDING OF THE CALIFORNIA PLAN
Nearly a year after Secretary Babbitt's Record of Decision adopting
the Guidelines, the states were beginning to grow restless with a
continuing perception the California agencies were not finalizing the
agreements and processes necessary to put the California Plan into
action. The DOI shared this concern. At the December 2001
In closing, it's important to add that the United States intends to fulfill
its treaty obligations to deliver to Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado
River water per year as provided for in the 1944 Water Treaty. And the
United States will continue to comply with its legal obligations concerning
the salinity of those waters as provided under International Boundary Water
Commission Minute 242.
Dennis Linsky, U.S. State Dep't, Address at the Colorado River Delta Bi-National
Symposium 17-18 (Sep. 11-12, 2001).

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, No. 00-1544, slip op. (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2003).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 29.
Id.
at 27.
Id. at 29.

319. Defenders of Wildlife, No. 00-1544, slip op. at 30-31.
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Colorado River Water User's meeting in Las Vegas, Assistant Secretary
for Water and Science, Bennett Raley, delivered the DOI's annual
message. He affirmed that the DOI, under the new Bush
administration, intended to "stay the course" with respect directions
established on the Colorado River over the last several years. He also
took up the annual task, started by Secretary Babbitt, of scolding
California for being dilatory in getting its water use within its
apportionment. Raley affirmed that Secretary Gale Norton would
enforce the terms of the Decree in Arizona v. California, which would
hold California to 4.4 million acre-feet in normal years, thus cutting off
MWD and potentially setting off a string of political and legal battles
on the Colorado River and in California.
Raley also expressed concern about the environmental compliance
issues in the implementation of the 4.4 Plan. The California agencies,
particularly the IID, wanted an ESA Section 10 habitat conservation
plan approach to ESA compliance, believing that more regulatory
certainty for the agencies could be achieved. ° However, with this
process stalled in issues related to the Salton Sea, he stated the DOI's
intent to proceed with an alternative approach under Section 7,
asserting that restoration of the Salton Sea "is separate from what is
necessary to implement the California 4.4 Plan.... The California 4.4
Plan cannot and should not2 be held hostage to the larger issues
presented by the Salton Sea."0 1

The QSA was hung up on issues surrounding the Salton Sea, and
environmental compliance with the federal and state endangered
species acts ("ESA and CESA"), which was required in order for the
California agencies to implement the water conservation measures
necessary to meet the water reduction benchmarks established in the
Record of Decision. The water conservation measures would reduce
agricultural return flows to the Sea, thus accelerating the inevitable
decline of the Sea.
California agencies were working on an
amendment to the California ESA, and were involved in hearings
before the state Water Resources Control Board, to obtain
environmental compliance for the California Plan.
MWD also
developed a plan for "transitional land fallowing" designed to allow
the California Plan to avoid Salton Sea restoration issues. However,
IID resisted the plan because of political opposition to land fallowing.
IID presented to the other California agencies and the DOI what
can only be euphemistically described as a "Santa's wish list" of
demands and assurances that it needed in order to even consider land
fallowing. It claimed that it must be protected by agreement and
legislation from any challenges to the reasonability of its beneficial use
of water. It insisted on protection by agreement and legislation from
future demands for additional land fallowing. IID demanded: (1) ESA
320. Bennett Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't of Interior,
Address to Colorado River Water Users Association, 2001 Annual Conference (Dec.

13, 2001).
321. Id. at 7.
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and CESA "coverage" for all identified (not just listed) species of
concern, which number over twenty-five species, under incidental take
permits; (2) "no surprises" assurances under the ESA and CESA, by
agreement and legislation, for the effects of implementation of the
fallowing and conservation measures; and (3) a new federal law
limiting statutes of limitation for citizen suits under both NEPA and
the ESA. IID wanted full mitigation of the social and economic
impacts of land fallowing. Finally, IID demanded federal liability
protection from any lawsuits that might be filed related to322air quality
or other impacts from fallowing or conservation programs.
With IID's demands on the table and no apparent progress in the
California negotiations, in mid-2002 the DOI began its annual process
of developing the AOP for 2003. The issue immediately arose as to
how the AOP should deal with the possibility that the California
agencies might not reach agreement on the QSA before the December
31, 2002, benchmark. The Guidelines provided that they would be
suspended if California did not meet the specified benchmarks for
reductions in water use, and would be replaced by a 70R operating
regime until such time as the benchmark is met. The first benchmark
was that the agricultural agencies in California reduce their total water
use to 3.74 million acre-feet in 2003.2 California would be able to
meet this first water reduction benchmark, because this involved the
already-implemented MWD/IID agreement to conserve 110,000 acrefeet reached in 1988.
However, without quantification of the California agricultural
priorities, there was no way to measure or administer the water transfer
upon which the 1988 MWD/IID agreement was based. Therefore, the
Guidelines also provided that in the event the California water
agencies did not execute the QSA before December 31, 2002, the
Secretary would suspend the Guidelines, "until such time as California
completes all required actions and complies with the reductions in
The issue faced by the states and the DOI was
water use . . . ,
whether signing the QSA before December 31, 2002 was in and of
itself a benchmark, regardless of whether California would be able to
meet the reduction in water use in 2003. Several states took the
position that the QSA was indeed a stand-alone benchmark that must
be met in order for California to continue to receive the benefit of the
Guidelines. The MWD/Arizona forbearance agreement affirmed this
position because it was expressly contingent on execution of the QSA
by the end of this year.325 In response to an inquiry from IID on the
issue, Assistant Secretary Raley made the DOI's position clear that the
Secretary would in fact suspend the Guidelines if the QSA were not
322. Letter from John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, to Warren
Weinstein, Legislative Assistant, Office of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (Mar. 1,
2002).
323. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, 7782 (Jan. 25,
2001).
324.

Id.

325.

Id. at 7779-80.
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signed, stating, "the Department is fully committed and prepared to
take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that California's use of
Colorado River water fully complies with the requirements of the
32 6
Decree of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. California."
In subsequent Congressional testimony, he put it even more bluntly.
"The draft QSA is a cornerstone of the California 4.4 Plan.... Absent
completion of the [QSA], the contemplated water transfers cannot
proceed.
Absent these water transfers, the California 4.4 Plan will
27
fail.

3

As negotiations between the California agencies proceeded on a
full-time, daily basis, with shifts in the negotiations occurring hourly,
the DOI proceeded to make plans for a potential suspension of the
Guidelines on January 1, 2003. The then-current draft of the 2003
AOP, being circulated by the DOI, included two options for the
operation of Lower Basin reservoirs depending upon whether or not
California agencies executed the QSA. "Option A" assumed California
agencies would execute the QSA, and provided for a Full Domestic
Surplus under the Guidelines.
"Option B" assumed California
agencies would not execute QSA as required by the Guidelines; thus,
the DOI would suspend the Guidelines and under a 70R strategy a
normal condition would apply, reducing deliveries to California to 4.4
million acre-feet in 2003.
In addition to the penalty to California, the Option B operation
would reduce deliveries to Nevada by about 18,000 acre-feet from its
2001 deliveries. This meant Nevada would not be able to undertake
underground storage operations for use in future years, as it had
contemplated it would be able to do under the surplus declarations
established by the Guidelines."' As a result, the DOI issued a Federal
Register notice outlining the DOI's position that the Guidelines
required California agencies to execute the QSA, and raising the
question as to the effect of suspension of the Guidelines on entities
outside of California. The notice raised the question of whether
special treatment should be afforded to affected agencies such
329 as the
Southern Nevada Water Authority, and requested comments.
Nevada asserted the drought and the failure of California to
finalize the QSA were elements outside its control, and that the
Secretary should not penalize Nevada for California's failure. It asked
the states to support a position to the Secretary that the Secretary
should penalize only California, and not limit Nevada's access to the
326. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Stella Mendoza, President of Bd. of Dirs., Imperial Irrigation Dist.
(May 31, 2002).
327. Implementation of the California Plan for the Colorado River: Opportunities
and Challenges Before the House Comm. on Res., Subcomm. on Water and Power,
107th Cong., 6, 9 (June 14, 2002) (statement of Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for
Water & Science, U.S. Dep't of the Interior).
328. See Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7782.
329. Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, Notice Regarding Implementation
of Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,733, 41,734 (June 19, 2002).
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surplus waters it would have had if the Guidelines were in effect.
Despite sympathy with the equities of Nevada's position, the states
declined to support Nevada's requested position, because there was no
support for special treatment of Nevada under the Law of the River.
The states took the position the Operating Criteria, to which the
Guidelines are subservient and implement, and the Decree in Arizona
v. California,do not contemplate differential treatment of Lower Basin
States with regard to normal, shortage and surplus declarations, except
as expressly set forth in the Decree or by Congress. For example,
surpluses are to be shared fifty percent to California, forty-six percent
to Arizona, and four percent to Nevada.33 ° In a shortage situation, CAP
deliveries
are
subordinated to 4.4 million acre-feet of deliveries to
C 1.r
•
331
California.
In all other cases, normal, shortage and surplus
declarations are made based on water supply and demand conditions
of the Lower Basin as a whole.
The other states also pointed out to Nevada that there was a
precedent Nevada could use, in the form of the MWD/Arizona
forbearance agreement in place, for the states to agree on and the
Secretary to allocate, unused apportionment or surplus water. For
example, if Arizona did not use its full 2.8 million acre-foot
apportionment, MWD could forbear its entitlement to the use of such
water so as to maximize the amount of water available to Nevada.
However, due to the drought and continuing demands in Arizona,
Arizona could not guarantee that it would not use its full
apportionment in 2003, and refused to enter into a forbearance
agreement.
Moreover, California representatives made repeated
assurances of their "cautious optimism" that the QSA would be
executed by the end of the year. As a result of this discussion, Nevada
and the other states agreed to defer any discussion of the issue of
differential treatment until such time as the QSA was not signed.332
Meanwhile, back in California, new developments continued
apace. By the fall of 2002, House Speaker Emeritus Bob Hertzberg
facilitated negotiations, and the California agencies had imposed a
deadline of October 15 to reach agreement on a term sheet that could
then form the basis for the QSA. Both California and federal
environmental permitting agencies were proceeding under the
premise the interim land fallowing programs proposed by MWD would
eliminate any adverse effect on the Salton Sea or listed species with
respect to implementation of the QSA.
Moreover, there was an apparent crack in the wall of IID's
opposition to land fallowing. IID had announced in August that it was
willing to consider a five-year land-fallowing program, but later agreed
330. SeePartI, supranote 3, at 311-12.
331. Id. at 316 n.122.
332. Memorandum from James S. Lochhead, to City of Grand Junction, Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist., Denver Water Dep't, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
Southeast Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Southwestern Water Conservation Dist. 2-3
(Sept. 24, 2002).
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to a possible ten-year, 500,000 acre-foot per year program-for a price.
The SDCWA responded in late August with an offer of a schedule of
payments for a larger fallowing program. The SDCWA offer illustrated
the lengths that metropolitan Southern California was prepared to go
to satisfy IID's demands. San Diego proposed limiting fallowing to ten
percent of the irrigated lands in the Imperial Valley, and for a period
not to exceed fifteen years. San Diego would pay to farmers a onetime enrollment fee of $700 per acre, plus $550 per acre (escalated at
2.5% per year) for each acre of land fallowed. It would also create an
escrow fund for on-farm/system improvements of $800 per acre of
land enrolled in the program, totaling $354 million over the life of the
fifteen-year program. San Diego would fund a community benefit
fund at $100 per acre per year of enrolled land, totaling $40 million
over the fifteen-year program. San Diego would create a $50 million
environmental fund. Finally, San Diego would pay 1ID $25 per acrefoot for transferred water to cover IID's administrative costs, together
with $175 per acre-foot for water transferred through system
33
improvements, totaling $73 million over the fifteen-year program.
Not swayed, IID's response held firm reiterating its initial 500,000 acre
foot/ten-year proposal, demanding additional up front payments, and
requiring that IID be held harmless from environmental risk.3 4
Thus, as of late August, the parties still seemed far apart. However,
other activities were also ongoing, and pressure from all sides mounted
for resolution of the stalemate over the QSA, and in particular, for IID
to agree to land fallowing. On August 30, 2002, the California
Legislature passed Assembly Concurrent Resolution 251 ("ACR 251"),
which declared that signing the QSA by December 31 was of "utmost
importance to the people of California." If the parties did not sign the
QSA, the Legislature declared it would "consider appropriate
legislative actions" to ensure implementation of the QSA.33 The
legislature transmitted the resolution to the parties by a letter from
legislative leadership underscoring the importance of reaching
3 6 Governor
agreement."
Davis added his voice in support of ACR 251,
in a letter to legislative leadership.3 7
333. Letter from Maureen A. Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water
Auth., to John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote 2-3 (Aug. 23, 2002).
334. Letter from John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, to Maureen
A. Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water Auth. 3 (Aug. 30, 2002); Letter
from John P. Carter, Partner, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, to Maureen A. Stapleton,
Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water Auth. 2 (Sept. 11, 2002).
335. A.C.R. 251, 153rd Leg., Spec. Sess. 2-4 (Cal. 2002), at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_02510300/acr251_bi11_20020918_chaptered.pdf.
336. Letter from John L. Burton, President Pro Tempore of the State Senate, and
Herb J. Wesson, Jr., Speaker of the California State Assembly, to Maureen A.
Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego County Water Auth., Tom Levy, Gen.
Manager/Chief Eng'r, Coachella Valley Water Dist., Ronald R. Gastelum, Chief Exec.
Officer, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., Jesse Silva, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation
Dist. 1-2 (Aug. 31, 2002).
337. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of California, to Herb Wesson, Speaker of
the State Assembly, & John Burton, President Pro Tempore of the California State
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Shortly thereafter, Governor Davis signed Senate Bill 482, which
provided for allocation of $50 million from a statewide referendum,
Proposition 50, the Water Security, Clean Drinking Water, Coastal and
Beach Protection Act of 2002. Proposition 50 provided $3.4 billion in
bond funds for various environmental programs in California. 38 The
funding in Senate Bill 482 depended on voter passage of Proposition
50 at the November election, execution of the QSA by December 31,
and determination by California agencies that the QSA would not
adversely affect the Salton Sea. The money was to be used for
environmental mitigation purposes at the Salton Sea. Also, the
legislation authorized the take of specified species in the Salton Sea, as
a result of the QSA implementation, if the QSA implementation did
not result in a material increase in the salinity of the Salton Sea during
the first fifteen years of the QSA. The act also confirmed that
fallowing was an authorized water conservation measure under
California law.339
Additionally, Governor Davis signed into law Senate Bill 1473, a bill
that made available an additional $150 million in funding allocated
from Proposition 50 funds for projects contributing to achieving the
benchmarks in the Guidelines (including desalination projects). 340
Thus, the San Diego and legislative proposals alone put over $700
million on the table to IID.
With great fanfare, on October 15, the day of their deadline and
following several straight days of negotiation well into the night, the
California agencies announced agreement on a term sheet providing a
framework for a QSA by December 31, 2002. House Speaker Emeritus
Bob Hertzberg, who led the
"341 negotiations, hailed the agreement as a
"lasting peace on the river.
However, as was the history over the last several years of
negotiations of California announcements about reaching agreement,
the term sheet and the draft QSA that was released by the California
agencies about a month later did not resolve all issues. Instead of the
usual conditions precedent, the draft QSA contained a condition
subsequent that the Habitat Conservation Plan be completed before
December 31, 2003, "acceptable in form, substance and coverage to

Senate (Sept. 10, 2002).
338. S.B.
1473,
153rd
Leg.,
Spec.
Sess.
(Cal.
2002),
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_14511500/sb_1473_biL20020917_chapte red.pdf.
339. S.B. 482, 153rd Leg., Spec. Sess., ch. 617, §§ l(b), 1(f), 2(a), 3, 7(b) (Cal.
2002), at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_04510500/sb_482_bill2002091 7chaptered.pdf.
340. Letter from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Exec. Dir., Colo. River Bd.of Cal., to Colo.
River Basin State Representatives (Sept. 13, 2002); S.B. 1473, 153rd Leg., Spec. Sess.,
ch. 617.
341. Press Release, Imperial Irrigation Dist., Agreement Reached on Landmark
Colorado River Water Accords (Oct. 16, 2002) (quoting Bob Hertzberg, House
Speaker Emeritus).
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liD" 41 "in its sole, complete and absolute discretion."343 The QSA also
capped IID's costs of environmental mitigation at $30 million. The
MWD and SWCDA would bear the costs above that amount, but the
draft QSA also contained a condition subsequent that if the costs
became unacceptably high, MWD or SDCWA could back out of the
QSA. 4
As a practical matter, these conditions subsequent illustrated that
the California agencies had in fact not reached agreement on the
important issues necessary for a QSA, and the conditions subsequent
simply would have amounted to an extension of the Guideline
benchmark that required the QSA be finally executed by December
31, 2002. The other Basin States and the DOI found these conditions
unacceptable, and asserted that California could meet the benchmark
only by executing a final and binding QSA. On December 9, 2002, on
the day the IID Board was scheduled to vote to approve the QSA,
Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley wrote to the California agencies
expressing the DOI's opposition to the conditions subsequent. He
wrote:
[R]ecent proposed revisions that add new conditions subsequent to
the QSA will not meet the requirements of the Interim Surplus
Guidelines. In this regard, I have become aware that some have
suggested that the Quantification Settlement Agreement should be
subject to termination unless a Habitat Conservation Plan is approved
by the Department relating to potential impacts on the Salton Sea.
This proposal is unacceptable because it would destroy the long-term
certainty that is required if California is to have access to surplus
water under the Interim Surplus Guidelines.
The Department has no interest in a QSA that does not represent
a long term Quantification of the parties' portion of California's
apportionment of Colorado River water, lest in fifteen years we find
ourselves as Gatsby did - 'So we beat
3 45 on, boats against the current,
borne back ceaselessly into the past.'
On December 9, 2002, amid defiant statements against the DOI
and the other California agencies, the Imperial Irrigation District
Board voted 3-2 to reject the proposed QSA, the terms of which had
been agreed to in October. One of the District's board members
served on the IID negotiating team that agreed to the term sheet in

342. Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement Between Imperial Irrigation Dist.,
Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., and Coahcella Valley Water Dist., art. 6, § 6.2(2) (ii) (c)
(Nov. 27, 2002).
343. Summary Term Sheet-Principal QSA Revisions 4 (Oct. 15, 2002).

344. Id.; Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement Between Imperial Irrigation
Dist., Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., and Coahcella Valley Water Dist. (Nov. 27, 2002).
345. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Tom Levy, Gen. Manager/Chief Eng'r, Coachella Valley Water Dist.,
Ronald R. Gastelum, Chief Exec. Officer, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., Stella Mendoza,
President, Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Maureen A. Stapleton, Gen. Manager, San Diego

County Water Auth. 2 (Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Letter to Cal. water agencies].
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October, yet voted against the full agreement when it came before the
Board in December.

46

In truth, it would appear that IID was never interested in actually
entering into an agreement. A "proposal" made by IID 6n December
13, four days after it voted to reject the draft QSA illustrates the wide
gulf between the positions of IID and the other California agencies. In
the proposal, IID backed away from many of the commitments that it
had previously made, both in the QSA document it had agreed to in
2000 and in the term sheet that its negotiators had endorsed in
October. Among other demands, IID proposed a shorter-term
fallowing program, a shorter overall term, and renegotiated
environmental and socio-economic mitigation measures.34
In the wake of the IID vote, the Governor's or their representatives
of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming wrote letters to
Secretary Norton, urging the Secretary to suspend the Guidelines,
according to their terms on Janua 7 1, 2003, if the agencies did not
sign the QSA by the end of the year.
The Colorado River Water Users Association meeting in Las Vegas
provided a fitting occasion for the Secretary to reflect on the year's
events and set direction for the upcoming year. Clear and forceful in
her comments, Secretary Norton told the California agencies that, in
fact, she would order reductions in California's use of water if the
California agencies did not sign an acceptable QSA by the end of the
year. She further warned the reduction might not come to California
as a whole (which under the Seven Party Agreement would hit MWD
only as the junior-most priority). Secretary Norton implied that
individual California water users could face reductions in water use in
the DOI's enforcement of the Arizona v. CaliforniaDecree.
We are at a turning point in the history of the Colorado River. For
the first time, a Secretary of the Interior faces the need to enforce the
limits confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the historic Arizona v.
Californialitigation. The issue is not whether but when California will
live within its apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet of water.

As Secretary and River Master, I must enforce the Law of the River.
This means I will hold California to the express covenant it made in

346. Tony Perry, Inland Water Sale Rejected; Coastal Cutback Threatened, L.A. TIMES,

Dec. 10, 2002, at Al.
347. Imperial Irrigation District Proposal for Short-Term Fallowing Transfer
Pending Resolution of Outstanding Issues and Conditions for Long-Term Transfer 1,
3 (Dec. 13, 2002).

348. Letters from Jane Dee Hull, Governor, State of Arizona (Dec. 17, 2002), Greg
E. Walcher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dep't of Nat. Res. (Dec. 12, 2002), Philip B. Mutz, Upper

Colo. River Comm'r, New Mexico, &Thomas C. Turney, State Eng'r & Sec'y Interstate
Stream Comm'n, New Mexico (Dec. 16, 2002), D. Larry Anderson, Dir./Interstate
Streams Comm'r (Dec. 13, 2002), Patrick T. Tyrrell, Wyoming State Eng'r (Dec. 13,
2002), to Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior.
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1929 to limit its use of the Colorado River to 4.4 million acre-feet. No
alternative is permitted under the Decree of the United States
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California. Absent enforcement of the
limits established in the Law of the River, the allocation of the right
to consume water among the states would be meaningless.

The Department will be carefully considering all of these issues in the
course of acting on the pending water orders for 2003. In this
context, the Department may take other steps to ensure that all
requirements
of the Decree of the United States Supreme Court are
rn t349
met.
Secretary Norton also affirmed what the Guidelines said, that if the
California agencies executed a QSA after the first of the year, the
Guidelines could be reinstated. However, she did not back down on
the DOI's position that a QSA must effect a permanent quantification
of the agricultural priorities within the first 3.85 million acre-feet of
California's apportionment, with no strings attached.
In the event that the QSA is not signed by the deadline, it is possible
for California to have the Guidelines reinstated. Reinstatement can
occur if the QSA is signed, or if California takes such actions as are
required by the Department. For those who rest hope on the "all
required actions" option in the Guidelines, you should be aware that
the actions that will be required must be real and permanent. It
makes no sense to respond to a failure to meet the first deadline in
the Seven States agreement [the Guidelines] by lessening the
requirements for enhanced
access to surplus water. To the contrary,
350
the bar will be raised.
Finally, recognizing the hardship on Nevada for California's failure
to meet the benchmark, Secretary Norton held out a small ray of hope.
311

[A]s noted in our Federal Register notice last summer, we are
aware of the impact of a suspension of the enhanced surplus on
Nevada. We will continue our discussions with Nevada and the other
basin states to address this issue. We understand the equity issues,
and are wrestling with the legal issues associated with separating
Nevada's future from the consequences of California's actions.3 52
If the QSA was not finalized, the California agencies would lose
more than just the benefits of the Guidelines. In addition to a
suspension of the Guidelines, a number of pieces to the California
Plan would unravel if there was not a QSA by the end of the year. One

349. Gale Norton, Sec'y of the Interior, Address to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, 2002 Annual Conference 1, 3-4 (Dec. 16, 2002).

350. Id. at 3, 4.
351. See supra text accompanying note 328-29.
352. Gale Norton 2002 Conference, supranote 349, at 4.
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of the most significant pressures on the California agencies to enter
into a QSA was the fact that the California legislation that provided an
exemption from the "take" of species under the California fully
protected species law would expire on December 31, 2002, if there was
no QSA.353 The MWD/Arizona forbearance agreement, an important
piece of the California Plan implementation, would also4 expire at the
end of the year if the agencies did not execute the QSA.1

At meetings in Las Vegas between representatives of the Basin
States and the California water agencies, during the Water Users
Association conference, the three California agencies other than IID
(MWD, SDWCA and CVWD) expressed their continued desire to make
proposals to IID that might bring IID back to the table before the end
of the year. Yet at the same time there was a realistic assessment of the
prospects for success. Although the Basin States had both formally
and informally expressed strong support for an immediate suspension
of the Guidelines after the first of the year, they also expressed a
continued desire to work with the California agencies to implement a
"soft landing" for reductions in California's water use.
However, the states also expressed some principles that should be
met by the California agencies in any renegotiation of the QSA. First,
the states expressed there should be no conditions subsequent in the
QSA. The Guidelines require, and the states insisted upon, a firm
quantification. Second, the states expressed that it might be possible
to consider conditions subsequent, if California would agree to allow
the Guidelines to go into suspension, or if MWD would agree to forego
any surplus water deliveries, until the parties met the conditions
subsequent.
The California agencies continued negotiations on the terms of a
QSA. On December 31, 2002, the IID Board voted three-to-two in
favor of a revised QSA. The ILID-approved version of the QSA
continued to contain conditions subsequent that allowed IID to back
out of the deal, and also contained an additional provision for a $150
million loan guarantee and an additional $50 million to be provided to
IID for mitigation water. However CVWD and MWD had already
rejected the version of the QSA that IID approved, rendering the act
meaningless.355
On December 31, Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley held a press
conference, and announced that the DOI would institute two basic
actions. First, it would declare the Guidelines in suspension, limiting
California to 4.4 million acre-feet in 2003 and running the Colorado
River under a 70R strategy. Second, it would limit IID diversions to a
duty of water set forth in the 1979 Decree in Arizona v. California. This
latter action would limit IID to about 2.9 million acre-feet, as opposed
to the 3.1 million acre-feet that would have been allowed under the
Guidelines or the approximately 3.3 million acre-feet that IID
353. See supra text accompanying note 338-39.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 292-93.
355. Rudy Yniguez, Transfer:A Done Deal?, IMPERIAL VALLEY PREs, Jan. 1, 2003.
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historically used. 3

56

Shortly before the end of 2002, the DOI sent letters to seventeen
Colorado River contractors in Nevada, California, and Arizona
informing them how much Colorado River water would be available to
them under their water delivery contracts in 2003. The DOI approved
all water orders as submitted except for those of the State of Nevada,
1ID, and MWD. The amount of water use for 2003 approved for these
entities depended on whether or not the California agencies would be
able to agree on a QSA. This approval process represented a
milestone in Lower Colorado River accounting and administration. It
was the first time the Secretary had exercised administrative authority
with respect to individual water orders pursuant to contracts under the
Boulder Canyon Project Act.
Because the California agencies did not sign a QSA, the DOI
restricted Nevada's consumptive use to its basic apportionment of
300,000 acre-feet, as opposed to the 337,000 acre-feet it requested. It
restricted the cumulative requests for the State of California to its basic
apportionment of 4.4 million acre-feet, as opposed to cumulative
requests of 5.02 million acre-feet. The DOI approved the Arizona
requests, up to the state's full allocation of 2.8 million acre-feet.
The adjustments to California water orders from the MWD, IID
and CVWD water order requests are described in Table II, below.
TABLE II: ADJUSTMENTS TO CALIFORNIA WATER ORDERS

Entity

2002 Water Order
(acre-feet)

Order with
QSA (acrefeet)

Order without
QSA (acre-feet)

Imperial

3,003,200357

2,974,5003"

2,769,600

338,82039

347,0000

347,000

1'250'00'

1,128,600

713,500

Irrigation District
Coachella Valley
Water District
Metropolitan
Water District

356. See generally Tony Perry, Southland Share of Water to be cut as Deal Collapses;
Farmers,MWD Fail to Reach Accord That Would Allow ColoradoRiver Allotments to Continue,

L.A. TIMwES, Jan. 1, 2003; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Interior Department
Transmits 2003 Water Order Approvals to Colorado River Users (Dec. 27, 2002).

357. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 2003 Water OrderApprovals 2

(Dec. 27, 2002), at http://www.lc.usbr.gov/pao/2003orders/2003approvals.pdf.

358. "From this amount, 104,000 acre-feet [is] be delivered to MWD under the 1988

[IID/MWD water transfer] agreement, 11,500 acre-feet will be provided for present
perfected rights and miscellaneous users, and 10,000 acre-feet will be provided to San
Diego County Water Authority under a separate agreement." Id. at 2 n.2.
359. Id. at 2.
360. This amount is based upon a "330,000 [acre-foot] consumptive use cap, plus
20,000 acre-feet from conserved water use under [the 1988 IID MWD water transfer]

agreement, minus 3,000 acre-feet for present perfected rights and miscellaneous
users." Id. at 2 n.3.
361. Id. at 2.
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The DOI's letter to lID carefully set forth the basis for its action in
reducing liD's water order. First, the letter asserted the DOI had no
discretion in ordering the reduction. This statement is important with
respect to the issue of whether the DOI is required to comply with
Section 7 of the ESA in the implementation of its action.36 ' The letter
stated:
The Supreme Court has specifically enjoined the United States, its
officers, attorneys, agents and employees in the 1964 Decree in
Arizona v. California from releasing Colorado River water other than

pursuant to valid contracts. The Department is therefore compelled
by the Supreme Court and the terms of IID's 1932 contract to release
water to IID only in such quantities as might be 'reasonably required
for potable and irrigation purposes within the boundaries of the

District,' to ensure that the junior right holders are not deprived of
water lawfully theirs.
Second, the letter based the DOI's approval on the 1979 Decree in
Arizona v. California." That decree approved ajoint motion by various
litigating parties, including 1ID, which quantified their present
perfected rights3 65 for the use of mainstem water within each of the
Lower Division States. The Decree quantified IID rights at 2.6 million
acre-feet, or the amount necessary to irrigate 424,145 acres, whichever
amount is less. The DOI found that this admission by IID formed the
basis for a duty of water within IID.366 Its letter noted that the actual
duty of water within IID might be less, but that for the purpose of
approving 2003 water orders, it could not be more than this amount.
Third, the letter required the IID delivery in 2003 might be further
reduced to repay the Colorado River for overuse by IID that occurred
in 2002. This repayment requirement was pursuant
367 to an amendment
to the AOP, as amended by letter of the Secretary.
Finally, the DOI's letter signaled a change in the historic
administration of water in the Lower Colorado River. Historically, the
DOI simply delivered whatever water the contractors ordered, and
then made an accounting at the end of the year. Because of system
inefficiencies and contractor tendency to order more than actually
needed, there have often been overruns in water deliveries. In
contrast to this historic practice, the DOI's letter announced:
362. The ESA applies to actions "authorized, funded, or carried out by [a federal]
agency," but only where there is "discretionary federal involvement or control." 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002); see also supra text accompanying
note 301.
363. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of Interior, to Jesse P. Silva, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist. 4-5 (Dec. 27,

2002) [hereinafter Letter to IID].
364. 439 U.S. 419 (1979).
365. Present perfected rights are rights in existence prior to June 25, 1929, the
effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340
(1963); Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. at 429.
366. Letter to IID, supranote 363, at 5.
367. Id. at 7. Letter from Gale Norton, supra note 67.
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Reclamation will be monitoring and projecting consumptive use of
Colorado River water during calendar year 2003 to ensure the annual
entitlement of each water service contractor is not exceeded. These
projections will be made available to IID on a monthly basis. It is
expected that IID will use this information to adjust diversions to
remain within approved annual quantities.
In the dawning of the new-year, Governor Davis of California
called the agencies back to the negotiating table "with the goal of
having the Surplus Guidelines reinstated early this year," and initiating
new rounds of negotiation. 369
However, MWD denied that the
suspension of the Guidelines had precipitated a southern California
water crisis.
MNWD asserted that it had been planning for the
contingency of the suspension of the Guidelines by developing
programs to rely more heavily on groundwater storage, shifting
delivery schedules, accelerating conservation and seawater desalination
with
programs, and entering into a series of dry-year option contracts
water districts and farmers in the Central Valley.
There were other
factors that made MWD less motivated to agree to a QSA. Without the
Guidelines, and with operation of the Colorado River system under a
70R strategy, MWD is not denied all access to surplus water. That
water will simply not be available in every year, and will not be available
on a reliable basis. Additionally, the onset of dry years in 2000-2002
meant that MWD might not receive as much surplus water under the
Guidelines as originally projected.
Finally, the Secretary's
enforcement of reductions in water orders to lID, if upheld, would
mitigate the adverse effect on MWD of termination of the Guidelines
by some 200,000 acre-feet per year.
On January 10, 2003, IID filed suit in federal district court against
the DOI, challenging the DOI's water orders. The complaint outlined
the priority system established under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement,
and asserted liD's right to the delivery of any amount up to 3.85
million acre-feet, less deliveries to priorities 1 and 2 under the
California Seven Party Agreement.37' The complaint then summarized
the history of the QSA negotiations, and accused the DOI of
attempting to "strong-arm" IID into executing a QSA, in order to avoid
DOI-imposed water reductions."
The suit sought to enjoin the DOI's asserted reductions based on a
violation of IID's water rights under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement
Asserting the DOI's action was
and a taking of IID property.
368. Letter to IID, supra note 363, at 5.
369. Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of California, to Dede Alpert & Dennis
Hollingsworth, California State Senators (Jan. 14, 2003).
370. See generally Written Statement ofJeffery Kightlinger, Gen. Counsel, and Debra
Man, Vice Pres. of Water Transfers & Exchanges, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal.
InformationalHearing of the Assembly Water, Parks and Wildlife Committee, 2003 Leg., XX
Sess. (Cal. 2003).
371. Plaintiffs Complaint at 17-18, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03

CV 006 (S.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 2003).
372. Id. at 23-27.
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discretionary; the complaint further sought an injunction based on the
failure of the DOI to undertake compliance with NEPA, ESA, and the
environmental justice provisions of federal law. Although the DOI's
letter did not base its authority under 43 C.F.R. Part 417, s17 the
complaint sought to invalidate the 417 regulations and to enjoin based
on improper application of the 417 regulations. lID also based its
request on a separation of powers argument (asserting the DOI had
asserted judicial functions), violation of state's rights under the Tenth
Amendment, and violation of an alleged oral contract by lID to pay
37,
back overruns.
lID also began a campaign to try to put political pressure on the
DOI to back down from its position and diffuse attempts by the
California legislature to exact retribution on lID for the failure of the
QSA negotiations. 5 lID convinced some members of the California
congressional delegation to send a letter to Secretary Norton blaming
the DOI for the collapse of the QSA negotiations. lID started a
campaign to assert the DOI's action was one of an oppressive federal
government that has impacts on and should be resisted by water users
all over the West. In a letter to Secretary Norton, the lID stated:
Your Department has falsely blamed lID for the failure to execute the
QSA by December 31st, and has wrongfully sought to punish lID by
attempting to cut lID's water supply for the 2003 water year. Simply
stated, the action of your Department is misguided, unjustified,
unsupported by the law or the facts, and is an example of heavyhanded and unwarranted federal interference with intrastate water
allocation matters.

[F]inally, your action also sends a message to all water rights holders
throughout the West: comply with the desires of the Department of
Interior s7and the urban populations, or your water rights will be
the
confiscated.

373. These regulations, known as "beneficial use regulations," provide for the
Regional Director of the Lower Colorado Region of the Bureau of Reclamation to
make a determination each year of a Contractor's estimated water requirements for
the ensuing calendar year, "to the end that deliveries of Colorado River water to each
43
Contractor will not exceed those reasonably required for beneficial use ....
C.F.R. 417.2 (2002).
374. Plaintiff's Complaint at 36-38, 46-50, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
No. 03 CV 006 (S.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 2003).
375. For example, two California legislators introduced a bill to limit IID's water
supply to 2.6 million acre-feet per year. SeeJim Sanders & Dale Kasler, Senators Target
Imperial Water Agency, THE SAcRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 8, 2003; S.B. 117, 154th Leg., Spec.
at
2003),
3,
Feb.
(Introduced
2003)
(Cal.
Sess.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/sen/sb -01010150/sbl 17_bill_20030203_introduced.pdf.
376. Letter from Lloyd Allen, President, Imperial Irrigation Dist., to Gale Norton,
Sec'y of the Interior (Jan. 10, 2003).
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At a hearing on March 18, 2003, the court granted IID's motion
for preliminary injunction, finding that IID had "established a
likelihood of success on the merits" of its claims of a violation of DOI's
43 C.F.R. Part 417 regulations and breach of contract.377 The court
ordered DOI to restore IID's full water allotment of 3.1 million acrefeet. 8 The court asked for briefing on whether Interior should
conduct a complete Part 417 review, or whether the parties (including
Coachella and MWD) should commence a reasonable beneficial use
challenge to IID in an alternative forum. 3 79 Following the briefing, the
court approved a process proposed by DOI to conduct a Part 417
review of IID's water use practices.8
The DOI immediately reversed its December 27, 2003 water order
approvals,' the effect of which was that California was still restricted to
4.4 million acre-feet, but IID's allowed use increased by about 330,000
acre-feet, Coachella's approved use decreased by about 108,000 acre82
feet, and MWD's approved use decreased by about 121,000 acre-feet.
The DOI initiated the Part 417 process, with the intent to complete
the administrative part of the process by the fall of 2003.383
Despite the litigation, and at the urging of the California
Governor's office, the California parties hammered out a new version
of the QSA ("2003 QSA"). At a March 13, 2003 meeting of the Basin
States, the State of California and the California water agencies
presented a new packet of materials they touted as the "new and final"
QSA. Re-using a phrase that has become almost tiresome, Governor
Davis hailed the agreement as a "peace treaty" among the water
agencies.384 The negotiators for the State of California and the
southern California water agencies signed a statement that they would
seek approval of the 2003 QSA from their respective boards when:
the conditions precedent to the [2003] QSA... are all satisfied;...
the Interim Surplus Guidelines are reinstated; the overrun payback
issue is resolved; the legal action of ID v. U.S.... is settled and/or
dismissed; the California legislature... enact[s] the implementing
377. Transcript of Motions for Preliminary Injunction, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, No 03CV0069-TJW, at 126 (S.D. Cal. argued Mar. 18, 2003).

378. Id. at 134.
379. Id. at 134-35.
380. Order Remanding Action, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No
03CV0069 W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2003).
381. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 357.
382. Letter from Bennett W. Raley, Assistant Sec'y for Water & Science, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Jesse P. Silva, Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist., Steve

Robbins, Gen. Manager, Coachella Valley Water Dist., and Ronald R. Gastelum, Chief
Exec. Officer, Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., at 3 (Apr. 28, 2003).
383. Colorado River, Notice of Opportunity for Input Regarding Recommendations
and Determinations Authorized by 43 C.F.R. Part 417, 68 Fed. Reg. 22738 (Apr. 29,

2003).
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legislation; and the [2003] QSA and related agreements are
satisfactory to the Department of the Interior and the other Basin
States. ""
All of these measures must be completed by October 30, 2003.
This is a formidable list, raising serious doubts that these matters can
be satisfied before that time. Moreover, the 2003 QSA differs in
significant respects from the QSA negotiated in 2000, that was the
basis for the agreement between the Basin States and DOI to the
Guidelines ("2000 QSA").386
First, the fundamental structure of the program to reduce
California's water use changed from the time the 1999 California Plan
documents and the 2000 QSA were prepared. These changes were a
result of the need to address environmental mitigation issues, and
were the subject of intense negotiation among the California agencies.
Rather than permanent conservation-based water transfers, the 2003
QSA was now predicated on temporary land fallowing in the early
years of the fifteen-year program, with a sudden increase in
conservation-based transfers late in the fifteen-year period. Land
fallowing is a measure that can be quickly implemented, but also
quickly reversed. Moreover, IID has throughout the opposed land
fallowing as a permanent measure to reduce water demands. As a
result, the permanence of the program to reduce California's reliance
on surplus Colorado River is again brought into question.
Second, the 2003 QSA was subject to four off-ramps, including if
the costs of environmental mitigation exceed $243 million, and if IID
is afforded sufficient environmental regulatory assurance. One of the
objectionable off-ramps to the 2002 QSA was IID's ability to terminate
the QSA if a Habitat Conservation Plan was not completed before
December 31, 2003, "acceptable in form, substance and coverage to
lID," "in its sole, complete and absolute discretion." 7 Assistant
Secretary Raley specifically rejected such an off-ramp in his December
9, 2002, correspondence to IID.388 However, the off-ramp remained in
substance, albeit in different form, in the 2003 QSA.
Third, the 2003 QSA listed over fifteen conditions precedent that
must be satisfied before October 30, 2003. 39 The difficulty of
completing all these matters casts doubt on the viability of the 2003
QSA. For example, the 2003 QSA provided that all permits and other
resource approvals necessary to implement the 1998 IID/SDCWA
Transfer Agreement, the conservation by IID of up to 303,000 AFY,

385. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis, Water Agencies Present
Colorado River Water Transfer Proposal 2 (Mar. 12, 2003).

386. Compare Imperial Irrigation Dist. et al., Draft Quantification Settlement
Agreement (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 QSA], with Imperial Irrigation Dist. et
al., Draft Quantification Settlement Agreement (Dec. 12, 2000) discussed in Part
XVIII.
387. See supra notes 342-43.
388. See Letter to Cal. water agencies, supra note 345, at 2.
389. 2003 QSA, supra note 386, § 6.1.
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and IID's priority 3a cap, including ESA and CESA compliance, be
finalized, that all appeals there from be exhausted, and that the
governing board of each entity approve the measures. Additionally,
the pending litigation in ID v. U.S. must be settled or dismissed. This
may be particularly difficult given the beneficial use claims in the
litigation, the initiation of the Part 417 process by DOI which was
scheduled to be complete by October 2003, and in light of the
beneficial use provisions in the proposed Secretarial Implementation
Agreement, discussed below.
Fourth, part of the "related agreements" associated with the 2003
QSA include a proposed Secretarial Implementation Agreement
("SIA"), by which the Secretary would agree to implement the water
transfers contemplated by the QSA. "0 The SIA is similar to a draft
implementation agreement that was part of the 2000 QSA. However,
that portion of the SIA concerning reasonable and beneficial use is
substantially different. This paragraph, as amended, potentially limits
the authority of the Secretary under the Boulder Canyon Project Act
and section 5 water delivery contracts thereunder, and the Secretary's
ability to meet her obligations under the Decree in Arizona v.
California. In the SIA, the Secretary is asked to foreclose consideration
of the reasonableness of both past and current beneficial use within
IID. The Secretary is asked to acknowledge that the creation and use
of conserved water by IID is within the scope of the IID's Section 5
Contract.39" ' Thus, the Secretary is asked to deliver water to IID under
its contract that is not needed for irrigation use, and allow IID to use
that water for other purposes, including for environmental mitigation.
The Secretary is asked to take the implementation schedule in the
2003 QSA into account in connection with any future assessment of
reasonable and beneficial use of Colorado River water within IID.
Although called "conservation" in the 2003 QSA, land fallowing is
more accurately described as forbearance of use. As discussed above,
the QSA implementation schedule is based on land fallowing in the
early years of the program, with true water conservation measures not
being implemented until the later years of the fifteen-year program.
The Secretary is further requested not to assess IID's reasonable and
beneficial use until year 24. 39 Thus, IID would appear to avoid
scrutiny of its reasonable and beneficial use, which was first initiated by
the State Water Resources Control Board in the 1980s, for another
quarter of a century.
The adoption by the Bureau of Reclamation of an Inadvertent
Overrun and Payback Program acceptable to the California agencies is
390.

Secretarial Implementation Draft Agreement (2003).

391. The concept in the 2003 QSA of IID retaining dominion and control over
conserved water, changing the point of diversion of such water, and retaining the right
to subsequently use such water, is an unusual concept in western water law. Normally,

conserved water is available to the stream system and subject to use by other water
users. Such a concept is certainly true under the 1931 Seven Party Agreement absent
agreement among the California Parties and DOI.
392. 2003 QSA, supra note 387, § 7 (g).
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a condition precedent to the 2003 QSA. The SIA solidifies the
program by requiring that the Secretary shall not materially modify the
program for a period of thirty years. This provision is not only of
questionable legality, but also hamstrings the potential efficient
management of the Colorado River. If effective, it forecloses the
ability of the Basin States and the Bureau of Reclamation to modify the
program based on operating experience, drought, or other issues.
So, the California agencies continue to circle endlessly around the
same set of issues. In the meantime, the window of opportunity
presented by the relatively full reservoir conditions in the Colorado
River Basin, that in part prompted the Basin States to offer additional
surplus water,393 may have closed. As California continues to
negotiate, system reservoir levels continue down in the course of a new
drought cycle. Even if the Guidelines are restored, the availability of
surplus water may be less than originally anticipated when the
Guidelines were adopted in 2000. In the words of Assistant Secretary
Bennett Raley, quoting from The Great Gatsby, "[s]o we beat on, boats
against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.""'
XXI. EPILOGUE
After twelve years of negotiation, tens of thousands of hours of
meetings, millions of dollars-mostly public-in resources spent on
environmental studies, legal and engineering fees, facilitated
processes, lawsuits and lobbying, the success or failure of the California
Plan came down to the vote of five people, the board members of the
Imperial Irrigation District. Those five votes, representing about
100,000 people, determined, for the time being, the destiny of a
portion of the water supply for twenty million people in the Southern
California coastal plain, and the management of a river system serving
seven states. Those five votes, along with everything that led up to the
vote of the IID Board, illustrated so much about the dynamics of the
complex yet fragile nature of our democratic public process, of the
tension between urban and rural cultures in the western United States,
of the paralysis sometimes caused by our environmental laws, and of
the difficulty in dealing with the ultimate public resource - water.
It would be easy to lay the blame for the failure of the California
Plan at the doorstep of the Imperial Irrigation District. Certainly, the
IID Board asked for far more than any agency could ever deliver, not
only in money, but also in regulatory certainty and freedom from legal
and political liability. The certainty demanded by IID simply does not
exist in the water supply business. But the IID Board was not just
protecting a water supply; it was protecting a culture, an economy, and
a lifestyle. And for that, as members of their community and as
elected representatives, they could hardly be blamed. Certainly, every

393. Letter from the Governor's Representatives on Colorado River Operations,
supra note 203.
394. See Letter to Cal. water agencies, supra note 345, at 2.
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agency involved in the processes that began in 1991 made mistakes or
overplayed their hand at one time or another. The IID Board was just
the last.
Perhaps one could place the blame on "the system," and in
particular on the Law of the River. One could argue that it was an
arcane, complex, rigid, and shortsighted set of allocations and
operational regimes that ultimately could not be made to
accommodate the need for additional water in southern California
and southern Nevada. Yet the negotiators for the Basin States and the
DOI demonstrated the Law of the River can, in fact, be modified to
meet changing needs, while still protecting the fundamental public
interests of security of supply and economic stability the Law of the
River was developed to serve. The states and the DOI put in place the
framework necessary to meet California's needs, and are fully capable
of doing so in the future to meet new challenges. It was not the
inflexibility of the Law of the River, but the failure of negotiations
within California, that led to the demise of the California Plan.
Without the foundation of the Law of the River, that framework
negotiated by the states and the DOI could not have been put in place.
As was stated in Part I of this article,95 and as echoed by Secretary
Norton in her 2002 speech to the Colorado River Water Users
Association, if California were not required, either by agreement or
legal fiat, to honor its commitment to live within its apportionment,
then the allocation upon which the entire Law of the River is based
would have no meaning whatsoever.
Perhaps the process illustrates the ultimate reality, as the West
faces the challenge of balancing the needs of a booming population,
the need to maintain agricultural water supplies, the need to quantify
and honor commitments to Tribal interests, the need to address
increasing interest in in-stream recreational values, and the urgent
need to protect a water-dependent environment under siege. The
reality is in the era of limits, which will define the future of water
supply planning and negotiation, in which increased supply for one
segment must be balanced by the loss of supply for another. For better
or worse, the prior appropriation doctrine has established individual
property rights, contract rights, reserved rights, and public
expectations far in excess of the water supply available. And also for
better or worse, even though the Upper Basin has not developed its
full entitlement under the Law of the River, the water of the River is
over-allocated and over-appropriated.
This over-allocation is
exacerbated by the uncertainties associated with unresolved issues such
as reserved rights and whether the Upper Basin must bear the burden
of sharing the Mexican Treaty delivery obligation.
The dawning of the era of limits is precisely the reason that the
Upper Basin, and Colorado in particular, pushed the issue of
California's reliance on water in excess of its apportionment. The
395.
396.

See PartI, supra note 3, at 292.
See supra text accompanying note 349.
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Upper Basin's future, based as it is on hydrologic and legal leftovers,
could not tolerate the additional uncertainty of a California addiction
to surplus water.
From the perspective of the Upper Basin, the process achieved
precisely what Colorado intended when Governor Romer of Colorado
initiated the process with his letter to Governor Wilson in 1991.' 9'
Colorado did not care whether the limits to California's allocation
were realized by the mutual negotiation of the California Plan, or by
the operation of law through the enforcement of entitlements by the
DOI. Colorado sought to have California live within its means, so that
Colorado's interests could be protected. However, Colorado also
never intended that California, Nevada, or any other water user would
be forced to suffer shortages or hardship through the imposition of
limits to water use.
The negotiated solution of the California Plan and the Interim
Surplus Guidelines represented a remarkable achievement in good
faith public interest negotiation-a management regime developed by
public entities interested in sharing and managing a public resource
for the benefit of the greatest number of people. Such a solution is
obviously preferable to litigation, divisiveness, and competition
between states and agencies, and illustrates why water should continue
to be a public resource rather than a private commodity. It will be in
Colorado's and other Basin States' interest to continue those
negotiations, and seek ways to accommodate the interests of California
and Nevada in achieving a more secure water supply consistent with
the interests and allocations established under the Law of the River.
The economics, land use, recreation, environment, law,
technology, and political landscape of the Colorado River Basin will
continue to evolve and change. The fundamental error of the original
negotiators of the Colorado River Compact in overestimating water
supply will be magnified as global climate change alters the hydrology
of the Basin. The public trust held by the agencies responsible for
managing the river system demands that these dynamics be
recognized. Perhaps at some point in the future, and with an
appropriate change in the law, interbasin water marketing will be a
reality. Perhaps at some point in the future the allocations of the
states may have to be renegotiated. However, there is a significant
distance that must be covered before those fundamental cornerstones
are revisited. As demonstrated in these negotiations, there is plenty of
flexibility in the system to accommodate the needs of the Colorado
River over the next several decades, and those issues should be left to
another generation. Despite the inability of the California agencies to
reach agreement on implementation of the California Plan, there are
sufficient resources within California and within the Lower Basin to
take care of the relatively modest needs of MWD and southern Nevada.
The agricultural transfers and interstate water banking arrangements
397. Letter from Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado, to Members of the Colorado
General Assembly, supra note 58.
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already being negotiated or in place provide ample demonstration of
that fact.
In continuing their negotiations, and in light of the reality of the
era of limits, the states and the DOI should continue to be mindful of
the basic principles that underlie the allocation framework established
by the Law of the River, and the principles reflected in the six-state
positions taken in the negotiations of the interim surplus criteria. In
particular, no water user has been or can be guaranteed a firm supply
of water. Water use, efficiency, and transfers must be maximized at a
local level before proceeding to a regional, interstate or interbasin
level, and these levels must be addressed sequentially and on the basis
of good-faith negotiation. For the time being, the fundamentals of the
1922 Colorado River Compact398 and the interests articulated by Delph
Carpenter39 ' on behalf of Colorado, which have formed the basis for
the Colorado negotiating position, remain.

398. Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 to 104 (2000).
399. See generally PartI, supra note 3, at 293-306; Daniel Tyler, DelphusEmoy Carpenter
and the Colorado River Compact of 1922, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 228 (1998).

